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Background: The impact of contrasting societal structures on various 
neuropsychological test performances is well recognized within the clinical 
community. Much of the research to date has focused on showing that a difference 
in performance exists, and less so on understanding specifically which aspects of 
the societies’ structure or “culture” are driving these differences. Many studies 
have explored conscious behavioral responses between individuals that are deemed 
“Western” and “Eastern-mainly Americans and Chinese-on visual perceptual tasks. 
Authors of these studies extrapolated their results to a theory suggesting that 
individuals who originated from Western/individualistic societies tend to implement 
an analytical cognitive style, attending to more focal/local information; and those 
who originate from Eastern/collectivist societies implement a holistic cognitive 
style, attending to the background/global information. With the rapid rise in 
technology starting from the turn of the century, one’s ability to understand various 
physiological mechanisms related to visual perception increased, and with it came a 
rise in studies investigating the translation of the aforementioned theory as a 
kinetic behavioral response-eye movements and neural activity specifically. The 
results of the studies investigating this theory within object/scene perception have 
been mixed, some confirming this theory while others showing little to no evidence 
of it. However, it is also important to note that this theory is limited to mainly 
Americans and Chinese individuals, and is unclear as to whether it can be 
confidently expanded to other cultures that are historically considered as part of 
the “West” and “East”, e.g. British and Indians, two cultural groups that have not 
been used in comparison with each other in cultural visual perceptual studies. This 
theory, along with the advances in technological techniques, has also not been 
explored as an explanation for performance differences seen in various 
neuropsychological visual perceptual tests. One example of observed performance 
differences in neuropsychological tests of perception is in the Visual Object Space 
Perception (VOSP) Battery. More specifically, on the Silhouettes subtest, a subtest 
that requires participants to identify objects from silhouettes of animals and man-
made objects. Indians performed significantly worse than their Spanish, Greek, and 
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American counterparts; however the driving forces behind this difference remain 
unknown. 
Given this information, the purpose of this thesis is to use eye tracking, the most 
commonly used technology in cultural object/scene perception studies, to see if 
differences in eye movement pattern exist between British and Indian individuals, 
whether these differences emulate the West/East theory in perceptual processing, 
and finally, whether these patterns of eye movements can help explain the 
performance differences seen between Indians and the British on the Silhouettes 
subtest.  
   
Method: I first conducted a systematic review to establish in what way eye 
tracking, fMRI, and EEG are able to detect differences in perception between 
distinct cultural groups during scene or object perception. In addition to this, the 
systematic review also investigated how cultural concepts, e.g. East vs West, 
Individualism vs Collectivism, etc., are used to explain any differences seen, and 
the specific cultural groups used as exemplars of the cultural concepts, e.g. 
Chinese vs. American, Japanese vs. American, etc. to represent East vs West, 
Individualism vs Collectivism, etc.  
My first experimental study utilized a scene perception recognition task, the most 
commonly used visual perceptual paradigm, to establish whether differences in eye 
movement are seen between Indians and the British, and whether these differences 
followed the West/East theory. In addition, participants were also given the Singelis 
Self-Construal Scale, a scaled used to measure degree of collectivist or individualist 
values an individual holds. I incorporated this scale in order to see if the conceptual 
link made between West/East and individualism/collectivism in previous studies 
could be demonstrated.  
In the second experimental study, the findings of the first experimental study were 
used as a base to investigate whether comparable differences in eye movement 
patterns were also present when viewing the shadowed single objects from the 
Silhouettes subtest. 
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The question of familiarity to the objects depicted in the Silhouettes subtest as a 
driving cultural factor either oppose to or in addition to the West/East theory of 
perception held strong relevance. Thus, my third experimental study investigated 
whether the self-reported degree of familiarity with the objects represented in the 
Silhouettes subtest influenced their ability to accurately identify them. Participants 
were also asked to physically indicate which parts of the image they felt caught 
their attention when looking at the picture. This was to see if the features that 
Indians and British participants felt they were attending to differed from each 
other, and whether this explained their chances of accurately identifying the 
objects. 
    
Findings: My systematic review suggested that the cultural concepts most 
commonly used to explain perceptual differences were East Asians vs. Westerners, 
and Object/Context Independent vs Context/Context Dependent. The most 
common participant groups compared were Chinese/Chinese Singaporeans/Han 
Chinese and Americans. In terms of differences in perception, all but two studies 
found a cultural difference in at least one measurement. EEG and eye-tracking 
studies showed conflicting results among studies, but fMRI studies consistently 
showed differences between groups in neural activation for the processing of 
objects in scenes. 
British participants significantly out-performed the Indian participants in the 
memory recall portion of the first experimental study. A difference in eye 
movement was also present between Indians and the British only within the focal 
object; eye movement patterns in the background was not significantly different 
between the Indians and the British. When looking at the focal object, the British 
and Indians made a comparable number of shorter fixations and saccades, but made 
significantly fewer longer fixations and saccades than the Indians. The Singelis self-
construal scale showed that Indians were slight more collectivist than the British 
but not significantly so. Singelis, regardless of which country participants were 
from, did not influence any of the eye movement patterns.  
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My second experimental study showed that no significant difference in performance 
alone existed between Indians and the British; however a significant difference in 
performance was seen when analyzed across difficulty levels. Performance/
accuracy was negatively correlated to the difficulty level of the object, and the 
British showed a greater declined in performance than the Indians. This is expected 
since the difficulty level of the objects was determined by the accuracy rates of 
each objects from the original UK normative data that the Silhouettes subtest was 
based on. In terms of eye movement data, the British showed a significantly greater 
saccade amplitude and saccade velocity than the Indians. No differences were seen 
in any other eye movement data. Singelis was not an influential variable in 
predicting accuracy or in any of the eye movement data.   
  
In third experimental study, I combined the performance data of the current study 
with the previous study and the integrated result re-enforced the findings of the 
second study. The British, overall, performed better than the Indians, but the 
difference did not reach significance. Performance/accuracy was, again, negatively 
correlated to the difficulty level of the object, for which, the British showed a 
greater declined in performance than the Indians. When examining the influence of 
familiarity on accuracy, results showed that the performance of the British were 
significantly influenced by how familiar they were with the object, however the 
performance of Indians remained unaffected. Furthermore, of all the incorrect 
answers given, participants claimed the correct answer to be a part of their thought 
process for only a small percentage (13% for the Indians and 3% for the British) of 
them. When asked about features that participants felt their attention was drawn 
towards, features indicated by Indians and the British largely overlapped. 
  
Conclusions: Though there is a difference in perceptual strategy between Indians 
and the British when viewing scenes, as evidenced by their eye movements, the 
strategies don’t follow the expected cognitive styles—analytic vs. holistic— of the 
West/East theory described in previous studies. This may be because the previously 
described cognitive styles have been examined mainly through studies of individuals 
who are American and Chinese, and thus the explanations developed may not fully 
encompass other types of cognitive styles that could possibly exist, or any 
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variations of the analytical/holistic styles. None-the-less, the differences in eye 
movements seen between Indians and the British during scene perception were not 
evident during the viewing of the single, shadowed objects of the Silhouettes 
subtest suggesting that eye movement patterns used during scene perception and 
single object perception may not be directly interchangeable-how individuals go 
about looking at a scene may not be indicative of how individuals go about looking 
at a single object. Furthermore, though the overall difference in performance was 
not significant, a difference in performance was still seen between the Indians and 
the British on the Silhouettes Subtest which was driven by notable differences 
certain items. Self construal and familiarity were also not influential factors on 
overall performance which suggests that any performance difference may not be a 
result of any one factor but maybe be more specific to each item. Overall, I 
recommend that future research investigate the factors influencing the major 
performance differences seen on specific items of the Silhouettes subtest and to be 
cautious that factors may be unique to each case-what may be influential for one 
item may not be the same for a different item. This will allow for a clearer 
understanding of how to move forward in the test development of a Silhouettes 
subtest in the Indian context.  
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1. General Introduction  
Perception can be understood to be the organization, interpretation, and conscious 
experience of sensory information (Schacter, Gilbert, & Wegner, 2011). It is what 
informs us about our surroundings, and our personal relationship with those 
surroundings which, in turn, allows us to make judgements on how we maneuver 
ourselves and interact with our environment. This creates a continuous relational 
cycle between ourselves and our surroundings; in other words, perception is an 
essential part of human ecology. In particular, our visual input accounts for a large 
portion of what informs our conscious and unconscious experience (Van Essen, 2003; 
Jerath, Crawford, & Barnes, 2015), and is what directs our attention towards 
information deemed relevant to the task, goals, or desires at hand. When our 
faculties of visual perception are impaired, so is our ability to understand and 
experience our environment. The degree and type of impairment can be evaluated 
in a clinical setting using a range of neuropsychological assessments which compare 
conscious behavioral responses on the individual in question with those of a 
representative normative sample of a population to determine whether the 
individual’s performance is within normal range or substantially below (i.e. is 
impaired). Though these tests are designed to target the different facets of 
perception, they have typically been made to mimic stimuli from a specific 
environment, and therefore the “expected” normative performance against which 
individuals’ responses are compared is based on the responses from people who are 
from that specific environment. For example, if an individual was shown a picture 
of a blueberry and asked to name it in order to test for their object identification 
and verbal recall abilities, this question would have been based on the presumption 
that the individual is familiar with such an object. This presumption is particularly 
unfair if the individual being tested spent a life time in a place where this fruit 
would not typically exist. If we are to then extend this example to the whole 
assessment, where the individual is asked to identify many objects that are 
unfamiliar, the ultimate performance of the individual on the test will suffer and 
not be representative of the individual’s true abilities. To the clinician, if the 
performance on the test below the “normal range”, the individual would appear to 
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have cognitive impairments, but the clinician may not know how much to attribute 
this apparent impairment to the individual or to the inherent bias of the test. Many 
of the commonly used neuropsychological assessment have been developed in the 
United States or the United Kingdom and are, therefore, designed for English 
speaking populations. Therefore, when presenting these assessments to individuals 
who belong to societal structures that are less similar to that of the assessments’ 
point of origin, responses to them begin to vary, from the normative expectations 
rendering these tests less effectual in detecting cognitive impairment (e.g., 
Bonello, Rapport, & Millis, 1997; Agranovich & Puente, 2007; Salinas, Salinas, & 
Arango-Lasprilla, 2018). 
In response to this, many countries have started to adapt these assessments to 
better suit their populations (Albonico, Malaspina, Daini, 2017; Fernández & 
Fulbright, 2015). This movement in increasing awareness towards creating more 
culturally compatible tests came with greater vigor starting from the end of the 
20th century (Puente & Agranovich, 2003) and with it came the necessity to take a 
broader look at what factors are influencing performance on cognitive tests. In 
doing so, it increases the possibility of appropriately developing/adapting tests to 
be used in a new context.  
India, starting from around the mid 1970’s, has taken an active stride in adapting 
many neuropsychological assessments that were developed in the USA and Europe 
for the Indian population, one example being the creation of the National Institute 
of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS) Neuropsychological Battery (Kumar 
& Sadasivan, 2016). Though this battery steps towards the improvement of 
neuropsychological testing in India, it still does not cover all aspects of cognition 
and as a result, unadapted assessments are still being used to fill in the gaps. One 
such example is the Visual Object Space Perception Battery (VOSP), a visual 
perceptual battery developed in the UK (Warrington & James, 1991) that has been 
shown to have varying results across cultures (Bonello et al., 1997; Herrera-Guzmán 
et al. 2004) including India (Dutt et al., 2016). However, in order to understand how 
to best proceed in adapting the VOSP, it is important to begin isolating the factor(s) 
responsible for this difference in performance.  
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This thesis will mainly focus on visual perception, examining evidence for the 
impact of culture on visual perception as a potential impetus for the discrepancy 
described above. I will first examine whether the object perceptual differences 
observed between two cultural groups—principally Chinese and American—in 
previous studies involving object perception tasks are also present between Indian 
and British people, two cultures that are thought to have considerably different 
societal structures. I will then examine whether any differences in the perceptual 
processing involved in eye movement seen in the first study can be used to explain 
any performance differences between Indians and the British on the Silhouettes 
Subtest, a visual perceptual assessment developed in the UK that has begun to be 
used in India. Lastly, I will examine familiarity as a potential additional or 
alternative factor driving performance difference. All together, my studies will 
allow an understanding of how to better evaluate a path towards the adaptation of 
the Silhouettes Subtest within the Indian context. In order to understand the 
nuances of culture’s influence on visual perception, I will begin with a brief review 
of what is known about the human visual system.   
1.1 Anatomy of the Visual System 
Our eyes have evolved to capture information about the external world via the 
medium of light; this information in light is carried in the form of photons (Palmer, 
1999). After light enters the eye, the photons strike millions of photoreceptors that 
cover the retina and fovea located at the back of the eye (Palmer, 1999). These 
photoreceptors then translate the photonic information to a chemical and electrical 
form that can then be passed on to the next stages of the visual system (Palmer, 
1999, Kolb & Whishaw, 2009). This chemical and electrical form can be called 
neural activity. 
There are two types of these photoreceptors: rods and cons. Rods span much of the 
retina with the exception of the center. They are extremely sensitive to light, and 
they are what allows our vision to adjust to low light situations-scotopic conditions- 
such as a dimly lit room or twilight. At the center of the retina exists a small pit 
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called the fovea that is densely packed with cones. Though the fovea is where 
cones are most abundant, some cones are found scattered along the periphery of 
the retina. Cones are less sensitive to light compared to rods but are essential for 
our perception of color, and for vision in normal light-photopic conditions. The 
fovea is where we are able to see the most amount of detail about the objects and 
events we are viewing (Palmer, 1999). Though the eye is an incredible piece of 
evolution, it is not perfect. Depth resolution is reduced converting a 3D image into 
a 2D image (Webb & Hughes, 1981). In other words, information is lost, which the 
human visual system must then reconstruct using other cues, e.g. shadowing. 
Therefore, human visual perception is partly a construction of the brain, which is a 
central point in understanding how culture/experience shapes vision (Hermann 
Helmholtz, 1867/1910, as described by Hatfield, 2002).  
When photoreceptors translate photons into neural activity, it travels along the 
optic nerves that leave each of the eyes. These optic nerves cross over at a point 
called the optic chiasm and it is from there that two pathways branch out into the 
brain on both sides (Palmer, 1999; Kolb & Whishaw, 2009). The smaller of the two 
pathways leads to the superior colliculus, which is thought to be involved in the 
processing of preliminary spatial information and in directing eye movement. The 
larger of the two paths leads first to the lateral geniculate nucleus in the thalamus 
before continuing on to the occipital lobe (Palmer, 1999; Kolb & Whishaw, 2009).  
The first place where cortical processing of this visual information takes place is in 
the striate cortex, or area V1, which is the outermost layer of the occipital lobe. 
From here, information is conveyed to area V2 where further processing takes place 
(Kolb & Whishaw, 2009). No one specific type of information is analyzed in V1 or V2 
but rather all information is processed and segregated into color, form and motion 
to then be sent to other cortical areas that specialize in more specific information 
processing (Kolb & Whishaw, 2009). For example, area V4 is thought to be crucial 
for color perception, V5 is thought to be specialized in detecting motion, and V3 is 
thought to be involved in perception of object shapes when in motion (Kolb & 
Whishaw, 2009). It is important to note here that these cortical areas are not 
exclusive in what they process. Though they mainly process specific types of 
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information, these regions are highly interconnected and therefore influence each 
other in what and how information is analyzed.  
From the V1 and V2 cortical areas, two main pathways, or streams of information 
flow to regions of the brain that make differing contributions to perception. Early 
on, it was thought that these two pathways were distinctly separate from each 
other: the temporal pathway, or the ventral stream, was thought to be more 
involved in object identification, where as the parietal pathway, or the dorsal 
stream, was thought to carry information regarding spatial location of objects 
(Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982; Mishkin, Ungerleider, & Macko, 1983); Ungerleider 
and Mishkin called them the “what” vs. “where” streams. Melvyn Goodale and 
David Milner then expanded this theory to include the purpose for which the 
information was being processed. They theorized that the dorsal stream is involved 
in processing information about an object—vision for perception—and the ventral 
stream is involved in processing information that can guide movement—vision for 
action (Goodale & Milner, 1992, Goodale et al., 1994).  Thus they expanded the 
“what” vs “where” streams to the ““what” vs “where/how” streams. However, this 
distinction between the functionality of the dorsal and ventral stream is not 
absolute. It is simply a description of the degree to which different regions play a 
part in specific information processing. The two streams have been shown to 
anatomically interact with each other (for review, see Cloutman, 2013) and 
therefore cross-over in information processing would be expected. An overlap in 
information processing is evident when looking into clinical cases of cortical 
blindness (Goodale et al., 1994). These patients typically have lesions in the ventral 
stream leaving them “blind”, however despite their lack of visual experience, they 
are able to identify the location of objects and are able to interact with the objects 
appropriately (referred to as ‘blindsight’). This indicates that along with having an 
intact spatial awareness, they are able to “understand” the shape of the object 
such that they are then able to direct specific movements towards the object in a 
manner that would be considered correct for the most part (Goodale et al., 1994) 
with some limitations when changes to the orientation of an object are made 
(Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 1996). Though these patients with cortical blindness are 
able to direct movement and grasp objects with sufficient proficiency, knowledge 
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of how to use the object does not occur until tactile explorations are made upon 
holding the object itself (Carey, Harvey, & Milner, 1996). For this knowledge to have 
existed prior to physical interactions, object perception is critical. 
1.2 Object Perception 
                                                                                                                   
An early model for object perception and identification followed Biederman’s 
theory which claimed that all objects can be reduced to basic features, and our 
ability to process the interaction of these individual structural elements is what 
allows for object identification (Biederman, 1987). Though this recognition-by-
components theory is rooted in decomposing objects into geometric shapes, more 
recent research has shown that features can be extended beyond concrete 
structural parts to include contours (Loffler, 2008), colors or textures (Bramão et 
al., 2011a), or minimal elements of contrast, such as Gabor patches (Dong & Ren, 
2015). Some theories suggest these specific visual components, or diagnostic 
features, facilitate object identification within a specific context by enabling 
efficient and effective decision making between probable alternatives (Baruch, 
Kimchi, Goldsmith, 2014). However, what is considered to be a “diagnostic feature” 
can vary dramatically depending on the situation in which the viewing is occurring, 
and other cognitive factors such selective attention (Baruch, Kimchi, Goldsmith, 
2014; Schlangen & Barenholtz, 2015; Ballesteros & Mayas, 2015). For example, 
when viewing a zebra amongst brown horses, the stripes of the zebra will 
undoubtedly be the most salient visual information to guide identification; saliency 
being the degree to which a feature stands out or is attention-grabbing. However, 
this would not be the case to the same degree if the zebra were amongst white 
Bengal tigers. Furthermore, when considering object identification across all view 
points, it is argued that for relatively consistent recognition, the most distinct 
diagnostic features must be available to the viewer (Hayward & Tarr, 1998). For 
example, if asked to identify a hammer from an angle that mostly obscured the 
hammerhead, it is likely that the viewer would find it more difficult (and so be 
slower) to identify the object based on a portion of the wooden handle than if the 
angle were reversed and the hammerhead was more clearly seen (see spreading 
activation theory of memory; Anderson, 1983). Once the distinguishing features of 
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an object are identified, it can then be compared across multiple exemplars of the 
same object or category (Karimi-Rouzbahani, Bagheri, & Ebrahimpour, 2017) (e.g. 
double headed hammers, single headed hammers, other tools similar to a hammer, 
etc.), and the similarities/dissimilarities found can then be used to fine tune which 
diagnostic features are essential for accurate identification. Though strides have 
been made, the link between discrete diagnostic features and more holistic or 
complex cognitive representations still remains unclear. It is therefore important to 
understand the relationship between object perception and recognition so as to 
move towards improving the theories and methods that can accommodate all the 
processes involved in object perception. However, this becomes further 
complicated when what is considered diagnostic varies between individuals 
(Karimi_Rouzbahani, Bagheri, & Ebrahimpour, 2017), or when the influence of 
“culture” is considered — what would generally be considered to be a “diagnostic 
feature” becomes even more abstract if different cultures vary in terms of which 
features are essential for perception and identification (Kuwabara & Smith, 2017). 
Furthermore, when many objects are viewed simultaneously with a single space, 
e.g. a scene, how an individual approaches the perception and understanding of the 
relationship between objects or themselves and the objects in space can be heavily 
influenced by that individual’s culture/past experiences.  
1.3 Scene Perception 
Multiple objects can be placed together to form a scene. However, a real-world 
scene contains a spatial layout that organizes a large variety of objects into 
foregrounded objects and background elements in a meaningful manner. Henderson 
& Hollingworth (1999) have defined a scene as:  
“a semantically coherent (and often namable) view of a real world environment 
comprising background elements and multiple discrete objects arranged in a 
spatially licensed manner.” - p. 244 
This definition allows us to understand how scene perception differs from object 
perception in that:  
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“objects are spatially compact entities that one acts upon, scenes are spatially 
distributed entities that one acts within” (Epstein 2005) 
The visual system is finely tuned towards rapidly recognizing scenes as it allows us 
to quickly locate ourselves within a space. An example of this was seen in research 
by Potter and colleagues which showed that when exposed to pictures of scenes at 
a rate of 8/sec, individuals were able to detect the target scene that was mixed in 
with a number of distractor scenes with 75% accuracy (Potter, 1975; Potter, 1976; 
Potter & Levy, 1969). This ability to quickly recognize the scene as a category 
rather than a specific unique place with unique objects is beneficial because, 
though spatial identity can be deduced by individual objects, understanding a scene 
as a whole provides a much more cohesive constellation of place related cues.  
Furthermore, scenes inform us of objects likely to be found in that space, and 
therefore the kinds of actions that can be executed (Bar, 2004). For example, if I 
am able to identify a space as a kitchen, I can therefore deduce that I will most 
likely find food and utensils to cook the food in that space. Understanding scenes as 
a whole as opposed to separate single objects can also allow us to evaluate the 
quality of a space—does this place look sanitary or not—or make judgements on the 
level of safety a space provides. Previous behavioral work has also shown that 
humans are strongly evolved to recognize logically organized real-world scenes that 
are very briefly presented. For example, Biederman (1972) reported that individuals 
were able to more accurately recognize target single objects if the scene briefly 
shown to them was coherent rather than if the image of the scene was jumbled up. 
Antes, Penland, & Metzger (1981) found very similar results when participants were 
shown images of scenes and were asked to identify the object in the image from a 
selection of options. Participants were more accurate in identifying the object if it 
“made sense” that the object would be found in that kind of scene vs. if the scene 
was nonsensical for the object to be in (for review, see Wu, Wick, & Pomplun, 
2014). Another study showed that the co-occurrence of objects that would be 
expected to coexist within a space facilitate scene identification. For example, a 
sink and an oven together, are highly predictive that the scene is a kitchen (Gagne 
& MacEvoy, 2014). These studies indicate that the human visual system can extract 
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meaning from a complex visual scene in a very short amount of time, and can use it 
to advance various types of decision-making. Subsequent work in scene perception 
also provided evidence that scenes can be identified based on more global 
characteristics. For example, Schyns and Oliva (1994) demonstrated that 
participants were able to correctly categorize scenic images that were briefly 
flashed (30 ms), even though the images were filtered to remove all high-spatial-
frequency information— any objects looked more like coarse blobs. Similarly, 
Greene and Oliva (2009) were able to demonstrate a 75% accuracy rate for the 
target image when images of nature were presented between 19-67 ms 
(performance peaking at 100 ms). Furthermore, subjects were able to categorize 
certain global features, e.g. how expansive or navigable the scene is, at even lower 
presentation times, when the images were masked to reduce high level features. 
This ability to quickly and accurately identify complex scenes has also been 
demonstrated in other properties of low-level features beside spectral features 
including contour junctions (Walther & Shen, 2014; Wilder, Dickinson, Jepson, & 
Walther, 2018), and color (Oliva & Schyns, 2000; Goffaux et al., 2005, Castelhano 
and Henderson, 2008). Our ability to rapidly recognize different types of 
environments based on very little information implies that a relatively conservative 
amount of brain power is used for this process. However as we start to gather 
greater detail about said environment, greater cognitive processing is required. To 
streamline the demanding nature of this, we start to selectively attend to certain 
aspects of the surroundings more than others depending on our goals or desires. 
1.4 Selective Attention and Eye Movements 
The environment in which we exist carries much more information than the finite 
computing power of our brains (Palmer, 1999). As a result, we selectively attend to 
certain information more than others depending on what our needs, aspirations, 
desires, etc. are. This doesn’t mean that we are physically receiving less 
information, simply that not all the visual information that we are sensing is 
brought to conscious awareness. The classic example of this is demonstrated in the 
Invisible Gorilla experiment in which individuals are asked to watch a video of a 
group of people running around passing a basketball between them, and to count 
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the number of passes made. However when asked if they noticed the person in the 
gorilla suit walk through the group, only about half of them had said “yes” (Simons 
& Chabris, 1999). This phenomenon is referred to as change-blindness.  
What is available to our brains for visual processing is dependent upon a range of 
factors, including eye movements such as eye fixations and saccadic eye 
movements, the latter referring to rapid, ballistic movements of the eyes that 
occur between fixations and influence the direction/location of the next fixation 
point (Palmer, 1999). Whether it is for detailed recognition, search, or something 
else, eye movements are essential. Different parts of the eye are evolved to pick up 
different levels of information: the fovea, the central ~2° of the visual field, is able 
to gather information in high resolution-it can “see” the greatest level of detail. 
The level of acuity drops in the surrounding parafoveal (~4.5° into the periphery) 
and peripheral regions, though these regions are very sensitive to other types of 
information such as motion (McKee and Nakayama, 1982; see Finlay, 1982 for 
review), and scene-gist categorisation (Loschky et al., 2019). Our eye movements 
are strongly biased towards fixating objects instead of backgrounds (Malcolm and 
Shomstein, 2015; Xu et al., 2014), typically landing the fixation itself within the 
object (Foulsham & Kindstone, 2013; Pajak & Nuthmann, 2013). When there is no 
specific goal, certain properties can predict where people will fixate, e.g. edge 
density, visual clutter, and homogenous segments, while other features like 
luminance and contrast are more minor influencers (Nuthmann & Einhauser, 2015). 
When there is a more specific goal, the visual system can utilize various scene 
properties depending on how diagnostic they are for that particular goal.  
If one were to attempt to view a scene with all its details, the process would take a 
long time as we would have to systematically fixate at different consecutive points 
in order to take in all the details of the scene. So to make this more efficient, the 
visual system directs eye movements by integrating low-resolution peripheral 
information and high-resolution foveal information, with our goals, past 
experiences, and knowledge of the environment (Nuthmann, 2014; Castelhano et 
al., 2009). This might be done by matching low-level features, such as color 
(Nathmann &Malcolm, 2016) or shape (Reeder and Peelen, 2013) that fall within our 
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peripheral view to the target’s properties, along with high-level factors like the 
semantic relationship between scene gist and object (Eckstein et al., 2006; Pereira 
& Castelhano, 2014), co-occurrence of objects (Mack & Eckstein, 2011; Hwang et 
al., 2011; Coco et al., 2014), spatial dependency between objects (Wu et al., 
2014), or spatial layout (Castelhano & Heaven, 2011). These various factors are 
integrated to direct attention to the most likely location of our target (Spotorno et 
al., 2014). To give an example, when searching for our keys, we first identify the 
space where they would most likely be found, given our personal habits, past 
experiences, etc. Once we are in that space, instead of scanning the whole space in 
consecutive segments until the keys are found, our eyes are initially directed to 
specific locations within that environment where we believe the keys would most 
likely exist. In other words, we first selectively attend to specific areas that are 
chosen based on expectation and passed experiences. When attending to these 
areas, information falling within the foveal or parafoveal regions allows for detailed 
visual processing therefore leading to a more confident identification of the keys or 
identification of other objects, like a wallet, that might bring greater confidence as 
to the location of the keys-perhaps you are highly likely to keep your keys and 
wallet together. Information in our periphery can influence our saccadic 
movements, informing us on where to potentially fixate next, e.g. detecting the 
general shape or color of the keys (or wallet) in our periphery would influence the 
direction of the saccade and therefore the location of the next fixation; this, in 
turn, increases the efficiency of saccadic distribution so that our eyes are not 
haphazardly moving about between fixations (Nuthmann, 2014).   
Where we gaze is thus the result of a feedback loop between scene properties-low 
level features and high level semantics-and the viewer’s goal and past experiences. 
However, the diagnostic value of a particular property is also dependent on 
availability. Searching for an object in a space initially relies on semantic 
knowledge: the keys are typically on the key holder by the door. However, if the 
semantic cues are not fulfilled: the keys are not on the key holder, our eyes are 
then guided by episodic memory (Vo and Wolfe, 2013): when did I last have the 
keys? As we interact with an environment more and continue to build memories in 
it, we continue to develop more detailed scene representations (Malcolm et al., 
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2014) and our eye movements continue to become more fine-tuned. These concepts 
can be easily related to when the task at hand is a simple search task, however, 
these concepts can also be applicable to larger concepts of “environment” like 
societal structure and other factors that belong under the umbrella of culture.  
  
1.5 Culture and Visual Perception 
Culture is a term that comes with much controversy. Etymologically the word is 
derived from the Latin term cultura, meaning cultivating, and was primarily used in 
the context of agriculture (Williams, 1976). However, it came to be used 
figuratively to mean caring for or honoring somebody or something (Williams, 1976). 
The origins of the word can also be traced to cultus or colo, coming from the Latin 
stem word colere which means to tend, guard, till, inhabit, cultivate, foster 
(Williams, 1976). The word was used by Cicero, a Roman orator, in the 1st Century 
B.C. as cultura anima, meaning cultivation of the soul however, its usage was not 
very popular outside of the works of Cicero (Williams, 1976). In the 15th century, 
cultura was mainly linked to land and the preparation of the earth for crops 
(Williams, 1976). It wasn’t until around the 16th century that it took on a more 
figurative sense of cultivation through education and a systematic refinement of 
the mind. By 1867, culture started to be related to the collective customs, 
achievements, and intellectual development of a people. Strong commentary on 
this definition was made by Mathew Arnold in his 1869 collection of essays, Culture 
and Anarchy, in which he brings to light the classist nature with which “culture” 
was used to distinguish a certain sub-sect of society from the other “less civilized” 
sect. Though meant as criticism of the society within which he belonged, his work 
was used to bring forward the Victorian cultural agenda, which remained dominant 
until the 1950’s. Since then, many have defined culture in an attempt to break 
away from such an oppressive ideation and towards a more encompassing definition 
of its meanings and connotations.  
Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) suggested that: 
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“Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired 
and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human 
groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture 
consists of traditional (i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially 
their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as 
products of action, on the other as conditioning elements of further action.” – p.
181 
This definition relates culture with a group of people as opposed to a single 
individual. At the same time, it conveys the idea that the acquired behavior can be 
transmitted forward. Raymond Williams, a major figure within the British New Left, 
in Culture and Society (1958) argued that the meaning of culture changes with 
time. For him culture was a: 
“description of a particular way of life which expresses certain meanings and 
values not only in art and learning but also in institutions and ordinary behavior.”  
Culture from this perspective aimed to clarify the meaning and values that are 
implicit as well as explicit in our particular ways of living. Raymond Williams 
intended to popularize the notion that culture is ubiquitous, emphasizing the 
ordinary, everydayness of culture. Moving towards the end of the 20th century, 
definitions of culture continued to emphasize the aspect of a transmittable shared 
nature: 
“Culture consists of the derivatives of experience which are more or less 
organized, learned or created by the individuals of a population including those 
images or encodement and their interpretations (meanings) transmitted from past 
generations, from contemporaries, or formed by individuals themselves” -T. 
Schwartz (1992, p. 324) 
The same idea continued into the 21st century by Spencer and Oatey (2008) who 
suggest that: 
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“Culture is a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, 
beliefs, policies, procedures and behavioral conventions that are shared by a group 
of people, and that influence but do not determine each member's behavior and his 
or her interpretations of the meaning of other people's behavior.” - p. 3 
The influences of culture on cognition have intrigued cognitive scientists for many 
years. Segall et al. (1968) demonstrated this in a study in which geometrical 
illusions, specifically the Müller-Lyer and the Sander parallelogram illusions, were 
presented to over 1000 individuals from 14 non-European countries and the United 
States. Their results showed that susceptibility to these illusions was different 
across cultural groups because of different ways in which these groups of people 
were taught to infer the information provided. Similarly, Deregowski (1972) was 
able to demonstrate that individuals belonging to various African tribes showed 
difficulty in depth perception when shown 2D pictorial drawings of 3D images. 
These differences in perceptual abilities have been attributed to thinking styles 
that are thought to be encouraged by the ideology, politics, language, and other 
characteristics of a social structure within which individuals live. A popular 
characterization of the influence of culture on cognition is the analytical style of 
the individualistic West, and the holistic style of the collectivist East. Varnum et al. 
(2010) explain analytic and holistic thinking as: 
“Analytic cognition is characterized by taxonomic and rule-based categorization 
of objects, a narrow focus in visual attention, dispositional bias in causal 
attribution, and the use of formal logic in reasoning. In contrast, holistic cognition 
is characterized by thematic and family-resemblance-based categorization of 
objects, a focus on contextual information and relationships in visual attention, an 
emphasis on situational causes in attribution, and dialecticism” - p 9  
Richard Nisbett, in his book Geography of Thought, consolidates his many years of 
research in which he claims that the dichotomous holistic-analytic cognitive styles 
of the East and West are a byproduct of the geography from which these styles 
originate. Rooting the “East” to China, he describes that the vast nature of the land 
and the little communication between villages encouraged individuals to turn 
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inwards and form a societal structure that valued harmonious living. Thus came 
Confucianism, a legal system that emphasized the context within which the offense 
was created, and scientific discoveries that revolved around relational interactions, 
e.g. the push and pull relationship between the moon and water. Attributing the 
“West” to Greece, Nisbett argues that the location of Greece by water lent itself to 
the exposure of different cultures through trade. As a result, Greek-and therefore 
Western-thought was propelled outwards towards questioning contradictions, 
encouraging an Aristotelian style of thinking involving categorizations and logic, and 
scientific discoveries that were more extra terrestrial in nature, e.g. Pythagoreans 
and their strive to create geometric models that could imitate celestial motion. In 
relating this to cognition, Nisbett links these styles of thinking to causal attribution, 
where individuals categorized as Easterners are more likely to attribute the cause 
of a situation to something in the environment, as opposed to individuals 
categorized as Westerners who are more likely to attribute the cause to something 
integral to the perpetrator (Choi & Nisbett, 1998; Hong, Chiu, & Kung, 1996; 
Kitayama & Masuda, 1997; Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog, 1996; Miller, 1984; Morris & 
Peng, 1994, for review see Choi, Nisbett, & Norenzayan, 1999). Emulations of this 
dichotomy have been shown in studies involving logical vs. dialectical tasks where 
individuals from East Asia were more susceptible to contradictions and propositions 
than Americans (Norenzayan et al., 2002; Peng and Nisbett, 1999). Similar, on 
categorization tasks, East Asians were more likely to classify objects and events on 
the basis of relationships and family resemblance, whereas Americans were more 
likely to classify objects on the basis of rule-based category membership (Chiu, 
1972; Norenzayan et al., 2002); and in terms of attention, “Easterners” are thought 
to attend more to background or contextual information and “Westerners” are 
thought to attend more to focal information (Masuda & Nisbett, 2001; Masuda and 
Nisbett, 2006; Boduroglu, Shah, & Nisbett, 2009, Ji et al., 2000; Kitayama et al., 
2003). With the developments in eye tracking and brain imaging (e.g. EEG, fMRI) 
technologies, there has been a new found interest in using them to understand 
these behavioral differences at a kinematic and neurological level (Chua, Boland, & 
Nisbett, 2005, Gutchess et al. 2006; Lewis et al., 2008; Masuda et al., 2016; Paige 
et al. 2017). These studies clain that attention to the contextual information by 
“Easterners” manifests in greater eye movements to the background of a scene 
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(Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005), greater neural activation in cortical areas that are 
more involved in scene/background processing-not in areas more involved in 
processing individual objects present in the scene (Goh, Chee, & Tan, 2007; 
Jenkins, Yang, Goh, 2010)-and greater activation in attentional networks when 
presented with a task that would require more analytical thinking (Heden et al., 
2008; Liddell et al., 2015). Similarly, attention to focal information in “Westerners” 
manifests in greater eye movements to the focal object (Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 
2005), greater neural activation in cortical areas involved in object processing, as 
opposed to scene/background processing (Goh, Chee, & Tan, 2007; Jenkins, Yang, 
Goh, 2010), and greater activation in attentional networks when given tasks that 
would require more holistic thinking (Heden et al., 2008; Liddell et al., 2015). The 
use of these technologies to investigate cultural differences in scene/object 
perception has mainly been reported in the 21st century and have shown some 
inconsistencies in their results (Rayner, Li, &Williams, 2007; Evans, Rotello, Li, 
Rayner, 2009; Kitayama & Murata, 2013). This begs the question of where in the 
entire perceptual processing process do we begin to see a divergence in perceptual 
strategy because of the influence of certain cultural factors, and are these 
technologies truly sensitive to this differences. 
Another point of contention is that the association of collectivism/interdependence 
to the “East” and individualism/independence to the “West” have been linked to 
analytical and holistic cognitive style respectively; however, most of these studies 
have used America and China or Japan as the according exemplars of the “West” 
and “East”. Some studies have shown that they are not confined to just North 
America and East Asia. This framework has been shown between Russians and 
Americans, Russians being more interdependent than Americans (Grossmann, 2009; 
Matsumoto, Takeuchi, Andayani, Kouznetsova, & Krupp, 1998). In other words, the 
Russians approached categorization, attribution, visual attention, and reasoning 
about change more holistically that the Americans (Grossmann, 2009). Similarly, 
Varnum et al. (2008) demonstrated that individuals from Eastern Europe had a more 
holistic cognitive approach to categorization and visual attention than those from 
Western Europe. Even within cultures, Kitayama et al., (2006) found that 
individuals living on the smaller island of Hokkaido, Japan were more independent 
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than those from the main islands of Japan. Similar intracultural bi-variation in 
social orientations and their coinciding cognitive styles have been found in northern 
and southern Italians (Knight & Nisbett, 2008) and between farming and fishing 
communities of Turkey (Uskul, Kitayama, & Nisbett, 2008). What has been explored 
much less is whether these differences within cultures, and between cultures that 
are globally thought to be a part of the “East” or “West”, are also seen in other 
historically “Eastern” and “Westerner” countries that are not North America, or 
China or Japan. For example, India, a country that is chronicled as being part of the 
“East” (Chakkarath, 2010) but is culturally distinctly different from China has been 
featured very infrequently in comparative studies of cultural visual perceptual 
studies. Furthermore, though India has been perceived as collectivist (Country 
Comparison - Hofstede Insights, 2018), many studies have shown this to be a 
mischaracterization of India, arguing that India, being a very diverse land within 
itself, is a spread between collectivism and individualism with certain area tending 
more towards collectivism, others more toward individualism, and some places in 
which both individualistic and collectivistic characteristics exist symbiotically (Jha 
& Singh, 2011; Khare, 2010; Sinha, Sinha, Verma, & Sinha, 2004).  
In essence, “culture” carries with it a great complexity and it can not be denied that  
it plays an influential role on visual perception. This could have a very important 
practical implication in the field of Clinical Neuropsychology, particularly for 
neuropsychological assessments of cognitive functions in the context of neurological 
conditions. However, it is just an important to start teasing apart the many layers 
of “culture” to begin understanding which aspects of “culture” are driving 
differences on these assessments. In this way, we can better guide ourselves 
towards the improvement/expansion of a health service. 
  
1.6 Culture and Neuropsychology 
Alexander Romanivich Luria was well noted for developing many neuropsychological 
assessments during his clinical work with victims of World War II, and is thought to 
be one of the founders of Cultural-Historical Psychology (Luria, 1962). Luria had 
taken on a particular interest in cultural factors that influence the development of 
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human cognition. In 1931 and 1932, Luria had conducted studies in Uzbekistan 
investigating cultural factors, particularly education, as a determinant of cognition. 
Luria’s work was replicated by Gilbert (1986) in Kwa Zulu, South Africa with results 
that closely reflected those of Luria. More recently, a study by Sisco et al. (2015) 
demonstrated the importance of quality of early education and literacy on 
cognition, using it to explain race-related disparities of cognitive functioning later 
in life. Performance disparities on neuropsychological assessments are hardly a new 
discovery however the subject gained momentum towards the end of the 20th 
century and into the 21st. Major efforts have been made to address this issue in the 
United States, considering the growing diversity of minority groups (Manly, 2008); 
however, most of the effort has focused on the Hispanic community. This is not 
surprising considering that the Hispanic community currently makes up about 18% of 
the American population, and is the largest ethnic minority group in the U.S.A.    
In India, Neuropsychology as a separate field was not introduced until 1975 when 
Professor C.R. Mukundan took the initiative to develop the NIMHANS 
Neuropsychological battery (Mukundan & Murthy, 1979), which consisted of a 
collection of neuropsychological assessments that had been adapted to better suit 
the population. Since then, the field has continued to grow to include more 
batteries such as the NIMHANS Neuropsychological Battery for the Elderly (Tripathi, 
Kumar, Bharath, Marimuthu, & Varghese, 2013), The NIMHANS Neuropsychological 
Battery for Adults (Rao, Subbakrishna, & Gopukumar, 2004), and The NIMHANS 
Neuropsychological Battery for Children (Kar, Rao, Chandramouli, & Thennarasu, 
2004). These batteries have also been used in Sri Lanka as a tool to create their 
own normative data set (Srinivasan & Jaleel, 2015). It should be noted that these 
batteries provide a brief assessment of all cognitive domains. If further assessment 
is required in any one domain, clinical neuropsychologists in India are then 
compelled to use the already existing, unadapted assessments that have come from 
America or Europe. For example, though the NIMHANS batteries have a visual 
spatial construction component to them, in order for a more detailed examination 
of visual and spacial perception, other batteries, like the VOSP, that have not been 
created or adapted to the Indian context are then used.  
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The VOSP battery was created in 1991 by Warrington and James to evaluate visual 
perception. The battery consists of eight subtests: shape detection, incomplete 
letters, silhouettes, object decision, dot counting, progressive silhouettes, position 
discrimination, number allocation, and cube analysis; all created to assess specific 
aspects of visual perceptual abilities. Recently, a study by Dutt et al. (2016) 
examined healthy Indians’ performance on the VOSP by comparing a sample of 200 
Indians residing in India, and comparing them with the performance of individuals 
from the UK (in relation to the test norms) as well as participant samples from 
Greece, Spain, and the United States. Their results showed that a substantial 
proportion of Indians performed below the original cut-off for impairment on all 
object perception subtests, including the Silhouettes Subtest. The study had 
controlled for education and had also tested for object familiarity, both of which 
proved to not be contributing factors for the difference in performance. Thus, the 
study revealed a cultural incompatibility of the assessments, implying the necessity 
of further exploration of more specific cultural factors, and for the potential need 
to adapt the battery.  
According the Comprehensive Handbook of Psychological Assessments and the 
International Handbook of Cross-Cultural Neuropsychology, when modifying 
measures, we must 
“take into account the purpose of the assessment as well as the various test 
factors, test-taking abilities, and other characteristics of the person being assessed, 
such as situational, personal, linguistic, and cultural differences [emphasis added], 
that might affect psychologists’ judgments or reduce the accuracy of their 
interpretations.” — International Handbook of Cross-Cultural Neuropsychology, p. 55 
To do this, we must be aware of varying equivalences when recording variables. For 
example, the number of years of education to receive a high school diploma may 
vary between different countries. We must be aware of the, “value and significance 
of specific cultural concepts, model of knowledge, and model of communication,” 
of the individual being interviewed (Puente & Agranovich, 2003). Importantly,  
 36
“when selecting assessment methods, researcher should address the variables that 
needs to be measured, and then select the test that measures those variables; 
select measures that have been accurately translated according to cognitive rather 
than linguistic equivalence; when possible, use tests that have appropriate norms 
accompanied with specific instructions and protocols; select tests that reflect the 
language ability and culture of the patient; and if available, use ecologically valid 
tests of function.” —Puente & Agranovich, 2003, p. 328 
Keeping this in mind, when adapting the VOSP, it is important to understand how 
culture—and which aspects of culture specifically—are the driving forces for the 
differences in perceptual abilities at its root. If we can understand this at a 
fundamental level, clarity can be brought upon the path towards creating a battery 
that can fulfill the needs of a population and better the practice of clinical 
neuropsychology compassionately.  
1.7 Rationale for Thesis 
The primary focus of the thesis is to explore whether what is understood about 
culture and object/scene perception in the “East” and “West” is emulated in the 
Indian and British cultures—two countries that are considered to be part of the 
“East” and “West” respectively but have not been compared in perceptual studies 
before. These studies were done for the purpose of stepping towards understanding 
how to approach the development/adaptation of a suitable version of the 
Silhouettes subtest of the VOSP for the Indian population. 
Firstly, Chapter 2 reports a systematic review investigating whether there are 
consistent patterns of differences in eye-movements and brain processing 
(measured using fMRI and EEG technologies) between cultures on visual object and 
scene perception tasks. In addition, the cultural frameworks used in the cross-
cultural comparisons were identified, e.g. Easterners vs. Westerners, Collectivism 
vs. Individualism, etc., within each study, and the cultural groups used to exemplify 
the cultural frameworks. This was undertaken to understand specifically which 
cultures were showing differences in perceptual strategies, given the cultural 
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framework lens through which each study was described. The systematic review 
provided information on which paradigm has been most commonly used to 
demonstrate cultural differences in perception in order to investigate whether the 
same paradigm would also reveal cultural differences between Indians and the 
British.  
Thus, in Chapter 3, the scene perception task first used by Chua, Boland, and 
Nisbett, (2005), was used with Indian and British samples in order to investigate 
whether a behavioral performance difference existed, whether there were 
differences in eye movements, and whether or not these related to the types of 
visual information that was processed. A key question was whether findings from 
this scene perception task would also be relevant in explaining performance 
differences previously reported on the Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP.  
In Chapter 4, a study is presented in which participant samples from the UK and 
India were presented with the Silhouettes subtest of the VOSP while tracking their 
eye movements. This study added to the previously mentioned findings of Dutt et 
al., (2016)’s study, while also investigating whether differences in eye movements 
between the British and the Indians during scene perception related to potential 
eye movements when presented with single objects with significantly reduced 
diagnostic information—the shadowed objects of the Silhouettes subtest—with the 
aim of investigating whether or not performance differences could be explained by 
differences in eye movements.  
One reason why one group of participants may be poorer at identifying objects is 
differences in familiarity with the objects. In Dutt et al., (2016)’s study it was 
found that Indian participants were familiar with the objects included in the VOSP 
Silhouettes task and hence familiarity with the objects was not considered to 
explain performance differences. However, in Chapter 5, a detailed investigation of 
familiarity is reported in which participants were asked to rate their familiarity 
with the Silhouettes objects but also with objects that had incorrectly been given 
as answers in the study reported in Chapter 4. The aim of this study was to 
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investigate whether differences between cultures in relative familiarity of objects 
might explain performance differences.  
Chapter 6 presents an overview and general discussion of the findings from all of 
the studies reported in the thesis. In particular, the implications of the findings 
from the studies for the development of culturally appropriate neuropsychological 
tests of perception in India are outlined.  
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2. Eyes, brains and culture: A systematic review of the use 
of eye-tracking, EEG, and fMRI in measuring cultural 
differences in object and scene perception 
Abstract 
Objective: There is substantial evidence that culture influences perceptual 
processing. However, which particular perceptual stimuli show differences and the 
mechanisms that underlie differences in perception between cultures remain 
uncertain. The aims of this systematic review were: (1) to locate, collate and 
synthesize the results of studies that have examined whether differences between 
cultures in the perception of scenes and objects are detectable using eye tracking 
and brain imaging (EEG/fMRI) technologies and (2) to identify the cultural 
frameworks used to characterize comparator groups.  
 
Participants and Methods:  Web of Science and EBSCOhost were searched using a 
set of key terms. Of 4718 potential articles, 38 met the a priori inclusion criteria. 
Studies were categorized according to the cultural framework examined and type of 
technology used.  
 
Results: Cultural frameworks were most commonly used were East Asians vs. 
Westerners, and Object/Context Independent vs Context/Context Dependent. The 
most common participant groups compared were Chinese/Chinese Singaporeans/
Han Chinese and Americans. All but two studies found a cultural difference in at 
least one measurement; however, EEG and eye-tracking studies showed conflicting 
results among studies. fMRI consistently showed differences between participants 
from different cultures in neural activation for the processing of objects in scenes. 
 
Conclusions: Although some studies found quantifiable cultural differences 
between Americans and Chinese participants, little evidence exists to extrapolate 
these findings beyond these two groups. Most studies reported differences between 
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cultures in eye movements and in measures of brain function; however there was 
very little consistency between studies in the specific measures used. Thus the 
specific mechanisms that may underlie cultural differences in object/scene 
perception remain uncertain and require further investigation. 
Introduction 
The concept of “culture” has been debated for many decades. Initially, culture 
referred to the arts and so, it was mainly reserved for “high society”. Matthew 
Arnold, in Culture and Anarchy (1869/1932), initially set forth to criticize this view 
that separated the elite from the mass, believing that culture was “the study and 
pursuit of perfection.” Though meant as a social commentary of the Victorian 
society to which he belonged, “culture” came to be associated with aesthetics, 
bringing with it connotations of “civilized” and “high intellect”. Those who were 
not a part of this niche were seen as potential sources of anarchy. 
In reaction to Arnolds’ definition of culture, a second usage of “culture” 
exemplified in E.B. Taylor’s Primitive Culture (1870) came about. In it, he explains 
culture to be a set of characteristics held by all individuals residing in a particular 
place. He defined it as,  
“that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, 
and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society”.      
-p 1 
This definition became the foundation for cultural anthropology, expanding culture 
to everyone who could claim membership to a group of people. These 
characteristics of culture were thought to be a by-product of a type of “social 
evolution” progressing from “savagery” to “barbarism” to “civilization”. Though the 
idea of an inherent movement of entire groups of people through a social hierarchy 
was rejected by subsequent anthropologists, many could identify with the idea of 
integrated systems creating a “complex whole”.  
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Though Taylor’s definition of culture was more inclusive, it oversimplified entire 
groups of people. Thus, came the third main usage of culture, brought forward by 
Franz Boas and his students such as Margaret Mead and A.L. Kroeber. Boas 
completely rejected the idea that culture operated along an evolutionary, classist 
system. Rather, he believed in cultural relativism where individuals viewed and 
interacted with the world according to their own set of acquired knowledge and 
norms (Boas, 1920; for collection of works of Franz Boas and other cultural 
anthropologist, refer to Moore, 2009). His approach stepped away from the extreme 
categorization of a group of people based on geography and saw culture to have 
more autonomy to the individual. Though overlap could be seen between 
individuals’ sets of norms, they were not seen to be limited to these common 
cultural boundaries (Baos, 1887; Boas, 1920).  
Boas’ usage of culture was carried forward by psychologists such as Lev Vygotsky, 
Alexander Luria, and B.F. Skinner in an attempt to bridge the gap between biology 
and social psychology. Culture was seen as a result of a feedback loop between 
one’s environment and one’s cognitive development. B.F. Skinner argued that,  
“behavior evolved as a set of functions furthering the interchange between 
organism and environment.” - p 501 
He believed that natural selection, when combined with operant conditioning, 
resulted in behaviors that indirectly affected survival. These behaviors are then 
further reinforced through the development of verbal behavior, lending itself to 
social environments. Over time, these behaviors are thought to then take on a less 
practical role and become something that is pervasive within a society, or culture in 
a larger sense (Skinner, 1981). This link between society and biology continued to 
be reinforced as research continued to investigate deeper into the influence of 
one’s environment on various aspects of cognition.  
One line of investigation within the topic of culture and cognition relates to visual 
perception. Differences in patterns of perception have been demonstrated in 
multiple domains including color perception, face perception, and scene 
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perception. Color perception has been linked to language in a well-known theory 
called the linguistic relativity hypothesis (Whorf, 1940/1956). This theory suggests 
that language guides how thought is shaped, and therefore influences how we 
perceive the world. Applying this theory through the lens of color perception, or 
color categorization, one can say that “seeing” a color is reliant upon how one’s 
language distinguishes the different hues of the light spectrum. This theory has 
been demonstrated by a South West African tribe who speak a language called 
Himba (Roberson et al., 2005) and a hunter-gatherer tribe in Papua New Guinea 
who speak Berinmo (Davidoff et al,1999). Both groups identified colors according to 
their own linguistic categorization as opposed to strictly adhering to the color 
categorizations that occur in English.  
Similar sorts of cultural relativity beyond language have also been demonstrated in 
the categorization of facial expression. In other words, a person from one culture 
may emote an expression that is unrecognizable to a person from a different 
culture because the physical expression of that emotion is not the same. This was 
demonstrated in a study by Jack et al. (2012) in which Western Caucasian and East 
Asian participants were asked to categorize simulated facial expressions as one of 
the six basic human emotions: happy, sad, fear, surprise, disgust, and anger, and the 
intensity to which the expression was being displayed. The results showed that 
though the two groups categorized the emotions differently, they were in 
accordance with the culturally specific facial muscles used to express those 
emotions. It should also be noted that face learning and recognition have also been 
shown to be easier when the face presented is the same as one’s own race. This is 
known as the cross-race effect (Hourihan et al., 2012).  
Scene perception studies, however, have been commonly used to demonstrate two 
main styles of cognition: Analytical vs Holistic. The study often referenced to 
exemplify this dichotomy is a study by Masuda and Nisbett (2001) in which 
participants were asked to view underwater video vignettes depicting various life 
forms. These videos consisted of a foregrounded, or focal, object, e.g. a fish, 
performing some kind of activity in a background scene, e.g. swimming across a 
water tank containing seaweed. This was followed by a recall task in which 
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participants were asked to describe what they had seen in the short videos. 
Japanese participants were more likely to recall information regarding the 
background whereas the American participants recalled more detail about the 
‘focal’ objects. 
Other examples demonstrating cultural differences in attention are studies utilizing 
the change-blindness paradigm, in which parts of a picture are changed but due to 
an inability to attend to the entire picture, the change may go unnoticed or require 
some time before it is detected (Levin and Simons, 1997). Masuda and Nisbett 
(2006) used this change-blindness paradigm to selectively modify either a focal 
object, an aspect of the background, or both. The participants’ task was to report 
any changes they detected. Consistent with Masuda and Nisbett’s (2001) findings, 
East Asians were faster than Americans at detecting visual changes that occurred in 
the background scene, and Americans were more likely to detect changes occurring 
in the focal objects.  
Similar patterns were also demonstrated in judgement studies. For example, in a 
study conducted by Kitayama et al. (2003), Japanese and American participants 
were asked to mentally judge the length of a line presented within a square frame 
of a fixed size. In the subsequent test phase, participants are presented with an 
empty square frame of a different size and were asked to draw a line that was 
either to the same length:frame ratio or the absolute length of the line seen during 
the previous phase. The results showed that Americans had greater accuracy in 
making absolute judgments and were less affected by the change in the contextual 
frame size, however the Japanese showed greater accuracy in making relative 
judgments. This study reinforced the finding of a previous study (Ji et al., 2000) in 
which East Asians were more dependent on the contextual frame when determining 
rod orientations compared to European Americans.  
Though culture has been deeply discussed in the social sciences and psychology for 
over 100 years, it has become a more significant part of the rhetoric of the natural 
sciences starting from the turn of the 21st century, particularly because of 
technological advancements. The first studies that used technology to directly 
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investigate culture and cognition were published in the year 2000 using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) (Hart et al., 2000; Phelps et al.,2000) and since 
then, many studies have been conducted using eye-tracking, 
Electroencephalography (EEG), as well as fMRI to further our understanding of the 
influence of culture and cognition. Despite the rapid increase in these kinds of 
studies, they have also been heavily criticized for taking a more Taylorean 
approach. In other words, these studies tend to investigate universal mechanisms 
between “cultural groups” by categorizing wholes sets of people along dichotomous 
scales likes Easterners vs. Westerners, Asian vs. Caucasian, Blacks vs. Whites, etc. 
Few researchers have highlighted these critical aspects of socio-biological research, 
mainly in studies done with fMRI (Mateo et al., 2012). Technology is also 
increasingly becoming an integral part of research, making it important to assess 
whether these technologies are truly sensitive to the measurements used to 
demonstrate cultural differences. A large body of research using technology to 
investigate cultural influences on perception has accumulated however, up to date, 
only one study has done a meta-analysis on culture and perception in fMRI studies 
(Han et al., 2014). This study took a broad perspective on perception which 
included object/scene perception, face/emotion perception, and self perception. It 
should be noted that neural pathways for these forms of perception, particularly 
between face and object perception, are distinctly different from each other (for 
reviews, refer to Leibo et al., 2011 and Kitayama and Park, 2010). Furthermore, 
cultural influences in perception have not been systematically investigated in 
studies utilizing eye-tracking or EEG. Thereby, this systematic review intended to 
review fMRI, eye-tracking, and EEG studies, specifically focusing on object/scene 
perception, and how these differences relate to the cultural frameworks and 
cultural groups used in these studies.  
Methodology 
This systematic review was conducted with reference to the PRISMA reporting 
protocol (Moher et al., 2009). The systematic literature search was conducted 
between August 6, 2019 - August 10, 2019 using the following databases; search 
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filters are described with the parentheses: 1) Web of Science which includes BIOSIS 
Citation Index, BIOSIS Previews, CABI: CAB Abstracts, Current Contents Connect, 
DATA Citation Index, Derwent Innovations Index, KCI-Korean Journal Database, 
MEDLINE, Russian Science Index, SciELO, Web of Science-Core Collection, Web of 
Knowledge, and Zoological Record (Document Type: Article, Language: English, Time 
Span: all the years), 2) EBSCOhost which includes CINAHL, Medline, PsycARTICLES, 
Psychology and Behavioral Sciences Collection, PsycINFO, Russian Academy of 
Science Bibliographies (Source Type: Academic Journal, Journal, Language: English). 
“Culture” related search terms included culture, cross culture, ethnicity, race, self 
construal, priming, interdependence, independence, analytic, and holistic; 
“perception” related search terms included cognitive style, visual perception, 
visual search, free search, search task, visual scanning, perception, perceptual 
processing, visual attention, selective attention, selective processing, global, local, 
scene perception, object perception, object processing, and categorical 
perception; “technology” related search terms included eye movement, eye 
tracking, fixation, fixation pattern, saccade, scan path, fMRI, EEG, neural, and 
event related potential. These search terms were entered in the aforementioned 
databases using Boolean rules. Some examples of these combinations include: 
Cultur* AND “visual percept*” AND “eye movement”, “Self construal*” AND “visual 
atten*”, and Cultur* AND “event related potential” AND percept*. 
We screened the search results according to specific eligibility criteria established 
by the authors: 
1. Be written in English.  
2. Have participants who are 18 years and above  
3. Have participants with no relevant health conditions  
4. Be quantitative  
5. Include more than one cultural environment  
6. Pertain to scene and/or object perception only 
7. Incorporate the use of technology (e.g. an eye-tracker, fMRI, EEG, etc.) in its 
experimental design.  
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8. Paper must be a published article and not a book, conference extract, 
dissertation, etc.  
Based on the eligibility criteria, we selected and categorized the articles according 
to the experimental design used. This resulted in the following categories: 1) EEG; 
2) Eye Tracking- Scene Viewing; 3) Eye Tracking-Change Blindness; 4) Eye-Tracking-
Saccade; 5) Eye-Tracking- Narrative Construction with Motion Video; 6) Eye 
Tracking- Reading Directions; and 7) fMRI.  
From all articles, we extracted the following data: name of first author, year of 
publication, experimental design, cultural framework, cultural groups used, 
cultural/self-construal survey results, and the presence/absence of a cultural 
difference in the main categories of measures taken within each category listed 
above.  
In addition to these variables, we used an adapted version of the Crowe Critical 
Assessment Tool (CCAT) in order to provide an empirical assessment of study quality. 
Since the CCAT contained questions geared towards assessing the quality of clinical 
studies, the tool was adapted to better suit the non-clinical studies included in this 
review. This was done by removing questions that were not relevant for a non-
clinical context if the question could not be rephrased.  Values for this tool range 
from 0 to 99 with a higher score indicating greater quality. This adapted version of 
the CCAT was also given to a second rater along with seven articles chosen at 
random to ensure inter-rater reliability.  
Cultural Framework Categorization 
Mateo et al. (2012) critically analyzed the concepts of culture used in fMRI cultural 
studies by classifying papers as Differentialism or Universalism based on defined 
parameters drawn from previous work done in understanding culture. This was 
intended to present potential biases in the framework within which these studies 
were operating. Though we did not use the same classification system, we 
categorized papers based on the cultural frameworks described in the paper. We 
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then compared this to the cultural sample groups taken in order to bring to light 
links being made between cultural concepts and actual cultural groups used to 
exemplify these concepts.   
Results 
Literature Selection Flow Chart 
Figure 2.1. PRISMA Selection Flow Chart 
A total of 4718 potential articles were identified from the electronic search of the 
databases after removing duplicates. We excluded 4411 references based on their 
title. After applying the eligibility criteria to the abstracts of the remaining 
references, we excluded an additional 183 articles. After reviewing the full-text of 
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Records identified through database searching 
(n = 14008) 
Additional records identified through other sources 
(n = 1) 
Records after duplicates removed 
(n = 4718) 
Records screened 
(n = 4718) 
Records excluded  
(n = 4594) 
4411 Title Exclusions 
183 Abstract Exclusions 
Full-text articles assessed for eligibility 
(n = 124) 
Full-text articles excluded, with reasons 
(n = 86) 
Number of papers that do not fulfill each criterion: 
Criterion (1): 5 
Criterion (2): 3 
Criterion (3): 23 
Criterion (4): 11 
Criterion (5): 5 
Criterion (6): 0 
Criterion (7): 36 
Criterion (8): 5 
NOTE: Some papers overlap between criteria because  
they didn’t fulfill more than one. One paper was also  
not available even though it appeared in the  
search results 
Studies included in Review 
(n =38) 
Eye Tracking- Scene Viewing: 11* 
Eye Tracking- Change Blindness: 2* 
Eye Tracking- Saccade: 4 
Eye Tracking- Narrative Construction with Motion Video: 3 
Eye Tracking- Reading Direction: 4 
fMRI: 10 
EEG: 6 
*One paper overlaps between the Scene Viewing and Change Blindness Category
the 124 remaining papers, we identified 38 articles for inclusion in the current 
review.  Figure 2.1 details the articles screened and excluded/included (for full 
details of selection process, see Appendix). Table 2.1 shows the first author, year of 
publication, experimental design, and the quality assessment score given according 
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Article Experimental Design
Rater 1 Rater 2
EYE-TRACKING
Chua et al. 2005 Scene Viewing - Memory Task 73 71
Rayner et al. 2007 Scene Viewing - Memory Task 61
Evans et al. 2009 Scene Viewing - Memory Task 68
Goh et al. 2009 Scene Viewing - Free 
Viewing_Visual Novelty 80
Rayner et al. 2009 Scene Viewing - Passive_Unusual 
Scenes 66
Miellet et al. 2010 Scene Viewing - Extrafoveal 
Information Use 82
Ueda and Komiya 2012 Scene Viewing - Likeness Rating 88 87
Zhang et al. 2015 Scene Viewing - Food Saliency/Free 
Viewing 87
Duan et al. 2016 Scene Viewing - Memory Task 71
Wang et al. 2016 Scene Viewing - Free Viewing 87
Masuda et al. 2016 Change Blindness - Visual Flicker 
Task 94
Alotaibi et al. 2017 Change Blindness - Visual Flicker 
Task 91
Abed et al. 1991 Reading - Symmetrical Pattern 74
Afsari et al. 2016 Reading - Priming and Complex 
Picture Viewing 77
Hernandez et al. 2017 Reading - Picture viewing 86
Afsari et al. 2017 Reading - Picture viewing 83
Quality Assessment Score
Table 2.1. Summary of articles including first author, year of publication, experimental 
design and quality assessment scores.
Papafragou et al. 2008 Motion - Narrative Construction 80 81
Senzenki et al. 2014 Motion - Narrative Construction 77
Goller et al. 2017 Motion - Similarity Rating 91
Amatya et al. 2011 Saccade - Gap/Overlap Paradigm 76
Knox et al. 2014 Saccade - Gap/Overlap Paradigm 86
Knox et al. 2017 Saccade - Gap/Overlap Paradigm 80
Petrova et al. 2013 Gaze Trajectory 86
EEG
Lewis et al. 2008 Odd-Ball Paradigm (numbers/letters) 87
Lin et al. 2008 Navon Letters 76
Goto et al. 2008 Congruent/Incongruent Scenes 92 94
Kityama et al. 2013 Odd-Ball Paradigm (scenes) 78
Wang et al. 2014 Odd-Ball Paradigm (shapes/objects) 78
Mecklinger et al. 2014 Architecture/Objects 93
fMRI
Gron et al. 2003 Learning Memory 77
Gutchess et all. 2006 Memory Recall 89 90
Goh et al. 2007 Scene Viewing - Passive 85
Hedden et al. 2008 Absolute/Relative Judgements 82
Aron et al.2018 Absolute/Relative Judgements 85
Jenkins et al. 2010 Congruent/Incongruent Scenes 79 77
Goh et al. 2010 House Scene Viewing 83
Goh et al. 2013. Visospatial Judgement 85
Liddell et al. 2015 Navon Shapes 89 91
Paige et al. 2017 Object Similarity Judgement 80
Total Average 81.6 84.4
to the adapted CCAT for all papers used in this review and the scores of the six 
papers rated by the second rater. 
Cultural Framework 
The cultural framework categories described include: Easterners vs. Westerners; 
East Asians vs. Westerners; East Asians vs. North Americans; Chinese vs. Westerners; 
Independence vs Interdependence; Individualist vs Collectivist; Holistic vs. Analytic; 
Context Independence vs. Context Dependence; Relative vs. Absolute, Physical 
Environment; Theory of Basic Human Value; Biological; and Language System, e.g. 
Right-to-Left readers vs. Left-to-Right readers (see Appendix for examples of how 
these frameworks have been portrayed or described). In certain cases, the authors 
described cultural differences found between specific cultures used in past 
research without specifying any one particular cultural framework. These papers 
were categorized as Chinese, Japanese, Korean vs. Northern Americans, Western 
Europeans to indicate that these papers used some combination of these cultures as 
the precedent for their article. 
In terms of the cultural frameworks examined, many papers had described multiple 
frameworks and had interlinked many of the frameworks to each other (see 
Appendix for quotes that exemplify the interlinking of different frameworks). The 
number of papers that referred to a cultural framework individually was calculated 
(before establishing how many papers interlinked various frameworks); of the 38 
papers, 17 papers referred to East Asians vs. Westerners, 11 papers referred to 
Easterners vs. Westerners, seven papers referred to East Asians vs. North 
Americans, one paper referred to Chinese vs. Westerners, 22 papers referred to 
Object, Context Independent vs. Context, Context Dependent, 16 papers referred 
to Holistic vs. Analytic, 13 papers referred to Independent vs. Interdependent, nine 
papers referred to Individualist vs. Collectivist, two papers referred to Relative vs 
Absolute, nine papers referred to Language System, three papers referred to 
Physical Environment framework, two papers referred to the Biological framework, 
and one paper referred to the Theory of Basic Human Values framework. Table 2.2 
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illustrates the cultural frameworks described in each paper (see Appendix for 
























































































































































































































Abed 1991 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Chua et al. 2005 -   - - - -   - - - -
Rayner et al. 2007 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Papafragou et al. 2008 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Evans et al. 2009 - - - -     - - - - -
Goh et al. 2009   - - -   - - - - - -
Rayner et al. 2009 - - - -  - - - - - - - - -
Miellet et al. 2010   - - -     - - - - -
Amatya et al. 2011 - - - - - - - - - - - -  -
Ueda et al. 2012 -  - -  - -   -  - - -
Petrova et al. 2013 -  - - - - -   - - - - -
Senzeki et al. 2014 - -  - - - -  - - - - 
Knox et al. 2014 - - - - - - - - - - -   -
Table 2.2. Summary of cultural frameworks described in each article used in the 
systematic review.
Cultural Framework
Zhang et al. 2015   - -    - - - - -
Masuda et al. 2016 -  - -  - - -  - - - - -
Duan et al. 2016  - - - - -  -  - - - - -
Afsari et al. 2016 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Wang et al. 2016 -  -  - - -   -  - - -
Hernandez et al. 2017 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Knox et al. 2017 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Alotaibi et al. 2017  - - - -    - - - - -
Afsari et al. 2018 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
EEG - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Lewis et al. 2008 - -  - -   -  - - - - -
Lin et al. 2008  - - -  - -  - - - - -
Goto et al. 2010 -   - -  -   - - - - -
Kitayama et al. 2013  -  - -  -  - - - - - -
Wang et al. 2014  - - - - - - -  - - - - -
Mecklinger et al. 2014 - - - - - - - - - -  - - -
fMRI - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gron et al. 2003 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Gutchess et al. 2006   - - -  - -  - - - - -
Goh et al. 2007 -  - - - -  -  - - - - -
Hedden et al. 2008 -   -   - -   - - - -
Aron et al. 2010 -  - -   - -   - - - -
Goh et al. 2010   - - -     - - - - -
Jenkins et al. 2010 -  - - - -   - - - - -
Goh et al. 2013 -  - - - -    - - - - -
Lidell et al. 2015 -  - - -    - - - - -
Paige et al. 2017  -  - - - -   - - - - -
"-": Indication that that measurement was not taken in the study.
"": The presence of that cultural framework. 
Twenty-five of the 38 papers linked the Easterners vs. Westerners, East Asians vs. 
Westerners, East Asians vs. North Americans, Chinese vs. Westerners, and/or 
Chinese, Japanese, Korean vs. North American, European Canadian, Western Europe 
frameworks to all or some combination of the Individualist vs. Collectivist, Holistic 
vs. Analytic, Object, Context Independent vs. Context, Context Dependent, and 
Relative vs. Absolute frameworks. Of these 25 papers, seven papers utilized Chinese 
participants, four papers utilized Chinese Singaporean participants, four papers 
utilized East Asian participants in which the exact ethnic make-up of the 
participants was not specified, three papers utilized East Asian Americans, two 
papers utilized Japanese participants, one paper utilized Chinese speakers, one 
paper used Japanese scenes, one paper measured for Collectivism, one paper 
primed participants for Interdependence, and one paper used a Left-to-Right 
reading culture to represent the Easterner/East Asian/Interdependent/
Collectivism/ Relative/Holistic/Context Dependent archetype. It should be noted 
that though Lewis et al. (2008) had an ‘East Asian’ American sample group, 16 of 
the 20 participants in this sample were Chinese American.  
Fourteen papers utilized American participants, two papers utilized Canadian 
participants, one paper utilized ‘Western Caucasian’ participants, one paper 
utilized English speakers, one paper utilized African participants, one paper utilized 
Australian participants, one paper utilized German participants, one paper used 
American scenes, one paper measured for Individualism, one paper primed their 
participants for Independence, and one paper utilized Right-to-Left readers to 
represent the Westerners/Independent/Individualism/Absolute/Analytic/Context 





































































































































































































































































Abed 1991    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Chua et al. 2005 - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rayner et al. 2007 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -   - -
Papafragou et al. 2008 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -   - - - -
Evans et al. 2009 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  -  - - -
Goh et al. 2009 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rayner et al. 2009 - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Miellet et al. 2010 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - -
Amatya et al. 2011 - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -
Ueda et al. 2012 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
Petrova et al. 2013 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -
Senzeki et al. 2014 - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -
Knox et al. 2014 - - - - - - - - - - -  - -  -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Zhang et al. 2015 - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Masuda et al. 2016 - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -
Duan et al. 2016 - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Cultural Groups
Table 2.3. Summary of cultural groups described in each article used in the systematic review.
Afsari et al. 2016    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Wang et al. 2016 - - - - - - - - -  - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Hernandez et al. 2017    - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Knox et al. 2017   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Alotaibi et al. 2017   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Afsari et al. 2018 - - - - - - - - - - -  - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - -
EEG - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Lewis et al. 2008 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Lin et al. 2008 - - -   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Goto et al. 2010 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kitayama et al. 2013 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Wang et al. 2014 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -
Mecklinger et al. 2014 - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -
fMRI - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gron et al. 2003 - - - - - - - - - - - - -   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Gutchess et al. 2006 - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Goh et al. 2007 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Hedden et al. 2008 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - -
Aron et al. 2010 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - -
Goh et al. 2010 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Jenkins et al. 2010 - - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Goh et al. 2013 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Lidell et al. 2015 - - - - -   - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Paige et al. 2017 - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - -  - - - - - - - - - - - -
"-": Indication that that measurement was not taken in 
the study
"": The presence of that culture. Blank space indicates the absence of that culture.     
Quality Assessment 
The average score of the seven papers that were rated by two investigators were 
86.2 and 84.4, with individual ratings correlating at rho=0.991. This suggests that 
the adapted CCAT is reliable. The average score of all the studies is 81.5 showing 
that the quality of the studies overall is fairly high (See Table 2.1). When looking at 
the average score of the studies within the aforementioned categories, we see that 
the score for Scene Viewing falls below the average (76.3) and that Change 
Blindness is above (92.5).  
Eye-Tracking 
Starting from the early 2000s, eye-tracking has been used to measure eye 
movements to understand the link between culture and cognition. However, there is 
some dispute as to whether or not a cultural difference is evident.  
A total of 22 papers were found to investigate cultural differences in scene/object 
perception using eye-tracking. These papers were categorized based on the general 
paradigm used: Scene Viewing; Change Blindness; Saccades; Narrative Construction 
with Motion Videos; and Reading Direction. The following is a breakdown of these 
various categories. 
Scene Viewing 
A total of 10 papers investigated culture specific eye movements during scene 
viewing. In addition, Masuda et al. (2016)’s paper was added to this analysis since 
no change trials were included in their change blindness study (see Change 
Blindness section). Four of these papers presented participants with images that 
consisted of an object(s) against a scenic background. Participants rated these 
images on a 1-7 likeness scale without knowing about a subsequent memory task. 
Both Chua et al. (2005) and Duan et al. (2016) were able to consistently find 
cultural differences in the number of fixations and fixation duration. However, 
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Rayner et al., (2007) and Evans et al., (2009) were not able to replicate the 
findings. Results are shown in Table 2.4.  
 
Of the remaining seven studies, six found a cultural difference in at least one of the 
measures taken however, where these cultural differences were found varied across 
the studies. The paradigms used in these six studies ranged from different 
variations of the aforementioned scene viewing paradigm (Rayner et al., 2009, 
Masuda et al., 2016), visual novelty (Goh et al., 2009), manipulation of focal object 
saliency (Zhang et al., 2015), utilizing blindspots (Miellet et al., 2010), testing for 
cultural affinity towards pictures of natural or cityscape scenes (Wang et al., 2016), 
and investigating the effects of priming by using pictures of culturally specific 
environments (Ueda and Komiya, 2012).  
Rayner et al., (2009) investigated the effects of unusual or weird images in eye 
pattern movement, the thought being that Chinese participants would more quickly 




























































































Chua et al. 2005 - All  x  - - -   -  
Rayner et al. 2007 - All 
images
 - -  - - - - - - -
Rayner et al. 2007 - 
Subsection of Images
- - - - x x - - - - x
Rayner et al. 2007 - 
Subsection of Images w/ 
only 1 foregrounded object
x  x  x - - - - -
Evans et al. 2009 - 
Encoding: All images
x x x x x x x x x -
Evans et al. 2009 - 
Encoding: - Subsection of 
Images 
x x x x x x x x  -
Evans et al. 2009 Test: All 
images
x x x x x x x x x -
Duan et al. 2009 x   x   - -  - 
Table 2.4. Eye movement measurements taken in studies that used the scene memory task paradigm.
"x" :  The absence of  a cultural difference 





"": The presence of a cultural difference.    
and the reverse would be true for the American participants. However, this was the 
only study of the remaining seven studies that found no cultural difference at all. 
Change Blindness 
Change Blindness is when an aspect of a visual stimulus is changed but goes 
unnoticed by the observer. This paradigm has been used to demonstrate the 
difference between “looking” and “attending” to something.  
Masuda et al., (2016) and Alotaibi et al., (2017) both used this paradigm to 
investigate cultural differences in scene perception. It was thought that if certain 
cultures propelled attention towards the background more than others, then it 
would show that one would be better at detecting changes to the background than 
in the focal object and vice versa. The logic follows the Western-Eastern or 
Individualistic-Collectivistic framework whereby people from Western/
Individualistic cultures would be more efficient at detecting focal object changes, 
and people from Eastern/Collectivistic cultures would be more efficient at 
detecting changes to the background. In the included studies the comparison was 
between European Canadian/British participants and Japanese/Saudi Arabian 
participants respectively. 
In both studies, participants were asked to detect changes that occurred in either 
the background or the focal object of a scene. Both studies found that regardless of 
culture, individuals tend to allocate more attention to the focal object than to the 
background.  All participants detected focal changes faster than changes occurring 
in the background. However, the Japanese participants in Masuda et al., (2016)’s 
study were able to generally detect changes faster than the European Canadian 
participants. Contradictory to this, the Saudi Arabian participants in Alotaibi et al., 
2017’s study took a longer time to detect changes compared to the British 
participants, however, this may be because the stimuli in this study were not 
presented as a flicker task but as pairs of images presented side by side, thus 
allowing the Saudi participants to scan the images for longer.   
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Both studies found no differences in the number of fixations made in the areas of 
interest (focal vs. background). In addition, Masuda et al. (2016) found no 
differences to the total number of fixations made, however Alotaibi et al. (2017) 
did find that the Saudi Arabian participants generally made more fixations. This 
along with Saudi Arabians taking more time to detect change, suggests that the task 
was more demanding/difficult for them. 
Masuda et al., 2016 also found that European Canadians spent more time looking at 
the focal object than the background compared to the Japanese who distributed 
their attention more between the focal object and the background. This behavior in 
the European Canadians was exaggerated when the change occurred in the 
background, indicating a more focused attention to individual objects compared to 
the Japanese. No such differences were found in Alotaibi et al. (2017)’s study 
however, Saudi Arabians were found to take a significantly longer time between 
their first fixation on the change to their last fixation on the change when their 
final answer was recorded.  
To further investigate differences in search strategy, Alotaibi et al., 2017 conducted 
a ScanMatch analysis whereby a score is given indicating similarity of scan paths 
between participants. Results showed that the scan paths were more consistent 
amongst British participants whereas there was greater variation in scan paths 
amongst the Saudi Arabian participants. Results of eye movement are shown in 
Table 2.5. 
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Article Fixation Count Fixation Duration ScanMatch Analysis
Masuda et al.2016 x  -
Alotaibi et al. 2016   
"-": Indication that that measurement was not taken in the study
Table 2.5. Eye movement measurements taken for change blindness 
studies.
"": The presence of a cultural difference.    
"x" :  The absence of  a cultural difference 
Saccades 
Saccadic eye movements are rapid, jerky movements of the eyeballs that occur 
when changing the point of fixation to a different location. Usually these 
movements occur 200 ms after the onset of a target stimuli (this is referred to as 
saccade latency), however reflexive eye movements can occur from time to time 
within 80-120 ms called express saccades (ES). ES have been shown to occur with 
greater frequency in monkeys than in humans though they can be elicited in 
humans if the experimental design incorporates a blank period (or a gap) between 
the fixation point and the appearance of the target as opposed to an absence of a 
blank period (or overlap).  
Amatya et al. (2011) and Knox et al. (2017) both investigated the presence of 
express saccades (ES) in Chinese and British samples using the gap/overlap 
paradigm. Knox et al. (2017) took this a step further by including a sample of British 
Chinese individuals who were raised in the UK by Chinese parents. Both studies 
found a higher proportion of ES in the Chinese samples in the overlap condition. 
Though this showed that different groups of people can exhibit varying degrees of 
this sort of reflexive eye movement, it is still unclear as to the role culture plays in 
this difference in eye movement behavior. To take steps towards answering this 
question, Knox then conducted the same study with a group of Egyptians and 
compared the data to the Chinese and British data collected in the previous study. 
The study showed that Egyptians had a higher proportion of ES than the British but 
only slightly, and though the proportion was closer to that of the British, it did not 
reach significance when compared to the Chinese participants. 
Petrova et al. investigated whether cultural differences existed in the nature of the 
curve saccadic eye movements take if the distractor and target are placed at 
different proximities to each other. Participants were asked to fixate on a 
centralized cross, but to shift their point of fixation whenever a target grey 
rhombus appeared either above or below the fixation cross. If a distractor grey 
ellipse appeared simultaneously in one of the four quadrants of the screen, the 
participants were asked to ignore it and to only look at the rhombus. The results 
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showed that when the target and distractor were in opposite sides, the curvature of 
the saccade was greatest across all participants. However, the difference in 
curvature resulting from the different combinations of target and distractor 
locations within the Chinese sample was significantly greater than that seen in the 
German sample. This complies with the theory that Chinese people have a wider 
field of vision and can therefore, be more affected by distractors. 
Narrative Construction with Motion Videos 
Three studies investigated the influence of language on attention allocation while 
viewing short videos depicting various actions. In the studies done by Papafragou et 
al. (2008) and Senzeki et al. (2014), participants were randomly split between a 
Linguistic condition and a Non-Linguistic condition. Those in the Linguistic condition 
were informed prior to viewing the videos that they would have to describe what 
they had seen, while those in the Non-linguistic Condition were not made aware of 
this. In both studies, cultural differences only emerged in the Linguistic condition 
such that eye movements reflected the narrative structure of the language the 
participant spoke. It should be noted that cultural differences also emerged in the 
Non-Linguistic condition of Papafragou et al.’s (2008) study but only at the end of 
each video when the last frame was kept frozen for an additional two seconds. 
Participants in both conditions were given a memory test based on this last frame, 
however, only those in the Non-Linguistic condition were made aware of the 
memory test.  
Goller et al. (2017) presented participants with pairs of videos depicting actions 
from four different categories: loose in, tight in, loose on, and tight on. 
Participants were asked to rate how similar the pair was. In congruence with the 
previous studies, participants’ eye movements and ratings matched the way in 
which such actions were categorized in their native language.  Results of eye 
movements are shown in Table 2.6 (See Appendix for full data). 
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Reading Direction 
Four studies investigated the influence of habitual reading direction on spatial bias 
of attention when viewing images. Abed et al. (1991) had presented symmetrical, 
geometric images to participants whose native reading habit was either right-to-left 
(RTL), left-to-right (LTR), or vertical. Similarly, Hernandez et al. (2017) presented 
RTL and LTR readers with a webpage consisting of a series of various pictures and 
logos. This was to investigate whether the lower right corner of a webpage 
(referred to as the “corner of death” by web designers) still received the least 
amount of attention among RTL readers. Both studies found all participants to have 
leftward bias, particularly the top left corner, however both RTL and vertical 
readers showed a greater distribution in spatial attention. 
Afsari et al. (2016 & 2017) continued to explore spatial bias and reading habits by 
investigating whether priming individuals who were bidirectional in their reading 
habits (i.e. have learned to read languages that are culturally written in the 
opposite directions) influenced where fixations were being made when presented 
with a natural scene or artificial fractal images. Both studies also found an overall 
leftward bias. Fixations for native LTR readers still maintained a leftward bias in all 










Papafragou et al. 2008: Non-Linguistic 
Condition  x* x x -
Senzaki et al. 2014: Non-Linguistic 
Condition
- - x -
Papafragou et al. 
2008: Linguistic Condition    x -
Senzaki et al. 
2014: Linguistic Condition - -  x
Goller et al. 2017  -  -
"": The presence of a cultural difference.    
"x" :  The absence of  a cultural difference 
"-": Indication that that measurement was not taken in the study
*No differences were seen while the video was playing, however a significant difference 
was seen only after the video stopped and the last image was frozen.
Table 2.6. Summary of eye movement measurements taken for narrative construction 
studies. 
only had an effect in the initial exploration of native RTL readers such that initial 
fixations where being made in accordance with the priming. After this initial 
exploration, spatial attention moved more to the left. 
Overall, these studies show that regardless of culture, a leftward bias exists when 
viewing images. However, habitual reading direction does influence spatial 
attention which can be modulated to a degree by priming. Table 2.7 shows the 
results of eye movement measures taken.  
EEG 
Six papers were found to investigate cultural differences in scene/object 
perception using EEG. The specific component waves that were studied across these 
papers include the P1, N1, N2, the Novelty P300/P3a/Novelty P3, P300/P3/Target 
P3, the Slow Wave (SW), the N350, the Late Positive Components (LPC), and the 
N400. These components are thought to be involved in attention, orientation, or 
semantic processing (see Appendix for summary of the different wave components.) 
Three studies (Lewis et al. 2008; Kityama et al. 2013; Wang et al. 2014) 
investigated the Target P3 and Novelty P3 wave using different iterations of the 3-
stimulus oddball paradigm, a task commonly used to measure attention. Here, a 
standard, a target, or a distractor object is presented randomly to the participants. 
The participant is tasked with having to report when the target object appears.  





Left Right Horizontal Vertical LTR RTL
Abed et al., 1991 x x     -
Afsari et al., 2016   - - - - -
Afsari et al., 2017   - - - - -
Hernandez et al., 
2017 x  - - - - 
Table 2.7. Summary of eye movement measurements taken for reading direction studies. 
"": The presence of a cultural difference.    
"x" :  The absence of  a cultural difference 
"-": Indication that that measurement was not taken in the study
No. of Fixations Direction of Saccade No. of Saccades
The other waves that were investigated include P1, N1, N2, SW, N350, LPC, and 
N400 waves—cultural differences were seen for all except the N1 wave. Table 2.8 
shows all studies that have used EEG to investigate cultural differences and which 
waves where investigated in which study. 
fMRI  
Ten papers investigated cultural differences in scene/object perception using fMRI. 
The paradigms used across the studies varied widely and included: learning 
memory, memory recall, passive scene viewing, absolute vs. relative judgements, 
congruent vs incongruent scene viewing, viewing of pictures of houses, visuospatial 
judgements, Navon shapes, and object similarity judgements (see Table 1). 
Both Gutchess et al., (2006) and Goh et al., (2007) showed that Americans had 
greater activation in cortical areas associated with object processing compared to 
the Chinese sample when presented with scenes. This corresponded to the results 
seen in Grön et al., (2003) whereby Caucasian participants, during the viewing of 
geometrical shapes, showed greater activation for object processing and Chinese 
participants showed greater activation of cortical areas involved in visuospatial 
processing.  
In accordance with the aforementioned studies, Hedden et al., (2008) and Goh et 
al., (2013) were able to show that when making relative versus absolute 
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Article P1 N1 N2 P3 Target P3 Novelty SW N350 LPC N400
Lewis et al. 2008 - - -   - - - -
Lin et al. 2008  x - - - - - - -
Goto et al. 2008 - - - - - - - - 
Kityama et al. 2013 - -  x x  - - -
Wang et al. 2014 - - -   - - - -
Mecklinger et al. 2014 - - - - - -   -
"-": Indication that that measurement was not taken in the study
"": The presence of a cultural difference.    
"x" :  The absence of  a cultural difference 
Table 2.8. Summary of eye movement measurements taken for EEG studies. 
judgements - tasks that involve making judgements of a particular object relative 
to a specific context, e.g. the size of something relative to its frame, or based 
solely on the object itself and nothing else, the American sample taken in both 
studies showed greater neural activation in attentional networks during relative 
judgements, while the East Asian and Chinese Singaporean samples respectively 
showed greater activation during absolute judgement making. It should be noted 
that these attentional networks were involved in the processing of the object only, 
however, the greater effort required in processing objects during absolute 
judgements for Chinese and Chinese Singaporean participants indicates that more 
attention for object processing is needed to filter out the superfluous information 
of the context and vice versa for Americans. Similarly, when comparing self rated 
‘collectivists’ with ‘individualists’ in their patterns of activation of attentional 
neural networks during local or global processing during a Navon task, Liddell et al., 
(2015) saw the same results as the East Asian/Chinese Singaporean and Americans 
respectively. In the same light, Jenkins et al., (2010) showed that Chinese 
participants had greater activation of cortical areas involved in object processing 
when presented with incongruent scenes (e.g. a crab in a parking lot) compared to 
congruent scenes (e.g. a crab on the beach), whereas American participants showed 
no significant difference in activation between the two scene types, suggesting that 
Chinese participants are influenced by contextual information during object 
processing more than Americans. 
Though a strong case can be made regarding the presence of a cultural difference, 
it should be noted that cultural differences were not found in the parahippocampal 
place area (PPA) and the lingual landmark area (LLA), cortical areas associated with 
the processing of scenes as a whole and environmental landmarks (Goh et al, 2010). 
Also, contrary to what is expected, Paige et al., (2017) found that East Asians had 
greater activation for object processing when presented with pictures of objects 
without a background compared to the American participants.  
 63
Discussion 
This systematic review examined 38 studies that have investigated the presence 
and nature of cultural differences in the visual perception of scenes and objects. 
These 38 papers were split into 3 main categories based on the type of technology 
used (EEG, eye tracking, and fMRI), and the presence of a cultural difference was 
noted in the types of measurements taken in each category. These papers were also 
evaluated for the cultural framework within which the studies were undertaken, 
along with the cultures used as samples to emulate the cultural framework.  
A large majority of the studies were classified as using the Easterners vs. 
Westerners, East Asian vs. Westerners, Individualism vs Collectivism, Independence 
vs Interdependence, Analytic vs. Holistic, and Object, Context Dependent vs. 
Context, Context Independent cultural framework. These dichotomies have been 
used interchangeably in most of these studies; for example, Easterners/East Asian 
cultures have been described as being harmonious, following a more collectivist 
philosophy that rely on the interdependence of the denizens of such societies. 
Those belonging to this way of life are thought to be more prone towards holistic, 
context dependent perceptual processing. Westerners, on the other hand, are 
described as being more individualistic, greatly valuing one’s independence within 
their society and are, therefore, thought to be more prone towards  analytic/
context independent perceptual processing (Goh et al, 2010; Miellet et al, 2010). 
When looking into the cultural groups included in these studies, Chinese, Chinese 
Singaporeans, and Han Chinese people were mainly used to exemplify Easterners/
East Asian/Collectivism/Interdependence/Holistic/Context Dependence, and 
Americans were used to exemplify Westerners/Individualism/Independence/
Analytical/Context Independence. This could mean that differences in behavior 
detected, and the types of measurements taken are more indicative of differences 
between these Chinese groups and Americans as opposed to Easterners and 
Westerners, Individualists and Collectivists, Independent and Interdependent, etc., 
people. It is important to note this because behaviors that are associated with 
specific cultural groups are being linked to larger concepts with the risk of over 
generalization. This could also mean that future research is being geared towards 
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looking out for specific types of measurements, potentially making investigators 
less sensitive to other measures in which behavioral differences could manifest. 
This bias could also explain certain cultural differences found that don’t match the 
expected patterns of eye movements. For example, Wang and Sparks, (2016) found 
that Australians made more overall eye fixations and had a longer fixation duration 
than the Chinese. Australians being the ‘Westerners’ and Chinese being the 
‘Easterners’, one would expect the reverse to occur—Chinese participants would be 
expected to have a greater number of fixations as described in the study done by 
Chua, Boland, and Nisbett (2005). Thus to stringently ascribe a list of behaviors to 
specific categories like “East” and “West” can either blind us to what the true 
reasons behind the differences in behavior are-perhaps the difference in fixation 
numbers have nothing to do with being “Eastern” or “Western”, but trying to 
pigeon-hole the justification as such might prevent us from seeing what are actually 
the leading factors.  
Though this sort of Taylorean rhetoric existed in cultural cognitive research well 
before the use of eye tracking or neuroimaging technology, the dangers of its use 
now is the essentialization of social characteristics to a biological level, thus 
potentially perpetuating social issues that are a result of a colonial past. For 
example, “Westerners” have been characterized as independent and individualistic, 
qualities that have historically been associated with freedom, and “Easterners” 
have been characterized as being interdependent and harmonious, qualities that 
have historically been associated with restriction. Regardless of intention, these 
characteristics not only over-generalize large groups of people, it also maintains 
the inherent hierarchy of the West being “better” or more desirable than the East. 
This is not to say that social factors do not influence biology, simply that care must 
be taken in how these issues are discussed. 
A total of six papers investigated cultural differences in scene perception using 
EEG. Nine different EEG waves were measured between the six papers, eight of 
which showed the presence of a cultural difference pertaining to object processing. 
However, only the P3 Target and P3 Novelty waves were investigated more than 
once, and the results are inconsistent despite all studies using the 3-stimulus 
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oddball paradigm. It should be noted that Kitayama and Murata (2013), unlike the 
other studies, used scenes consisting of a background and a focal object instead of 
basic geometric shapes, letters, or numbers. Either the background or the focal 
object where changed to create the target and distractor stimulus. The P3 Target 
wave is thought to represent neural activity involved in detecting an infrequent 
stimulus that is actively being sought out for (Hruby and Marsalek, 2003). The P3 
Novelty wave is thought to be elicited when one is presented with an infrequent 
stimulus that is irrelevant to the task at hand (Hruby and Marsalek, 2003). Though 
these waves are brought about for two different reasons, they are both the result 
of attentional processing. Therefore differences between them may be more clearly 
seen when the experimental stimuli are simple-basic geometric shapes-however 
complex stimuli-realistic scenes-may interfere with attention enough to make 
cultural differences less obvious. None-the-less, when taken all together, the EEG 
studies indicate that the cultural difference in perception most closely follows the 
holistic vs analytic dichotomy in that the East Asian American and Chinese 
participants were more sensitive to contextual information, allocating more 
attention to semantics—the meaning and relationship between objects and the 
scene as a whole—where as the American and German participants were less 
concerned for contextual information and attended more towards target objects. 
Though these studies indicate cultural differences in perception, more studies need 
to be done to verify the results of the extant studies. 
The results of the EEG studies are partially congruent with the 10 papers that have 
investigated cultural differences in scene/object perception using fMRI. These 
studies have consistently shown a difference in activation in areas that are known 
to be involved in object processing as contained units, not part of a larger context 
or scene. However, whether background processing differs between cultures 
remains unclear. The remaining 22 papers utilized an eye-tracker to investigate 
cultural differences in scene perception. These 22 papers were split into 5 
subcategories: Scene Viewing, Change Blindness, Saccade, Narrative Construction 
with Motion Video and Reading Direction. Most studies were in the Scene Viewing 
category which is also where the most discrepancies were seen. This could be 
because the tasks varied widely, some of which involved tasks that may not have 
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demanded enough attention from the participants. In addition, saliency of the focal 
object plays a factor in detecting cultural differences in that the two appear to 
have a positive relationship—more salient the focal object, the more likely a 
cultural difference is detected. Furthermore, based on the collective results seen in 
the Change Blindness and the Narrative Construction and Motion Video categories, 
cultural differences appear to emerge more distinctly when top-down processing is 
involved. When comparing quality assessment scores, we can see that the scores 
within the Scene Viewing category are slightly lower than that of studies in the 
other categories, but not enough to be able to conclude a definite relationship (See 
Table 1). 
The overall quality of the studies averaged high (81.6/99), however the range of 
quality ranged the widest within the eye-tracking studies (61-94) which may have 
contributed to differences in results.  
These studies aimed to understand whether cultural differences in scene perception 
exist, and if so, under what conditions do these differences emerge, and at what 
stage of perception does differentiation occur. Results indicate that cultural 
differences do exist under certain conditions, however, enough studies repeating 
the same conceptual paradigm, or taking the same kinds of measures have not been 
carried out with eye tracking and EEG studies, thus rendering the reliability of the 
results unclear. Furthermore, studies that have been undertaken for the purpose of 
replication show conflicting resulting bringing into question the validity of the 
measurements taken to show cultural differences. Examining the quality 
assessments of these studies, we see that the quality of the studies was fairly 
consistent with the exception of the Change Blindness studies, which scored higher 
than average, and the Scene Viewing studies, which scored lower than the average. 
Variations in results within the Scene Viewing category could possibly, in part, be 
explained by the quality of the studies themselves, however, it is important to note 
that only a limited number of studies in this field of study have been done and it is, 
therefore, too soon to definitively conclude the extent to which this has driven the 
disparities seen. The fMRI studies are the only category of studies that have shown 
consistency in their results, providing the strongest case that cultural differences 
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occur during encoding, consistency in cultural differences mainly being evident in 
the differences in level of activation in response to viewing objects. However, 
further research needs to be done in order to gain greater depth and clarity. 
It should also be noted that all but one study only investigated scene perception, 
making it unclear whether there are cultural differences in object perception 
specifically or only in objects as part of scenes. Future research should not only 
focus on trying to expand understanding of whether these technologies can reliably 
detect cultural differences in perception, but also expand upon the investigation of 
whether there are cultural differences in viewing objects alone, rather than objects 
in scenes.  
Furthermore, future research should be aware of the types of rhetoric used in their 
studies, so as to avoid potentially perpetuating preconceived notions and over 
generalizations.  
Some limitations of this review must be highlighted. The methodological 
heterogeneity between the different articles prevented us from being able to 
conduct a more quantitative, or meta-analysis, which would potentially clarify 
better where cultural differences in perception are and which measurement among 
the fMRI, EEG, and eye tracker can best detect these differences. Our search was 
limited to the use of fMRI, EEG, and eye tracker technologies, but this means that 
other technologies used to examine cultural differences in perception may have 
been missed (though no other technologies were noted in the included studies). In 
terms of reliability of study selection, the selection of studies was undertaken by a 
single researcher and it is acknowledged that it would have been better to have a 
second researcher complete selection of some or all of the identified titles/
abstracts. However only one paper was identified from other sources giving some 
indication that key papers were not missed from the search process. This review 
was also limited to just object/scene perception and did not explore other types of 
perception, such as color perception or face perception.   
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None-the-less, when taken altogether, the various technologies have allowed us to 
see an indication that when individuals are presented with new information without 
a specific goal or with a task that does not require much concentration, our 
methods of exploration, attentional allocation, and processing largely overlap with 
one another, regardless of culture. However, when deeper meaning is being 
derived, or when individuals are presented with information that demands greater 
attention or more topdown processing, culturally different perceptual processing 
occurs. For example, in the linguistic studies, cultural differences were only seen 
when individuals knew that they had to describe what they had seen—top down 
processing. These cultural differences are not set in stone and can, therefore, 
adopt the strategies used with the new “environment” as demonstrated when 
individuals were primed towards specific social orientations. 
This review ultimately informs us on how to understand where cultural differences 
potentially lie and provides a platform from which one can explore differences in 
other cultures that have been less explored. This can allow for a greater 
understanding of why disparities in other fields, like that seen in Clinical 
Neuropsychology (Puente & Agranovich, 2003), and opens up an avenue towards 
investigating and understanding the driving forces behind them. 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3.Variations in Performance During Scene Perception 
between Indians and the British: An Eye-Tracking Study 
Abstract 
Background: Over the last 15 years, there has been a renewed interest in the use 
of eye-tracking to understand cultural differences in perception and memory. Many 
of these studies claim that Westerners follow a more analytical cognitive style, 
attending more to focal objects, whereas East Asians follow a more holistic 
cognitive style, attend more to contextual information. However, a majority of 
these studies have shown these differences between Americans and Chinese. 
Studies have not investigated whether this theory would hold true for Indians and 
the British. 
Method: In the present study, we measured the eye movements of Indian and 
British participants while viewing pictures of scenes consisting of a focal object 
against a complex background. After viewing the images, participants were then 
asked to complete a recall task. The scene perception-recognition paradigm was 
then followed by the use of the Singelis self-contrual scale. This scale was used to 
measure self-perceived adherence to collectivist or individualist values. The data 
were statistically evaluated using a generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) 
framework. 
Results: The British were able to accurately recall focal objects significantly better 
than the Indians. No difference in eye movements were seen between the Indians 
and the British in the background; differences were seen only within the focal 
object. Within the focal object, the British made a comparable number of shorter 
fixations and saccades to the Indians, but made significantly fewer longer fixations 
and saccades than the Indians. The Singelis self-construal scale showed that Indians 
were more collectivist than the British but  the difference in score did not reach 
significance. 
 70
Conclusion: Though a difference in eye movement patterns were present between 
Indians and the British, they didn’t adhere to the patterns expected by individuals 
from countries historically considered to be part of the East(India)and West(UK).   
Introduction 
Cultural psychologists have emphasized the role of culture in perception for many 
years. Many have demonstrated variations in behavioral responses, specifically 
reflecting different modes of attention, between people belonging to 
fundamentally different societal structures (Segall et al., 1966; Bornstein, 1975). 
For example, Masuda and Nisbett (2001) reported a comparison of European 
American and Japanese participants who were shown animated videos of 
underwater scenes and asked to describe the content. Results revealed that the 
Japanese participants were more likely than European Americans to refer to aspects 
about the background, and also about relationships between the background and 
the foregrounded objects. Furthermore, description styles revealed that Japanese 
participants put more emphasis on relational, temporal, behavioral, and feelings-
related information (e.g. “At the beginning, a big fish was swimming towards the 
green seaweed;” or "the red fish must be angry because its scales were hurt”) 
whereas European American participants were more likely to describe physical 
characteristics and actions specific to the object (e.g. “I saw three big fish 
swimming from left to right). Researchers concluded that Japanese participants 
allocated their attention evenly between the foreground and the background, 
whereas Americans selectively attended more to the foreground than to the 
background. These findings were then corroborated by Senzaki, Masuda, and Ishii 
(2014) who replicated the study using an eye-tracker, further demonstrating that 
participants’ language structures corresponded to their eye movements; however, 
this was only in the case of participants having prior knowledge that they would be 
answering questions based on the videos. Similarly, Chua et al. (2005) measured eye 
movements of American and Chinese participants who were asked to view scenes 
consisting of a foregrounded object against a scenic background and rate how much 
they liked the picture. The results showed that Americans looked at the focal 
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object sooner and for longer than the Chinese participants, and that the Chinese 
participants fixated on the background more compared to the North American 
participants. Researchers concluded that, like that seen in the Masuda and Nisbett 
(2001) study, Chinese participants allocated their attention to both the foreground 
and the background, whereas Americans selectively attended more to the 
foreground than the background. Similar results have been demonstrated in many 
studies including: a study done by Goh et al. (2009) in which Chinese Singaporean 
and Americans were exposed to visually novel information; in the “no change” trials 
of a change blindness study involving Japanese and Canadian participants (Masuda 
et al. 2016); and in a study investigating the effect of object saliency on eye 
movements in Chinese and Americans (Zhang et al., 2015). However, these findings 
have not always been consistent. Rayner et al. (2007) and Evans et al. (2009) both 
were unable to completely reproduce results seen in Chua et al.’s (2005)  study 
despite having overlapping paradigms and all studies having recruited Chinese and 
American participants. Similarly, Rayner et al. (2009) was unable to detect cultural 
differences in eye movements between Chinese and Americans when asked to 
detect “weird” aspects of a picture that were either present on the focal object or 
somewhere in the background, nor was Miellet et al. (2010) able to detect cultural 
differences between British and Chinese participants in the use of extra-foveal 
information during scene viewing and object detection. 
Many researchers have theorized on the driving forces behind cultural variations in 
attention. Nisbett and colleagues have argued that “Westerners” have developed a 
perspective that emphasizes individualism, where importance is placed on 
independence and self reliance (Nisbett, 2003). Thus, “Westerners” tend towards a 
more object-oriented/analytic mode of attention. By contrast, “Easterners” have 
developed a perspective that emphasizes collectivism, where interdependence 
promotes a more harmonious social structure. As a result, they tend towards the 
context-oriented/holistic mode of attention (Nisbett, 2003). Though merit should 
be given to the general concept that one’s environment strongly shapes one’s 
cognition, whether cognitive styles can be generalized to concepts like “Western” 
and “Eastern” or collectivism and individualism is unclear. Especially since the 
“West” and “East” do not have distinct geographical locations, and those countries 
 72
that have been traditionally considered to be part of the “West” (e.g. the USA or 
Germany) and the “East” (e.g. China and India) contain within themselves cultures 
different enough from each other that such rhetoric has the potential to lay folly to 
over generalizations. For example, when looking at the cultural groups used in 
studies that have incorporated eye-tracking to measure cultural differences in 
object/scene perception, we see that a majority of studies have used Americans to 
exemplify the “West”/individualism and either Chinese or Japanese people to 
exemplify the “East”/collectivism. However only a few studies have investigated 
whether similar task performance differences and eye movement patterns are seen 
between other cultures that are considered to be “Western”/individualist and 
“Eastern”/collectivist (Miellet et al., 2010; Duan et al., 2016; Alotaibi et al., 2017). 
Furthermore, no studies that have used eye-tracking to investigate cultural 
differences in eye movement during object/scene perception have corroborated 
whether these cultures (or at least the study participants) indeed follow a value 
system that tends towards individualism or collectivism. These studies categorized 
the cultural groups as such based on historical context.  
This present study aimed to determine whether comparable task performance and 
eye movement differences are evident between Indians and British people, two 
cultures that have been considered to be “Eastern”/collectivist and “Western”/
individualist respectively. We used the same methodology as Chua et al. (2005), but 
also used the Singelis Self-Construal Scale, a scale of collectivism/individualism 
consisting of 30 statements regarding different social situations. Based on previous 
studies that have used eye tracking to investigate the influence of culture on the 
perception of objects and scenes, the eye movement measurements taken in this 
study included: Number of Fixations, Average Fixation Duration, and Number of 
Saccades. In addition to these measurements, Saccade Duration, Saccade 
Amplitude, Saccade Velocity, and Pupil Size were also recorded. If Indians and 
British people do tend towards collectivism and individualism respectively, we 
would expect their Singelis scores to coincide as such, and accordingly, we 
predicted that Indians would allocate more attention to the background compared 
to the British and that the British would allocate more attention to the focal object 
than to the background. Furthermore, we predicted Indians to be more influenced 
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by the background than by the focal object when asked if they recognized the focal 
object during the recall portion of the study. 
Methodology 
Participants and Recruitment 
Thirty-four British participants were recruited at the University of Glasgow (16:18 
female:male, mean age: 23, age range: 19-36, age IQR: 5, mean years of education: 
16)  and 33 Indian participants were recruited at the National Institute of Mental 
Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS), Bangalore (18:15 female:male, mean age: 28, 
age range: 21-41, age IQR: 4 mean years of education: 20). All Indian and British 
participants were born and raised in India and the UK respectively.  
The sample size that was aimed for was 66 (33 participants in each group). Previous 
studies had recruited between 20-25 participants (e.g. Chua et al., 2005; Rayner et 
al. 2007, Evans et al. 2009, Duan et al. 2016). Chua et al., (2005) reported cultural 
differences in memory for objects in a scene perception task with an effect size of 
d=0.72. Eye tracking differences had effect sizes ranging from d=0.64 to 0.94. 
Effect sizes for cultural differences in eye tracking measures in Duan et al., 2016 
ranged from d=0.57 to 3.62. In Rayner et al., (2007) and Evans et al.,(2009) the 
primary eye movement outcome variables in a scene perception task comparing 
cultures had non-significant small effect sizes. It was evident therefore that effect 
sizes are variable across studies from small through to very large. For the present 
study it was decided to power the study to be able to detect an effect size broadly 
consistent with that of Chua et al, (2005) as their findings seem to represent a mid 
point of effect sizes found across studies. In relation to comparing cultural groups 
on the behavioral and eye-movement variables investigated, the present study was 
therefore powered to be able to detect an effect size of 0.7, with an α = 0.05, and 
power = 0.8, meaning that a total sample size of 33 in each participant group was 
required (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 
2009). 
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Participants in the UK were recruited via online ads placed on commercial websites 
(e.g., Gumtree), community forums (e.g., The Student Voice), and social media 
(e.g., Facebook, Twitter). Additionally, individuals registered with the University of 
Glasgow Subject Pool, maintained by the Psychology Department, were emailed an 
advert for the study. Volunteers were paid £6/hr for their participation in the study. 
Participants in India were recruited through known associates at NIMHANS. 
Participants were provided with tea or water and biscuits, and any travel expenses 
were covered. Participants were not paid for participating as this was not normal 
practice at the Institute.   
Ethics Approval 
All procedures and materials used were approved by the Review Boards of both the 
University of Glasgow College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences (application 
number: 200160097), and the National Institute of Mental Health and 
Neurosciences, Bangalore. All participants who passed the initial screening gave 
written informed consent before proceeding.  
Screening 
All participants were asked to fill out a demographic form where they were asked 
about their age, gender, years of education, where they have lived and for how 
long. They were also asked to self-identify their ethnicity, and the ethnicity of their 
parents and grandparents (both maternal and paternal). Anyone who was under the 
age of 18 or did not self-identify themselves or their family members as solely one 
of the British or Indian ethnic groups were excluded. Participants were also ask if 
they had a history of brain injury or cognitive disfunction and were excluded if they 




Eye movements were recorded using an Eyelink 1000 eye tracker in both the UK and 
India. Ocular dominance of the participants was determined using the Miles test 
(Miles, 1930). For this test, participants were asked to hold up a piece of paper 
with a hole cut out. While focusing on a designated spot on the wall through the 
hole, participants were then asked to bring the paper towards their face. Which 
ever eye the hole naturally landed on indicated the participant’s dominant eye. 
Ocular dominance is the preferred eye by an individual for visual input. The image 
that falls within the retina of the dominant eye is more accurate, clear, stable, and 
larger (Shneor & Hochstein, 2005). In one study, the dominant eye was shown to 
have perceptual processing priority (Shneor & Hochstein, 2006). Thus, it was 
necessary to identify each participant’s dominant eye. Once determined, 
participants were asked to sit in front of a computer screen (screen dimensions: 
53.2 X 30 cm, resolution: 1920 X 1080) and to place their chin on a chin rest 
positioned at 57 cm from the screen. The height of the chin rest was adjusted 
according to the participant’s comfort level. The Eyelink 1000 was then set to track 
the participant’s dominant eye only and a nine point calibration and validation 
procedure was carried out. Between each trial, a central fixation point appeared on 
the screen in order to conduct a drift correction. 
Materials and Procedure 
The materials and procedures used were the same as that in Chua et al., 2005 
study. Briefly, for the study phase, 36 scenic pictures composed of a single 
foregrounded object that was either living or nonliving against a background was 
used. During the object recognition phase, these 36 objects and backgrounds were 
then mixed and matched with 36 new objects and backgrounds. This set of 72 
images can be split into 4 different conditions: 1) Old Object/Old Background: 18 
previously seen objects against the original background, 2) Old Object/New 
Background: 18 previously seen objects against a new background, 3) New Object/
Old Background: 18 new objects against previously seen backgrounds and, 4) New 
Object/New Background: 18 new objects against new backgrounds. All participants 
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saw the same set of pictures however the order of the trials was randomized 
between participants. It should also be noted that the study was conducted 
completely in English as the researcher had no knowledge of the languages spoken 
in Bangalore. 
During the study phase, we asked participants to place their chin on a chin rest and 
we proceeded with the calibration process as described above. Once calibrated, 
participants were asked to keep their head as still as possible and to only move 
their eyes. The screen in front presented them with instructions for the phase 
which the researcher read out and ensured that the participants understood what 
was being asked of them. Participants then proceeded with a practice trial before 
being presented with the study trials. Thirty-six pictures were presented to each 
participant for 3s each during which participants were free to move their eyes to 
view the picture. After viewing each picture, participants were asked to rate how 
much they liked the picture on a scale of 1-7 by pressing the number on the 
keyboard before moving onto the next trial. Between each trial, a central fixation 
point appeared and participants were asked to look directly at the point in order to 
conduct the drift check. After this phase, participants were administered the Mini-
Mental State Examination (MMSE) as a distractor before continuing onto the object 
recognition phase (Tombaugh, Kristjanson, & Hubley, 1996). The MMSE is a widely 
used test of cognitive function and consists of 30 questions testing for orientation, 
attention, memory, language and visual-spatial skills. It should be noted that since 
all participants were fluent in English, the English version of the MMSE was 
administered. Participants had no prior knowledge of the object recognition phase. 
During the object recognition phase, we, once again, asked participants to place 
their chin on the chin rest and re-calibrated their dominant eye. The same screen 
then presented the participants with the instructions for the current task, and the 
researcher, once again, read out the instructions and ensured that the participants 
understood what was being asked of them. Participants then proceeded with two 
practice trials before continuing onto the the study trials. The set of 72 pictures 
mentioned above were presented to the participants. Once again, the images were 
presented for 3s each with a fixation point appearing between trials for a drift 
check. Participants were asked to judge within the 3s, whether or not they had 
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seen the foregrounded object in the previous study phase by pressing designated 
keys for “yes” and “no”.  
After completing the object recognition phase, participants were once again 
presented with the 72 images and were then asked to name the foregrounded 
object and to judge how familiar they were with it on a scale of “Not Familiar At 
All” to “Very Familiar”. At the end of the task, participants were then asked to 
complete the Singelis Self-Construal Scale. This scale consists of 30 statements 
regarding social situations, 15 of which describe situation that are more 
characteristic of individualism (e.g. I do my own thing, regardless of what others 
think) and the other 15 are more characteristic of collectivism (e.g I will sacrifice 
my self interest for the benefit of the group I am in). Participants were asked to 
rate how much they agreed or disagreed with each statement on a 1-7 Likert Scale. 
The scores of the 15 individualistic statements and 15 collectivist statements are 
added up separately and a score is calculated using the following formula: Total 
Score Individualism - Total Score Collectivism. A more negative score is indicative of 
greater collectivism and vice versa. 
Data Analysis 
Due to a recording error, the data for reaction time were corrupted rendering them 
unanalyzable, and were therefore excluded from the analysis. In further scrutiny of 
the data, two images from the object recognition phase of the study were excluded 
because the images was presented multiple times in a single trial, and one 
participant’s responses for the recognition phase were not recorded. Thus, for the 
study phase, the total sample size was N = 67, and for the recognition phase, N = 
66. 
First-level descriptive statistics were done to compare Indian and British groups in 
order to understand where potential differences in perception may lie. 
Generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) were used to determine if there were 
cultural differences in participants’ responses to the scene perception task. As 
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there are many ways to quantify participant responses, we chose 16 response 
variables that were considered most likely to show cultural differences: Accuracy, 
Total Fixation Count, Focal Fixation Count, Background Fixation Count, Average 
Fixation Duration, Average Focal Fixation Duration, Average Background Fixation 
Duration, Total Saccade Count, Focal Saccade Count, Background Saccade Count, 
Average Saccade Duration, Average Focal Saccade Duration, Average Background 
Saccade Duration, Saccade Amplitude, Saccade Velocity, and Pupil Size. Note that 
the average durations refer to the average length of time of any given fixation or 
saccade as opposed to the average total length of time of fixations or saccades. 
Similarly, counts refer to the number of fixations or saccade in reference to a given 
image as oppose to fixations and saccades across all images together. 
GLMMs present a flexible and convenient statistical framework with which to 
evaluate multiple hypotheses with respect to how variables interact with each 
other (if at all) and how they affect the participant response. Furthermore, the 
evaluation is done while correcting for non-independence. GLMMs pose advantages 
over analysis of variance (ANOVAs) for many reasons: 1) They allow for both 
categorical and continuous variables to be modeled (“mixed”) simultaneously; 2) 
They account for non-independence through the hierarchal modeling of random 
factors (e.g., participant); and 3) They have greater statistical power since the 
analysis uses individual data points (with non-independence accounted for by the 
random effect) as opposed to using averages (Kliegl et al., 2010; Barr et al., 2013; 
Bates et al., 2015; Singmann et al., In Press). This GLMMs framework was ideal for 
this study because the study considered continuous, categorical/count, and binary 
fixed effects of 67 participants evaluating the same set of pictures. In other words, 
multiple responses by a single participant are by definition non-independent, 
because they are done by the same individual. Thus by modeling participant as a 
random factor, we were able to control for this non-independence while taking 
advantage of the power provided by using multiple data points per participant.  
The analysis was performed using the R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) for the  
binomial, count, and continuous response variables. We used the “glmer()” 
command for binomial and count responses. This command allowed us to specify 
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the family of distribution—binomial and poisson respectively. By specifying the 
family, we were able to perform a logistic or poisson regression, contingent on the 
random effects. The “lmer()” command was used for the continuous responses, 
which essentially performs a linear regression given a normal distribution, 
contingent on the random effects. Using the 16 response variables, we built global 
models that included the following variables as explanatory variables: saccade 
location, country of origin, Singelis, age, gender, years of education, and MMSE 
(Table 3.1, see Table 3.2 for list of abbreviations used in models). 
We systematically eliminated non-influential variables from the global model until 
we identified the simplest model that best explained the data (the most 
parsimonious model), and we based our conclusions on this best-fit model. 
Specifically, to systematically reduce variables from the global model, the drop1 
command was used to identify variables that did not explain a significant amount of 
variation in the response. We evaluated these uninfluential variables one-by-one, 
starting with the least influential one, by comparing the complex model to a 
reduced model that excluded the uninfluential variable. If a likelihood ratio test 
indicated no significant difference between the two nested models, the simpler 
model was then selected and the process of using the drop1 command and 
likelihood ratio test was repeated until a significant difference was found between 
models, indicating that continuing to drop variables would represent a significant 
loss of explanatory power. At this point, the Akaike information criterion (AIC)—a 
measure that estimates the quality of each model relative to each other—for the 
two models was compared to determine which model was the better fit. This 
process continued until the more complex of the two models was considered to be 
the best-fit model, and we based our conclusions upon this best-fit model. All best 
fit models were also tested against the null hypothesis as further confirmation. The 
variables included in all best-fit models are considered significant at P <0.05. All 
variables excluded was due to non-significance at P >0.05.  
For all best fit models for which a poisson or binomial distribution was selected, 
goodness of fit was assessed by confirming that the ratio of residual variance and 




av_fix_dur average fixation duration









mmse Mini Mental State Examination
sacc_locc
sqrt square root
tot_fix_count total fixation count
tot_sacc_count total saccade count
yoe years of education
total number of saccades made in the focal
saccade location: focal or background
Table 3.2. List of Abbreviations Used 
average fixation duration of fixations made in the background
total number of saccades made in the background
total fixation number of fixations made in the focal object
total number of fixations made in the background
average fixation duration of fixations made in the focal object
Response Variable Explanatory Variables Distribution
Accuracy country * condition + singelis * condition + 






 av_fix_dur + singelis * av_fix_dur Normal




3 country * back_av_fix_dur + singelis * 
back_av_fix_dur
Normal
Average Fixation Duration country * tot_fix_count + singelis * 
tot_fix_count
Normal
Average Focal Fixation 
Duration









3 country * av_sacc_dur + singelis * av_sacc_dur Normal
Focal Saccade Count country * focal_sacc_dur + singelis * 
focal_sacc_dur
Poisson
Background Saccade Count country * back_sacc_dur+singelis * 
back_sacc_dur
Poisson
Average Saccade Duration country * tot_sacc_count + singelis * 
tot_sacc_count
Normal
Average Focal Saccade 
Duration









3 country * sacc_loc + singelis * sacc_loc Normal
Saccade Velocity country * sacc_loc + singelis * sacc_loc Normal
country * fix_loc + singelis * fix_loc Normal
Table 3.1. Global models created to predict participants' responses to the scene 
perception task. All GLMMs models take the form: response variable ~ explanatory 
variables + (1|random effects). In addition to the variables shown below, all GLMMs 
models contain the following explanatory variables and random effects: 
age+gender+yoe+mmse+(1|participant)+(1|picture). 
1
A GLMs was conducted for this variable instead of a GLMMs. See Methodology for details.
Pupil Size
3
The following tranformation was made on the response variable: sqrt(y)
2 
"*": Denotes both the interactive and the additive effect
and total saccade count indicated a poor fit with their natural distribution—poisson 
distribution. The data were then transformed using a square root (sqrt) 
transformation for which a normal distribution was chosen. All best fit models for 
which a normal distribution was selected were confirmed graphically using a 
qqplot, to check that the distribution of the residuals matched our selected 
distribution. Table 3.1 indicates which distributions were chosen for each response 
variable for which goodness of fit was confirmed.  
For total fixation count, the data poorly fit the model despite having tried different 
transformations and distributions. As a result, we concluded that the GLMMs 
framework did not suit the analysis for this response variable. We therefore 
sacrificed statistical power by analyzing aggregated means in a general linear 
models (GLMs) framework—a framework analogous to an ANOVA. Since, data were 
aggregated means, a normal distribution was chosen for analysis, and goodness of 
fit was assessed and confirmed as described above. 
Response variables presented in all graphs on the y-axis are predicted values 
derived from best fit models. In other words, graphs are not depictions of the raw 
data, but rather are depictions of the expected behavior based on the best fit 
model. 
Results 
In this study, we investigated whether the eye movement patterns of Indian and 
British participants while viewing scenes matched the patterns theorized in 
previous studies regarding Western/individualistic and Eastern/collectivist cultures. 
The eye movement measures taken included 15 different variable. In addition, 
Singelis and Accuracy were also investigated. Best fit models for these variables are 
shown in Table 3.3. 
First-level descriptive statistics were done to on the eye movement data to 
compare Indian and British groups in order to understand where potential 




Response Variable Best Fit Model





 av_fix_dur + singelis + age




Average Fixation Duration singelis * tot_fix_count
Focal Fixation Duration country * focal_fix_count




Focal Saccade Count null
Background Saccade Count av_back_sacc_dur + age
Total Saccade Duration tot_sacc_count
Focal Saccade Duration null





Pupil Size fix_loc + mmse
Table 3.3. Best fit models for participants' responses in the scene perception task. 
Unless otherwise noted, all models contains the random effects: 
(1|participant)+(1|picture).
3
The following tranformation was made on the response variable: sqrt(y)
2
 "*": Denotes both the interactive and the additive effect
1
A GLM was conducted for this variable instead of a GLMM. See Methodology for details.
Response Variables India UK
Total Fixation Count 9.99 (0.2) 9.89 (0.2)
Focal Fixation Count 5.1 (0.16) 5.36 (0.13)
Background Fixation Count 4.89 (0.18) 4.5 (0.17)
Average Fixation Duration (sec) 0.27 (0.008) 0.25 (0.006)
Average Focal Fixation Duration (sec) 0.25 (0.008) 0.25 (0.006)
Average Background Fixation Duration (sec) 0.25 (0.006) 0.23 (0.005)
Saccade Count 9.20 (0.2) 9.11 (0.19)
Focal Saccade Count 4.76 (0.16) 4.99 (0.13)
Background Saccade Count 4.45 (0.18) 4.12 (0.17)
Average Saccade Duration (sec) 0.07 (0.004) 0.07 (0.006)
Avergage Focal Saccade Duration (sec) 0.05 (0.003) 0.06 (0.003)
Average Background Saccade Duration (sec) 0.07 (0.005) 0.08 (0.01)
Saccade Amplitude 6.34 (0.17) 6.86 (0.18)
Saccade Velocity 131.63 (3.17) 132.01 (3.17)
Pupil Size 1352.687 (71.32) 1402.449 (67.99)
Table 3.4. Means of response variables measured in scene perception task. Format of data is: Mean (SE). 
Significant differences between the British and the Indians were found in Total 
Fixation Count, Focal Fixation Count, Average Focal Fixation Duration, Total 
Saccade Count, Saccade Amplitude, and Saccade Velocity. Significant differences 
were also found in Accuracy (see below). 
Singelis - Collectivism vs Individualism 
Participants from India and the UK showed no significant difference in their self 
construal rating (MIndia = -8.71(0.09), MUK = -3.91(0.62); t = -1.382, p = 0.18, d = 
0.340036). 
Accuracy 
Our best fit model for accuracy included the interactive effect of country of origin 
and condition (Table 3.3). Overall, the UK participants were significantly better 
than the Indian participants in accurately recognizing the previously seen focal 
object (Table 3.5). 
Specifically, UK participants out performed the Indian participants in all conditions 
except when the original focal object was placed against a new background—both 
Indian and UK participants performed comparably. Figure 3.1 depicts the predicted 
accuracy rates based on the best fit model. In other words, the graph shows the 
expected accuracy rate for the specific condition for each cultural group. These 
values are not the raw data, but rather a prediction of accuracy rate derived from 
the best fit model that is based on the data collected. 
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Condition India UK
Old Object/Old Background (O/O) 0.24 (0.02) 0.73 (0.04)
Old Object/New Background (O/N) 0.54 (0.02) 0.49 (0.03)
New Object/Old Background (N/O) 0.42 (0.03) 0.64 (0.03)
New Object/New Background (N/N) 0.27 (0.02) 0.73 (0.03)
Table 3.5. The average proportion of correct responses of participants 
within each condition of the recognition phase of the scene perception 
task. Data are the raw data in the format: Mean (SE). Sample size: n India = 
33; n UK = 33.
Figure 3.1. Predicted accuracy rates from the object-recognition phase. Data shown 
refer to the predicted accuracy with which Indians and the British were able to 
correctly identify the focal object as being the exact same object in the study 
phase. Data were derived from the best fit model for accuracy. Images in the object 
recognition phase belonged to one of four different conditions: Old Object/Old 
Background (O/O), Old Object, New Background (O/N), New Object/Old 
Background (N/O), and New Object/New Background (N/N). Object refers to the 
single foregrounded object (living or nonliving) in the picture; background refers to 
the remaining, complex spatial area in the visual picture. 
Total Fixation Count 
Our best fit model for the total fixation count included the interactive effect of 
country of origin and the average fixation duration, plus the additive effects of 
Singelis and age (Table 3.3). Singelis showed a positive relationship with the 
predicted average fixation count; this was consistent across country of origin, age, 
and average fixation duration. Average fixation duration and average fixation count 
were negatively correlated (Figure 3.2a-c). At shorter fixation durations, the 
number of fixations made by both Indians and the British were comparable 
(Figure3.2a); however, as the average fixation duration increased, the British made 









































correlated with predicted average fixation count. In other words, older individuals 
fixated more. 
Figure 3.2. Predicted average fixation count during study phase. Data refers to the 
predicted average number of fixations made by Indians and British on any given 
image, at various average fixation duration time points, and across a Singelis scale-
lower numbers refer to greater collectivist values, higher numbers refer to greater 
individualist values. Predicted values were derived from the best fit model for 
average fixation count. Data also represent participants at the age of 25-average 
age of all participants.   
Focal Fixation Count 
Overall, participants made more fixations to the focal object than to the 
background (focal fixations = 53%, background fixations = 47%). Our best fit model 
for the total focal fixation count showed the interactive effect of country of origin 
and focal fixation duration as a significant predictor of total focal fixation count; 
however, Singelis did not explain a significant amount of the variance (Table 3.3). 
The interactive effect was strong: the British showed a negative relationship 
between average focal fixation duration and the predicted fixation count, whereas 
the Indians showed no relationship at all. In other words, when fixating at any given 






















































































































made a comparable number of fixations. However, when individuals started to 
fixate for longer periods of time, the number of fixations made by the British 
continued to decrease while the number of fixations for Indians remains unchanged, 
ultimately exceeding that seen by the British (Figure 3.3).  
Figure 3.3. Predicted average fixation count within the focal object during study 
phase. Data refers to the predicted average number of fixations made by Indians 
and British within the focal object of any given image, across different average 
fixation durations within the focal object. Predicted values were derived from the 
best fit model for focal fixation count. Average focal fixation duration refers to the 
average length of time spent at any given fixation within the focal object. The focal 
object refers to the single foregrounded object (living or nonliving) in the picture.   
Background Fixation Count 
Our best fit model for total background fixation count suggested that neither 
country of origin nor Singelis explained a significant amount of the variance. The 
only variable retained was the average background fixation duration which had a 
positive correlation with total background fixation count—the number of fixations in 
the background increased as individuals fixated at any given point in the 
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Average Fixation Duration 
Average fixation duration refers to the average length of time spent on any given 
fixation. Our best fit model for average fixation duration showed the interactive 
effect of Singelis and total fixation count as significant predictors of the average 
fixation duration, however, country of origin did not explain a significant amount of 
the variance (Table 3.3). The slope of the negative correlation between the average 
fixation duration and total fixation count became steeper as individuals scored 
higher on the Singelis scale—i.e., more individualistic (Fig. 3.4). In other words, 
when more fixations were made, less time was spent fixating on any given point. 
This pattern intensified in people who are more individualistic. 
Figure 3.4. Predicted average fixation duration during the study phase. Data refers to 
the predicted average fixation duration made by Indians and British on any given 
image, across different total fixation counts. Predicted values were derived from 
the best fit model for average fixation duration. Average fixation duration refers to 
the average length of time spent on any given fixation. 
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Average Focal Fixation Duration 
Average fixation duration refers to the average length of time spent on any given 
fixation within the focal object. Our best fit model for the average fixation 
duration for fixations made in the focal object showed the interactive effect of 
country of origin and focal fixation count as significant predictors of average 
fixation duration (Table 3.3). The British showed a negative relationship between 
focal fixation count and the predicted average fixation duration, whereas the 
Indians showed no relationship at all. These results correspond with our results for 
focal fixation count. 
Average Background Fixation Duration 
Average fixation duration refers to the average length of time spent on any given 
fixation within the background. Our best fit model for the average fixation duration 
of fixations made to the background suggested that neither country of origin nor 
Singelis explained a significant amount of the variance (Table 3.3). The only 
variable retained was years of education which had a positive correlation with 
average fixation duration of background fixations. In other words, individuals with 
more years of education fixated longer at any given point within the background.    
Total Saccade Count 
Our best fit model for the total saccade count showed the interactive effect of 
country of origin and the average saccade duration as a significant predictor of the 
total saccade count; however, Singelis did not explain a significant amount of the 
variance (Table 3.3). Total saccade count is negatively correlated with total saccade 
count. This negative correlation was steeper for the Indians than the British. In 
other words, there was no difference in number of short saccades between Indians 
and British, but the Indians made few longer saccades than the British (Figure 3.5).  
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Figure 3.5. Average saccade duration during the study phase. Data refers to the 
predicted average saccade count made by Indians and British on any given image, 
across different average saccade durations. Predicted values were derived from the 
best fit model for average saccade duration. Average saccade duration refers to the 
average length of time for any given saccade. 
Focal Saccade Count  
Our best fit model for the total saccade count was the null model; none of our 
explanatory variables were significant predictors of the focal saccade count (Table 
3.3). 
Background Saccade Count 
Our best fit model for the background saccade count suggested that neither country 
of origin nor Singelis explained a significant amount of the variance (Table 3.3). The 
only variables retained was the average saccade duration of saccades made to the 
background, which had a negative correlation with background saccade count, and 
age, which had a positive relationship with background saccade count. In other 





















































were longer. Furthermore, older individuals made more saccades in the background 
than younger individuals. 
Average Saccade Duration 
Average saccade duration refers to the average length of time for any given 
saccade. Our best fit model for the average saccade duration suggested that 
neither country of origin nor Singelis explained a significant amount of the variance 
(Table 3.3). The only variable retained was the total saccade count which had a 
negative correlation with average saccade duration. In other words, individuals who 
had longer saccade made fewer saccades overall. 
Average Focal Saccade Duration 
Average saccade duration refers to the average length of time for any given saccade 
within the focal object. Our best fit model for the average focal saccade duration 
was the null model; none of our explanatory variables were significant predictors of 
the average focal saccade duration (Table 3.3). These results correspond with our 
results for focal saccade count.  
Average Background Saccade Duration  
Average saccade duration refers to the average length of time for any given saccade 
with the background. Our best fit model for the average background saccade 
duration suggested that neither country of origin nor Singelis explained a significant 
amount of the variance (Table 3.3). The only variable retained was the background 
saccade count, which had a negative correlation with the average background 
saccade duration. In other words, individuals made fewer saccades in the 
background when their saccades were longer. These results correspond with our 
results for background saccade count.  
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Saccade Amplitude 
Our best fit model for saccade amplitude suggested that the additive effect of 
country of origin and the saccade location—in the focal object or in the background
—were significant predictors of saccade amplitude; however, Singelis did not 
explain a significant about of the variance (Table 3.3).    
Saccade Velocity 
Our best fit model for the saccade velocity suggested that neither country of origin 
nor Singelis explained a significant amount of the variance (Table 3.3). The only 
variable retained was the saccade location. The velocity of the saccades made 
within the focal object were significantly less than the saccades made within the 
background. 
Pupil Size 
Our best fit model for pupil size suggested that neither country of origin nor 
Singelis explained a significant amount of the variance (Table 3.3). The only 
variable retained was saccade location. The pupil size of individuals was 
significantly larger when they were looking at the focal object than when they were 
looking at the background. 
Discussion 
This study evaluated whether the performance of British and Indians on a scene 
perception/recall-memory task is reflected in patterns of eye movements between 
British and Indian participants. Furthermore, we investigated whether differences 
in eye movement were a function of self-construal. When individuals fixated at any 
given point for a short period of time, Indians and the British made a comparable 
number of fixations; however, as individuals fixated for longer periods of time, the 
number of fixation made by the Indians were significantly greater than the British. 
This may be because as fixations on the focal object increased in time-length, the 
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number of fixations made in the focal object decreased for the British but remained 
about the same for Indians—fixations to the background were comparable between 
the Indians and the British. In addition, when individuals made shorter saccades, 
the number of saccades between the Indians and the British were comparable to 
each other; however when individuals made longer saccades, the number of 
saccades made by the British was significantly greater than the Indians—these did 
not differ between the focal object or the background. These results imply that 
individuals fixate for a shorter period of time and make shorter saccades, the 
pattern of eye movement between the Indians and the British are very similar to 
one another; however, as fixations and saccades are made for longer periods of 
time, the British scan the whole image more than the Indians and allocate more 
attention to any given point in the focal object when they fixated in it. This is not 
consistent with the West/East theory which would assume the Indians to scan the 
image more. 
The difference in eye movements between Indians and British were reflected in 
their accuracy of performance in that Indians were, in general, poorer than the 
British in correctly recognizing the focal object. Their performance was particularly 
negatively affected when a new object was presented in the original background 
implying that the Indians were relying on the background in making their response 
much more than the British. 
Indians and British participants did not significant differ in their rating of their self 
construal-no one cultural group rated themselves to be significantly more 
collectivist or individualist than the other. The standard error of the British 
participants’ Singelis score was very high suggesting that there was considerable 
variability in our participants with regard to their self-construal. Interestingly the 
Indian participants were more consistent in their responses. It is unclear as to 
whether the results for the British sample is a true representation of the 
population, but it is possible that self-construal as collectivist/individualist is not a 
consistent feature of British culture, whereas self-construal as collectivist is a more 
consistent feature of Indian culture. Hofstede’s scores of cultural dimensions for 
the UK were found to be very similar to the scores of the United States. For 
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example, the cultural dimension with the highest rating for both countries was 
found to be individualism (UK: 89, US: 91); however, parts of the UK, Scotland and 
Wales in particular, have adopted more collectivist values into their social policies 
(Birrell, 2009). Recent political events including Brexit, Scottish and Catalonian 
independence, etc. have also brought light to a change in social ideology in 
continental Europe (Gobel, Benet-Martinez, Mesquita, & Uskul, 2018). This study is 
also limited in that the sample size taken for the measurement of self-construal 
may not be large enough to capture if the people of a culture more strongly 
associates themselves as collectivist or individualist. Put together, the UK may not 
be so easily classified as one or the other in the collectivist-individualist dichotomy. 
It should be noted that previous studies that have used this experimental paradigm 
have assumed their groups to be collectivist or individualist based on historical 
context and did not confirm these assumptions with any measure qualitatively or 
quantitatively. The Singelis Self-Construal Scale was specifically designed to capture 
characteristics of collectivism and individualism hypothesized by Markus and 
Kitayama (1991). This scale has been widely used to study the relationship between 
self-construal and cultural difference in cognition, emotion, and motivation 
(Gudykunst & Lee, 2003), and has been used across different cultures (Besta, 2018; 
Dardara, 2018; D’Amico & Scrima, 2016). However, it has not been validated in 
India; no scales of self-construal have been validated for both Indian and UK 
populations. Future research should consider validating this scale or other widely 
used scales, like the Gudykunst et al. (1996) Self-Construal Scale or the Swartz 
Value Scale, in the cultures being explored. A different option would be to include 
an ethnographic evaluation of self-construal, and implement a mixed methods 
approach, i.e. use both qualitative and quantitative research methods, as opposed 
to relying solely on quantitative measures that can be too reductionist or basing 
assumptions purely on historical knowledge.    
Singelis scores were associated with some eye movement measures in that 
individuals who rated themselves as more collectivist were less affected by the 
negative relationship between fixation count and fixation duration than individuals 
who rated themselves as more individualist. Singelis, however, did not appear to 
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influence any other eye movement measurements, thus not providing a very strong 
argument that self-construal influences perceptual strategies. 
This study had several limitations. India is a highly diverse country with 22 major 
languages and hundreds of dialects that can be split into two main linguistic roots: 
Indo-Aryan—mainly spoken by those in the northern half of India— and Dravidian—
mainly spoken by those residing in the southern half of India. There are many 
cultural differences in society that are also highly linked to religion and caste. 
Participants recruited in India were all staff members or PhD candidates at 
NIMHANS, mainly individuals from South India, and belonged to a high caste. 
Participants were also all in the medical field in some form. Therefore, the sample 
was not very representative of the Indian population. A similar argument can be 
made about the UK sample in that a majority of participants were from Scotland, 
even though the UK consists of four distinct cultural groups (Scottish, English, 
Welsh, and Northern Irish). Future research should consider conducting this study 
across difference cultural groups within India, and the UK in order to further 
understand cultural influences on eye movements and perception. 
Furthermore, many participants in the Indian sample were not able to participate 
during working hours and so for many, data were collected in the early evening. 
Thus, cognitive functioning may have been affected which could have contributed 
to the reduction in performance in Indians. Although all participants were fluent in 
English, the study was also not conducted in the native language of the Indian 
participants making it unclear if any incorrect answers were a result of a 
misunderstanding of instructions. The investigator of this study had also faced 
difficulty in calibrating the eye movement of Indian participants in part because of 
difficulty in encouraging participants to maintain a fixation long enough on any 
given calibration fixation point before and during the task. Furthermore, after the 
initial calibration, participants are required to keep their heads as still as possible 
which proved to be difficult for Indian participants because of a characteristic, 
side-to-side, Indian head nod that is common in social interactions. Calibration 
accuracy was therefore challenging, potentially affecting the quality of the eye 
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movement measurements taken.  
This study also did not take into account certain factors that could have played a 
role in understanding culture. For example, though years of education was 
recorded, quality of early education was not examined, a factor that has been 
shown to influence cognitive development later in life (Sisco et al., 2015). 
Education in India takes a greater variety in that different schools are taught in 
different languages and follow different standardized educational curriculums. 
Socioeconomic status and caste were also not taken into consideration which could 
have also had influenced perceptual and cognitive abilities (Nair, 2009). 
A point to also take note of is the use of the MMSE as a distractor and as part of the 
statistical analysis. Though any distractor can be used, the MMSE was chosen 
because it provided a variety of tasks that appropriately filled the allotted time gap 
between the study and memory-recall phase. It also provided a very simple and 
quick added check that participants did not have gross cognitive dysfunction. Use of 
the MMSE to assess for cognitive impairment could be considered a limitation as its 
effectiveness as a cognitive screening tool has been debated (Carnero-Pardo, 2013). 
However, part of the initial screening included a short history of any prior brain 
injuries or other conditions likely to impair cognition. An additional limitation is 
that the English version of the MMSE was used. However, Indian participants all had 
a fluency and literacy level high enough for there to be no significant reason to 
suspect that participants would not be able to complete the tasks appropriately. 
This was further re-enforced in that no participants scored below the MMSE cut-off 
score for impairment.  
The study is also limited in that the scene images used had only one distinct focal 
object. Cultural differences seen in this study may not exist when more complex 
images with multiple focal points are presented (Rayner, Li, Williams, Cave, & 
Well). This study also doesn’t inform us on potential differences in eye movements 
during different kinds of tasks that may require greater attention (Masuda, Ishii, & 
Kimura, 2016). Furthermore, this study does not inform us on whether these 
differences in eye movement translate to when individuals are presented with 
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single objects against no background. Future research should consider exploring 
differences in eye movement between Indians and British with various types of 
stimuli and various types of tasks that demand different levels of attention.  
In summary, the UK and India have historically been labelled as being part of the 
“West” and “East” respectively, and in extension, have been thought to adhere to 
individualist and collectivist social structures. Differences in eye movements were 
seen between Indians and the British however the differences did not align with the 
analytical cognitive style of the individualistic West or the holistic style of the 
collectivist East that have been used to describe eye movement patterns in previous 
studies. According the West/East theory, one would expect Indians to attend more 
to the background and the British to attend more to the focal object. However, 
here we see that both groups attended to the background comparably and Indians 
made more longer fixation in the focal object than the British. Furthermore, though 
the UK and India may previously have exhibited individualist and collectivist social 
structures respectively, ideology and social policies of both countries have shifted 
and don’t reflect such discrete categorizations anymore. The dichotomy with which 
these concepts have been described may not capture the more gradient nature with 
which they actually exists, therefore, the eye patterns seen by Indians and the 
British in this study are not captured by the current rhetoric. Expanding the 
vocabulary used to understand cognitive styles may allow for a more in depth 
understanding of possible variations of the analytic and holistic styles, along with 
other cognitive styles that may exist beyond the analytic and holistic types. 
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4.A Comparison of the Performance of Indian and British 
Participants on the Silhouettes Subtest of the Visual Object 
and Space Perception Battery: An Eye-Tracking Study 
Abstract 
Background: Clinical Neuropsychology allows for the evaluation of the proper 
functioning of our various cognitive domains, after experiencing an event that 
might render our cognitive ability to be subpar (e.g. a stroke). This evaluation is 
based on conscious behavioral responses on tests created to target specific aspects 
of cognition. However, these standardized tests have mostly been created in the 
U.S.A and certain European countries. Thus, when presenting these tests to 
countries that culturally differ from the originating countries, responses to these 
tests begin to vary, making the evaluation procedure more uncertain. One such 
assessment that has shown inconsistent performance levels is the Silhouettes 
Subtest of the Visual Object Space Perception Battery (VOSP) between the Indian 
and British population. The aim of this study is to further investigate the driving 
forcing behind the performance difference by investigating potential perceptual 
differences, through the use of an eye-tracker. 
Methods: British and Indian participants were presented with the Silhouettes 
Subtest while having their eye movements tracked. Participants were also asked to 
complete the Singelis Self-Construal Scale in order to evaluate social values as a 
potential factor. The data were then statistically evaluated using a generalized 
linear mixed models (GLMMs) framework. 
Results: The British, overall, performed better than the Indians. The performance 
of individuals was negatively correlated to the difficulty level of the object, for 
which, the British were seen to be more sensitive to than the Indian. Difficulty 
levels were based on the British normative data. Country of origin was associated 
with saccade amplitude and saccade velocity. Singelis was not an influential 
variable in predicting performance or in any of the eye movement data.   
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Conclusions: Performance differences present between the Indians and the British 
may, in part, be explained by cultural relevance and may, in part, be explained by 
potential differences in perceptual strategies in eye movement; however further 
investigation is required in understanding cultural differences in eye movement in 
single objects. Furthermore, social values did not present as a driving force for 
performance differences, thus further investigation into other factors that 
distinguish the two cultures is needed in order to understand which factors are, 
indeed, driving these differences. 
Introduction 
Clinical neuropsychology is the study of brain dysfunction expressed as an 
externalized behavior. In a clinical setting, this fills a diagnostic niche in which 
medical health professionals can systematically evaluate an individual’s cognitive 
functioning when the brain’s ability to operate at an expected level has been 
compromised. This evaluation is carried out using assessments that target the main 
domains of cognition: perception, orientation, motor abilities, attention, language, 
memory, executive function, affect, and social behavior (Lezak, Howieson, Bigler, & 
Tranel, 2012). 
Many of these assessment tools that are used globally were created according to 
the norms of the people living in the specific environment in which the test was 
created. One example is of this is intelligence testing. A test to assess ‘IQ’ was first 
created in the early 1900s by Alfred Binet and Theodore Simon in France as a way to 
evaluate students. An adapted American version was quickly developed, though it 
was heavily criticized for its racial, socioeconomic, and gender bias (Reynolds & 
Suzuki, 2013). It was also criticized by David Wechsler, particularly for basing 
intelligence on a single score that depended on the quickness of verbal responses. 
Wechsler’s advocacy for a more multidimensional approach to intelligence testing 
led to the development of the Wechsler-Bellevue Intelligence Scale (WBIS) that took 
both verbal and non-verbal, or performance, skills into account. The WBIS and the 
revised versions that have followed including the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale 
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(WAIS), the WAIS-R, and most recently, the WAIS-IV published in 2008, were created 
with the intention of being relevant to a wider population. However, these 
assessments were created in the U.S.A and have been shown to be inadequate in 
evaluating individuals from other cultures with varying education levels (Dershowitz 
and Frankel et al., 1975; Shuttleworth-Edwards et al., 2004; Walker et al., 2010).  
Like the WAIS, many other neuropsychological assessments have been evaluated for 
cultural compatibility and have shown disparities in performance (Puente & 
Agranovich, 2004). Of these studies, only a handful have investigated the effects of 
culture on the performance of standard, and widely used, neuropsychological visual 
perceptual assessments such as the Visual Object and Space Perception Battery 
(VOSP) (Calvo et al. 2013, Kosmidis et al., 2010; Bonello et al. 1997). The VOSP was 
created in the UK and is a collection of eight subtests designed to examine specific 
facets of object and space perception (Lezak et al., 2012). For example, the 
Silhouettes Subtest is a set of 30 images (15 animate, 15 inanimate) that are 
shadows of real objects. The task is to identify what the objects are based on their 
shadow. The test intends to assess one’s threshold for object recognition when 
provided with minimal information from unusual angles (Warrington and James, 
1991). Recently however, Dutt et al. (2016) conducted a study in which the VOSP 
was administered to 200 Indians residing in Kolkata, India. The data were compared 
to data collected in Spain, Greece, the USA, and the normative data of the UK that 
was originally collected during the creation of the VOSP. Their results showed that 
the Indians performed significantly worse on the object perception tasks of the 
VOSP, including the Silhouettes Subtest, compared to the Americans, British, Greek, 
and Spanish populations (Dutt et al., 2016). Though this study has contributed to 
increasing awareness of a cultural bias, it is still unknown as to what explains this 
apparent discrepancy between cultures.  
One method of studying culture and perception is through the use of eye-tracking 
technology. Studies suggest that certain aspects of an individual’s cultural 
environment encourage distinct eye movement patterns. For example, studies have 
shown that, despite having a bias towards the upper left visual field when viewing 
something, one’s habitual reading direction can influence the degree to which the 
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bias exists (Afsari et al. 2016, Hernandez et al., 2017, Afsari et al., 2018). Other 
studies have shown that eye movement can mimic the grammatical structure of a 
native language, provided that the individual knows that they will have to describe 
what they are viewing afterwards (Papafragou et al., 2008, Senzaki et al., 2014). 
The most commonly studied cultural factor is the relation between eye movement 
patterns and collectivism, a social structure that emphasizes cohesiveness amongst 
individuals and prioritizes harmony in a group over the self, vs. individualism, a 
social structure that emphasizes the  interest of the individual over that of the 
group. Studies suggest that individuals whose value system falls within collectivism 
or individualism exhibit eye movements that are either context dependent or 
context independent respectively (Chua et al., 2005, Goh et al., 2009, Zhang et al, 
2015, Masuda et al., 2016, Wang et al., 2016). These studies focus on scene 
perception and as a result, the findings of these studies are representative of what 
may occur if the stimuli presented have a distinct focal object embedded in a type 
of background (e.g. a deer -the focal object - in a forest - the background). For 
example, Chua, Boland, and Nisbett (2005) presented participants with pictures of 
scenes and participants were asked to rate the image based on how much they liked 
it, before being given an unexpected memory task on the images they had just 
seen. Results showed that American participants looked at the focal object sooner 
and for longer than the Chinese participants. Both cultures made comparable 
number of fixations to the focal object, but the Chinese participants made more 
fixations to the background that the Americans. The more equal distribution of 
fixations between the object and the background by the Chinese participants 
suggests that binding of the object and background is occurring. Similar results 
were found by Duan, Wang, and Hong (2016) who presented the same stimulus sets 
to African and Chinese participants. However, it should be noted that contradictions 
have been seen in eye movement patterns (Rayner et al. 2007, Evans et al., 2009, 
Rayner et al., 2009, Miellet et al., 2009) and that these studies have used Chinese/
Chinese Singaporean/Japanese/East Asians and Americans/Australians/Canadians/
Western Caucasian to exemplify collectivism and individualism respectively. 
Furthermore, no studies testing for cultural differences in attention through the use 
of eye tracking have used any form of measurement that would corroborate the 
participating individuals as being collectivist or individualist.      
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In the present study, eye-tracking was used to investigate the eye movements of 
British and Indian participants on the Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP. No studies 
have used an eye-tracker to investigate cultural differences in single object 
perception and therefore the aim of the present study was to examine whether the 
differences in patterns of eye movement between cultures evident during scene 
perception would also apply to single objects. Self-construal as collectivist/
individualist was measured using the Singelis Self Construal Scale to determine 
whether there were differences in self-perception in terms of collectivism/
individualism and whether this dimension affected performance (and associated eye 
movements) on the Silhouettes task. Participants were presented with each image 
of the Silhouettes Subtest and asked to identify the object. After completion of the 
subtest, participants were then asked to complete the Singelis Self Construal Scale. 
                                                                                                                                                            
Based on previous studies that have used eye tracking to investigate the influence 
of culture on the perception of objects and scenes the eye movement 
measurements taken in this study included: Number of Fixations, Average Fixation 
Duration, and Number of Saccades. In addition, Saccade Duration, Saccade 
Amplitude, Saccade Velocity, Saccade Angle, and Average Pupil Size were also 
recorded.  
This study aims to investigate three objectives: 
Objective 1: whether the assumptions of individualism and collectivism about 
Indians and British participants holds true using the Singelis Self Construal Scale. 
Objective 2: whether culture and/or Singelis influence accuracy and reaction time. 
Objective 3: whether culture and/or Singelis influence eye movement. 
The experimental hypothesis tested was that there would be significant differences 
in accuracy, reaction time, and eye-movements between Indian and British 
participants, which was contrasted with a null hypothesis of no significant between-
culture difference.  
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Methodology 
Participants and Recruitment 
Participants in this study were the same participants that were recruited in the 
previous study (see chapter 3). To re-iterate, thirty-three British participants were 
recruited at the University of Glasgow (16:17 female:male, mean age: 23, mean 
years of education: 16)  and 33 Indian participants were recruited at the National 
Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHNS), Banglaore (18:15 
female:male, mean age: 28, mean years of education: 20). All Indian and British 
participants were born and raised in India and the UK respectively. The sample size 
was sufficient to be able to detect a difference between groups of d=0.7. The study 
by Dutt et al. (2016) found differences on the Silhouettes task between young (<50 
years) Indian and Greek participants with an effect size of d=1.87.  
Participants in the UK were recruited via online ads placed on commercial websites 
(e.g., Gumtree), community forums (e.g., The Student Voice), and social media 
(e.g., Facebook, Twitter). Additionally, individuals registered with the University of 
Glasgow Subject Pool, maintained by the Psychology Department, were emailed an 
advert for the study. Volunteers were paid £6/hr for their participation in the study. 
Participants in India were recruited through known associates at NIMHANS. 
Participants were provided with tea or water and biscuits, and any travel expenses 
were covered. Participants were not paid for participating as this was not normal 
practice at the Institute.   
Ethics Approval 
All procedures and materials used were approved by the Ethics Committees of both 
the University of Glasgow College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences 
(application number: 200160097), and the National Institute of Mental Health and 
Neurosciences, Bangalore. All participants who passed the initial screening gave 
written informed consent before proceeding.  
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Screening 
All participants were asked to fill out a demographic form where they were asked 
about their age, gender, years of education, where they have lived and for how 
long. They were also asked to self-identify their ethnicity, and the ethnicity of their 
parents and grandparents (both maternal and paternal). Anyone under the age of 18 
or did not self-identify themselves or their family members as solely one of the 
British or Indian ethnic groups were excluded. Participants were also ask if they had 
a history of brain injury or cognitive dysfunction and were excluded if they did.  
Those who passed this initial screening then proceeded to the experimental tasks. 
Apparatus 
Eye movements were recorded using the Eyelink 1000. Ocular dominance of 
the participants was determined using the Miles test (Miles, 1930). For this test, 
participants were asked to hold up a piece of paper with a hole cut out. While 
focusing on a designated spot on the wall through the hole, participants were then 
asked to bring the paper towards their face. Which ever eye the hole naturally 
landed on indicated the participant’s dominant eye. Once determined, participants 
were asked to sit in front of a computer screen (screen dimensions: 53.2 X 30 cm, 
resolution: 1920 X 1080) and to place their chin on a chin rest positioned at 57 cm 
from the screen. The height of the chin rest was adjusted according to the 
participant’s comfort level. The Eyelink 1000 was then set to track the participant’s 
dominant eye only and a nine-point calibration and validation procedure was 
carried out. Between each trial, a central fixation point appeared on the screen in 
order to conduct a drift correction. 
Materials and Procedure 
All procedures were conducted in English, by the same researcher, for all 
participants in both the UK and in India. Prior to commencing the study, the English 
version of the Mini Mental State Examination (MMSE) was administered to all 
participants. The MMSE is a commonly used 30-point measure for the screening of 
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cognitive impairment(s). This was done to ensure that all participants were 
cognitively “healthy”. It should be noted that the English version of the MMSE was 
used. Indian participants all had a fluency and literacy level high enough for there 
to be no significant reason to suspect that participants would not be able to 
complete the tasks appropriately. 
After administering the MMSE, participants were presented, one-by-one, with the 
30 (15 animate, 15 inanimate) silhouetted objects of the Silhouettes Subtest of the 
VOSP, in random order. Participants were instructed to keep their head as still as 
possible and to fixate on the cross located at the center of the screen until an 
object was presented. When an object was presented, participants were free to 
move their eyes only, and were given up to one minute to identify the object. When 
the participants felt confident about their final answer, they then said their 
answers out loud while simultaneously pressing the spacebar, which provided a 
timestamp and allowed the participant to move on to the next image. Participants 
were informed that they were allowed to provide their final answer in whichever 
language best suited them. Verbal responses were recorded using a recording 
device. It should be noted that the VOSP is typically not administered in a 
computerized form. Furthermore, it should be noted that the administration of the 
Silhouettes Subtest in this study deviated from how it is typically done in a clinical 
setting. In addition to it not being a computerized assessment, in a clinical setting, 
the Silhouettes Subtest is administered by first presenting the animal silhouettes 
and then the inanimate object silhouettes, always in the same order. Patients are 
told what category the object belongs to and are then asked to identify it (e.g. 
“this is a drawing of an animal, can you name it?” and so on). This procedure is 
repeated for each image and is only discontinued if the patient makes five 
consecutive mistakes. The patient is also under no time limit in providing an 
answer.   
After completing the all thirty images of the Silhouettes Subtest, participants were 
asked to complete the Singelis Self-Contrual Scale (Singelis, 1994). This scale 
consists of 30 statements regarding social situations, 15 of which describe situation 
that are more characteristic of individualism and the other 15 are more 
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characteristic of collectivism. Participants were asked to rate how much they 
agreed or disagreed with each statement on a 1-7 Likert Scale. The scores of the 15 
individualistic statements and 15 collectivist statements are added up separately 
and a score is calculated using the following formula: Total Score Individualism - 
Total Score Collectivism. A more negative score is indicative of greater collectivism 
and vice versa. 
Data Analysis 
An initial analysis was conducted to compare Indian and British participants on each 
of the variables measured. 
We used generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) to determine if there were 
cultural differences in participants’ responses to the Silhouette subtest. As there 
are many ways to quantify participant responses, we chose ten response variables 
that were considered most likely to show cultural differences based on previous 
research: Accuracy, Reaction Time (rt), Number of Fixations (fix.count), Average 
Fixation Duration (av.fix.dur), Number of Saccades (sacc.count), Average Saccade 
Duration (sacc.dur), Saccade Amplitude (sacc.amp), Saccade Velocity (sacc.vel), 
Saccade Angle (sacc.angle), and Average Pupil Size (av.pup.size). Note that the 
average durations refer to the average length of time of any given fixation or 
saccade as opposed to the average total length of time of fixations or saccades. 
 The same statistical method used in Chapter 3 was also used in this study. The 
following is a repetition of the details of the type of statistical method used. GLMMs 
present a flexible and convenient statistical framework with which to evaluate 
multiple hypotheses with respect to how response variables interact with each 
other (if at all) and affect the participant response, and do so while correcting for 
non-independence. GLMMs have advantages over analysis of variance (ANOVAs) for 
many reasons: 1) They allow for both categorical and continuous variables to be 
modeled (“mixed”) simultaneously; 2) They account for non-independence through 
the hierarchal modeling of random factors (e.g., participant number); and 3) They 
have greater statistical power since the analysis uses individual data points (with 
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non-independence accounted for by the random effect) as opposed to using 
averages (Kliegl et al., 2010; Barr et al., 2013; Bates et al., 2015; Singmann et al., 
In Press). This GLMMs framework was ideal for our study because our study 
considered continuous, categorical/count, and binary fixed effects of 66 
participants evaluating the same 30 pictures. In other words, multiple responses by 
a single participant are by definition non-independent, because they are done by 
the same individual. Thus by modeling participant as a random factor, we were able 
to control for this non-independence while taking advantage of the power provided 
by using multiple data points per participant.  
The analysis was performed using the R package lme4 (Bates et al., 2015) for the 
binomial, count, and continuous response variables. We used the “glmer()” 
command for binomial responses, which essentially performs a logistical regression 
contingent on random effects, and the “lmer()” command for continuous responses, 
which essentially performs a linear regression contingent on random effects. Using 
the ten response variables, we built 10 global models that included the following 
variables as part of the explanatory variable: country of origin, object difficulty 
(obj_diff), singelis, age, gender, and years of education (yoe) (see Table 4.1). The 
variables described collectively are believed to provide insight into the three 
objectives mentioned in the introduction.  
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Response Variables Global Models Distribution
Accuracy country *
1
 obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff Binomial
Reaction Time
2 country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy Normal
Fixation Count country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Negative Binomial 
Average Fixation Duration
2 country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Normal
Saccade Count country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Negative Binomial 
Saccade Duration
2 country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Normal
Saccade Amplitude
2 country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Normal
Saccade Velocity country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Normal
Saccade Angle country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Normal
Mean Pupil Size country * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff + accuracy + rt Normal
Table 4.1. Global models created to predict participants' responses to the Silouettes subtest. All models take 
the form: response variable ~ explanatory variables + (1|random effects). In addition to the variables shown 
below, all models contain the following explanatory variables and random effects: 
age+gender+yoe+(1|participant)+(1|picture). 
1 
"*": Denotes both the interactive and the additive effect
2
The following tranformation was made on the response variable: log(y)
Object difficulty was defined using the percentage of individuals in the original 
normative data set who correctly identified the object. This was how the creators 
of this test had determined the difficulty level of each image. We systematically 
eliminated non-influential variables from the global model until we identified the 
simplest model that best explained the data (the most parsimonious model), and 
we based our conclusions on this best-fit model. Specifically, to systematically 
reduce variables from the global model, the drop1 command was used to identify 
variables that did not explain a significant amount of variation in the response.  We 
evaluated these variables one-by-one, starting with the least influential one, by 
comparing the global model to a reduced model that excluded the variable. If a 
likelihood ratio test indicated no significant difference between the two nested 
models, the simpler model was then selected and the process of using the drop1 
command and likelihood ratio test was repeated until a significant difference was 
found between models, indicating that continuing to drop variables would represent 
a significant loss of explanatory power. At this point, the Akaike information 
criterion (AIC)—a measure that estimates the quality of each model relative to each 
other—for the two models was compared to determine which model was the better 
fit. This process continued until the more complex of the two models was 
considered to be the best-fit model, and we based our conclusions upon this best-fit 
model. All best fit models were also tested against the null hypothesis as further 
confirmation. The variables included in all best-fit models are considered 
significant at P <0.05. All variables excluded was due to non-significance at P >0.05. 
All best fit models for which a poisson distribution and a binomial distribution were 
selected, goodness of fit was accessed by confirming that the ratio of residual 
variance and degrees of freedom approached 1. For both fixation count and saccade 
count, the data were accessed to be over-dispersed which was then corrected for 
by using a negative binomial distribution.  
For all best fit models for which a normal distribution was selected (Table 4.1) it 
was confirmed graphically that the distribution of the residuals matched our 
selected distribution using a qqplot. The data for reaction time, average fixation 
duration, average saccade duration, saccade amplitude, and average pupil size 
 108
were assessed to be over-dispersed which were corrected for by performing a log 
transformation.  
Response variables presented in all graphs on the y-axis are predicted values 
derived from best fit models. In other words, graphs are not depictions of the raw 
data, but rather are depictions of the expected behavior based on the based fit 
model. 
Results 
In this study, we investigated whether the difference in performance on the 
Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP could be explained by a difference in eye 
movement patterns. The eye movement measures taken included 8 different 
variable. In addition, Singelis, Reaction Time, and Accuracy were also investigated. 
Best fit models for these variables are shown in Table 4.2. In addition to these 
variables, self-contrual was also measured using the Singelis Self-Construal Scale. 
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Fixation Count accuracy + rt
Average Fixation Duration
2 accuracy + rt




2 country + rt
Saccade Velocity country + rt
Saccade Angle rt
Mean Pupil Size rt
1 
"*": Denotes both the interactive and the additive effect.
2
The following tranformation was made on the response variable: log(y).
Table 4.2. Best fit models for participants' responses in the Silouettes 
Subtest. All models contains the random effects: 
(1|participant)+(1|picture).
First-level descriptive statistics were also done to compare Indian and British groups 
in order to understand where potential differences in perception may lie (Table 
4.3). 
 
Accuracy and reaction time, as explanatory variables, were seen to explain most of 
the variance seen in the response variables (Table 4.2) while age, yoe, and gender,  
were seen to not influence any of our response variables. Country of origin was 
seen to influence accuracy, saccade amplitude, and saccade velocity, however, 
despite our predictions, Singelis was not a significant predictor for any of our 
response variables measured (Table 4.2). 
Singelis - Collectivism vs Individualism 
The Singelis scores of India and British participants were not significantly different 
due to the high variance in the British sample (MIndia = -8.71(0.09), MUK = -3.91(0.62); 
p = 0.18, d = 0.34). 
Accuracy and Reaction Time 
Overall, the British were more accurate than the Indians in identifying the 
silhouetted objects; however the difference in performance alone did not reach 
significance (Table 4.3). Our best fit model for accuracy showed a significant 
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Response Variables India UK
Accuracy* 15.71 (0.48) 17.21 (0.57)
Reaction Time (sec) 6.97 (0.59) 7.91 (0.72)
Singelis -8.71(0.09) -3.91(0.62)
Fixation Count 20.25 (1.56) 22.46 (2.01)
Average Fixation Duration (sec) 0.29 (0.008) 0.29 (0.008)
Saccade Count 19.43 (1.56) 21.62 (2.07)
Saccade Duration (sec) 0.05 (0.003) 0.05 (0.004)
Saccade Amplitude 3.17 (0.06) 3.62 (0.01)
Saccade Velocity 84.53 (1.83) 89.85 (2.08)
Saccade Angle 7.54 (1.31) 4.51 (1.32)
Mean Pupil Size 1146.89 (55.43) 1103.98 (48.46)
Table 4.3. Means of response variables measured in Sihouettes subtest. Format of data 
is: Mean (SE).
*Average Score out of 30
interactive effect of country of origin and object difficulty level (Table 4.2). Object 
difficulty had a negative relationship with predicted accuracy. In other words, the 
performance of all participants predictably continued to drop as the objects 
became more difficult; however, this relationship showed to be stronger for the 
British than for the Indian; as expected, the British were more sensitive to object 
difficulty than the Indians-the British performed better than the Indian on the easy 
objects but worse than the Indians on the difficult objects (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1. Predicted accuracy rates from the Silhouettes Subtest. Data shown refer 
to the predicted accuracy with which Indians and the British are able to correctly 
identify the silhouetted objects across different difficulty levels. Predicted values 
were derived from the best fit model for accuracy. 
Of the 30 images in the set, six images showed a considerable difference in 
performance between the two cultures: Bicycle, Corkscrew, Frog, Key, Snail, 
Spanner. Of these six images, Indian participants out-performed the UK participants 


































































































































































































Figure 4.2. Accuracy rates of each picture from the Silhouettes Subtest. Data shown 
refer to the accuracy rates with which Indians and the British were able to correctly 
identify the silhouetted objects. Values were derived from the raw data for 
accuracy, and error bars refer to standard error. 
  
Our best fit model for reaction time suggested that culture did not explain a 
significant amount of the variance in reaction time. Rather the only variable 
retained was accuracy which was negatively correlated with reaction time—
participants reacted slower to questions they answered incorrectly. 
Eye Movement Data 
Of the eight different eye movement measurements taken, only models for saccade 
amplitude and saccade velocity showed an effect of country of origin—reaction time 
was also a significant predictor in these two models (Table 4.2).  Best fit models for 
both variables predicted that across all participants, saccade amplitude and 
saccade velocity decreased as reaction time increased, with both being greater for 







































Figure 4.3. Predicted saccade amplitude (a) and predicted saccade velocity (b) from 
the Silhouettes Subtest. Data refers to the predicted saccade amplitude (a) and 
predicted saccade velocity (b) of Indians and the British across reaction times. 
Predicted values were derived from the best fit models for saccade amplitude and 
saccade velocity. 
Our best fit models for fixation count, average fixation duration, and saccade 
count, suggested that only accuracy and reaction time explained a significant 
amount of the variance, such that all variables were negatively correlated with 
accuracy but positively correlated with reaction time—the longer participants 
looked at any given point, the longer it took for participants to react, and it also 
decreased the chances of answering correctly. Average fixation duration refers to 
the average length of time spent on any given fixation. 
Our best fit models for average saccade duration, saccade angle, and average pupil 
size, suggested that only reaction time explained a significant amount of the 
variance such that both saccade duration and average pupil size were positively 
correlated with reaction time, however saccade angle was negatively correlated 
with reaction time—participants’ had longer saccades and larger pupils when they 














































































































responded. Average saccade duration refers to the average length of time spent on 
any given saccade. 
Discussion 
The present study examined cultural differences in patterns of eye movement 
between Indian and British sample groups during the Silhouettes Subtest of the 
VOSP. In addition to examining country of origin, participants were asked to fill out 
a Singelis Self Construal Scale in order to investigate if variations in behavior could 
be explained by a social values scale. Our findings showed that Indians rated 
themselves as more collectivist than British participants with medium effect size 
though the difference was not statistically significant. It should be noted that the 
standard error of the British participants’ Singelis score was very high making it 
unclear as to whether this finding is a true representation of the population. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, it is possible that self-construal as collectivist/
individualist is not a consistent feature of British culture, whereas self-construal as 
collectivist is a more consistent feature of Indian culture. Hofstede’s scores of 
cultural dimensions for the UK were found to be very similar to the scores of the 
United States. For example, the cultural dimension with the highest rating for both 
countries was found to be individualism (UK: 89, US: 91); however, parts of the UK, 
Scotland and Wales in particular, have adopted more collectivist values into their 
social policies (Birrell, 2009). Recent political events including Brexit, Scottish and 
Catalonian independence, etc. have also brought light to a change in social ideology 
in continental Europe (Gobel, Benet-Martinez, Mesquita, & Uskul, 2018). Put 
together, the UK may not be so easily classified as one or the other in the 
collectivist-individualist dichotomy. The Singelis Self-Contrual Scale was specifically 
tailored to capture characteristics of collectivism and individualism hypothesized by 
Markus and Kitayama (1991). This scale has been widely used to study the 
relationship between self-construal and cultural difference in cognition, emotion, 
and motivation (Gudykunst & Lee, 2003), and has been used across different 
cultures (Besta, 2018; Dardara, 2018; D’Amico & Scrima, 2016). However, it has not 
been validated in India; no scales of self-contrual have been validated for both 
Indian and the UK, or have any scales been validates for India alone. Future 
 114
research should consider validating this scale or any other widely used scales, like 
the Gudykunst et al. (1996) Self-Construal Scale or the Swartz Value Scale, in the 
cultures being explored. A different option would be to include an ethnographic 
evaluation of self-construal, and implement a mixed methods approach, i.e. use but 
qualitative and quantitative research methods, as oppose to relying solely on 
quantitative measures that can be too reductionist or basing assumptions purely on 
historical knowledge. 
Self-construal did not have a significant effect on accuracy, reaction time, or any of 
the eye movement data; however, country of origin, did have an effect on accuracy, 
saccade amplitude, and saccade velocity. The overall performance of the UK 
participants was better than the Indian participants in terms of accuracy even 
though the difference did not reach significance. As expected, performance 
decreased as the difficulty level of the picture increased, however, the British were 
more affected by the difficulty levels. Meaning that the drop in performance as the 
objects became more difficult was greater than that seen by the Indians. This may 
be because the test was created based on the UK population, therefore, British 
participants may be more sensitive to the difficulty level of the object. When 
broken down picture-by-picture, we see that Indians significantly out performed the 
British on the Bicycle picture. This may be because bicycles, motorbikes, scooters, 
etc. are more of a staple mode of transportation within India than in the UK and, 
therefore, may be more prone to interpreting the image to be as such rather than a 
pogo stick or pneumatic drill, common answers made by British participants. The 
images in which the British significantly out-performed Indians included the Cork 
Screw, Spanner, Snail, Frog, and the Key. These differences in performance can, in 
part, be explained through cultural familiarity since a cork screw is an extremely 
uncommon tool in an Indian home. This may be because of high import taxes placed 
on alcohol that then reserve the use of a cork screw for those who can afford to buy 
alcohol that require one. Similarly, a spanner may not be very commonly used by 
everyone since the use of tools, in general, is typically done more often by those in 
the working class in India. Though this argument can also be made for those living 
in this UK, this trend tends to be more exaggerated in India because of its cheap 
labor costs compared to that in the UK. It should be noted that “bone” was a 
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common answer for “spanner” which might have been due to the fact that 
participants recruited in India were mainly working in the medical field (doctors, 
psychologist, PhD candidates in the neuro field, etc.) and so responses could have 
been biased accordingly. However, justifying the remaining items in terms of 
unfamiliarity is less likely since all three items are commonly seen and used in 
India. In Dutt et al., (2016)’s study, the authors had asked their Indian participants 
if they were familiar with each object as a yes/no question; a factor that was not 
evaluated in this study. Their participants largely chose “yes” for each object 
suggesting that familiarity was not driving the low performance of their Indian 
participants. However, this could be a matter of “degree of familiarity” as opposed 
to the dichotomous question of familiar vs unfamiliar. Future research should 
consider investigating the nuances of familiarity, looking into whether the answers 
given relate to the individual’s greater familiarity with their response as oppose to 
the “correct” answer. This also raises the question of whether this is an issue of 
perception or of decision making. Future research should also consider investigating 
whether the “correct” answer featured as a part of participants’ decision-making 
process or not. It is also worth noting that according to the Silhouettes Subtest’s 
scoring guidelines based on the UK normative data, the expected average score of 
British people is 23/30 with a cutoff of 15/30. In this study, British participants 
scored well below the expected average raising the question of whether a 
performance difference exists between English and Scottish people since a majority 
of participants taken in the UK sample were from Scotland. This may be a result of 
the normative sample collected during the creation of the subtest being heavily 
biases towards a specific subsection of the British population that did not capture 
the subsection of the British population that was sampled in this study. It could also 
be possible that the prevalence and/or the representation of certain items in 
British society has changed since 1991 when the subtest was first created 
(Warrington & James, 1991) and thus, features that would have been considered 
diagnostic for accurate identification may have changed leading to a drop in overall 
performance. Future research should consider not only re-evaluating the subtest for 
the UK population, but also consider investigating what is considered to be 
diagnostic, and whether those diagnostic features are different between cultures. 
One possible way of exploring this may be through the use of the Bubbles 
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technique, a technique used in face perception to determine which facial features 
are being used for facial recognition (Gosselin &  Schyns, 2001; Saumure et al., 
2018). It should also be noted that the administration of the objects in this study 
was in random order. This is contrary to how the assessment is given where the 
objects are shown in the same order to all patients, according to category-objects 
and animals-and the patients are prompted as to which category the silhouette 
belongs to. For example, “what animal is this?”. This was done to isolate whether 
or not a difference in perception of the specific object was contributing to the 
difference in performance. Future research can consider whether a difference in 
test administration affects test performance. 
Along with accuracy, country of origin was seen to significantly influence saccade 
amplitude and saccade velocity, but not any other type of eye movement 
measurements. Saccadic eye movements have been demonstrated to be linked with 
attention, showing that attentional shifts strongly influence the direction of 
voluntary saccadic movements (Hoffman & Subramaniam, 1995, Zhao et al., 2012). 
Saccadic amplitude as been shown to indicate peripheral or central attention 
allocation with shorter amplitudes indicating more central focus and larger 
amplitudes indicating more peripheral focus (Cajar et al, 2016). Here we see that 
the British participants had significantly larger saccadic amplitudes than Indians 
implying that British participants focused more on the periphery, or the outline, of 
the silhouettes relative to the Indians. This would also explain why the British were 
shown to have a greater saccade velocity since a greater distance was being 
covered in about the same amount of time as the Indians (this is being assumed 
from rt between the two cultural groups being not significantly different). Perhaps 
this is why British participants were able to perform better since shadows provide 
very little detail and identification is more reliant on the outer shape.  
This study, however, had several limitations. Participants recruited in India were all 
staff members or PhD candidates at NIMHANS and were therefore all in the medical 
field in some form. This may have biased certain answers. Furthermore, many 
participants were not able to come participate during working hours and so for 
many, data were collected in the early evening. Thus, cognitive functioning may 
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have been hampered which could have contributed to the reduction in performance 
in Indians. Furthermore, although all participants were all fluent in speak English, 
the study was not conducted in the native language of the Indian participants, 
making it unclear if any incorrect answers were a result of a loss in translation - 
participants may have known the word for the object in their native language but 
not the correct word in English. An example of this is described in the Discussion 
section of the next chapter. There were also some challenges in calibrating the eye 
movement of Indian participants in part it because some participants did not 
maintain a fixation long enough on any given calibration fixation point before and 
during the task. Furthermore, after the initial calibration, participants are required 
to keep their heads as still as possible which proved to be difficult for Indian 
participants because of a characteristic, side-to-side, Indian head nod that was 
continuous made in response to any form of conversation. Calibration accuracy was 
therefore reduced, thus affecting the quality of the eye movement measurements 
taken.  
Beyond the limitations mentioned above, certain factors taken could have been 
expanded upon to further understand which aspect of culture may have played a 
role in performance. For example, though years of education was recorded, quality 
of early education was overlooked, a factor that has been shown to influence 
cognitive development later in life (Sisco et al., 2015). Further research can look 
deeper into demographic information in order to gain a better understand of more 
specific factors that could be influencing performance on the Silhouettes subtest. 
In conclusion, a difference in performance between Indians and the British can be 
seen across difficulty levels in the Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP which is not 
driven by an adherence to any value system (individualism vs. collectivism). This 
difference may in part be explained by cultural familiarity and a difference in 
attention allocation to the periphery of each image between the two cultural 
groups, however further investigation is required to be able to make more 
definitive conclusions on these findings. In the next chapter, I extended this study 
by taking a different Indian sample-Kolkata-to bring more power to this current 
dataset, explore if a difference in performance existed between individuals from 
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Bangalore and Kolkata-despite both being Indian cultures, both represent two 
starkly different subsections of the Indian culture. In addition, I explore familiarity 
and perceived attention as potential driving factors. 
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5. The Influence of Familiarity on the Performance of Indian 
and British Participants on the Silhouettes Subtest of the 
Visual Object and Space Perception Battery. 
Abstract 
Objectives: Clinical neuropsychological tests evaluate conscious behavioral 
responses on tests that target specific cognitive domains. These standardized tests, 
mostly created in the U.S.A and Europe, show noticeably varied test responses 
when presented to individuals from other culturally distinct countries, making 
evaluations more uncertain. One such test is the Silhouettes Subtest of the Visual 
Object Space Perception Battery (VOSP). Dutt et al. (2016) showed that Indians 
performed significantly below their Spanish, Greek, and American counterparts, 
despite their comparable cognitive abilities. The specific explanation for this 
disparity remains unclear. We present two studies investigating whether eye 
movement, object familiarity, cultural relevance, and/or self-construal (the degree 
to which a person adheres to individualist or collectivist values), might account for 
any performance differences. 
Methods: A further 33 British and 34 Indian participants completed the Silhouettes 
test along with object familiarity questionnaires. The performance data of this 
study was combines with that of the previous study for analysis. Object features 
that participants reported they had specifically attended to during the 
identification process were also recorded.  
Results: The combined total Silhouettes subtest score between Indian and British 
participants was not significantly different, though the effect size was medium-
large (d=0.66). At the level of individual objects, the proportion of correct 
identifications was significantly different for 13 objects. The British outperformed 
Indian participants on 11 objects whilst the Indians outperformed the British on 2 
objects. Both the Indian and British samples showed a substantially lower 
performance than the original UK normative sample. Indians and British largely 
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overlapped in object features they reported they were attending to during 
identification. Familiarity with the objects did not explain the Indians’ poorer 
performance, nor was self-construal as collectivist/individualist an influential 
variable in predicting performance or eye movements. 
Conclusions: We found no evidence that self-construal or object familiarity explain 
the performance difference between Indians and the British on the objects in the 
Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP. Although there was no difference in ratings of 
familiarity with the real objects represented by the silhouettes, one possible 
explanation for differences in ability to identify some objects is that there are 
differences in degree of cultural relevance of the objects, and in the ways in which 
the objects are most commonly depicted within each culture. 
Introduction 
Alexander Romanovich Luria is accredited for his pioneering work in understanding 
cognition, neuropsychological test development (Luria, 1987), and for his work in 
bringing necessary attention to the influence of “culture” on cognition. Luria’s 
interest in the coordinated dance between culture and cognition are rooted in work 
carried out in Uzbekistan in 1931 and 1932, in association with Lev Vygotsky. Luria’s 
work was able to demonstrate that level of global exposure and schooling were 
determinants of performance on various cognitive tests that were used in his home 
country. In other words, illiterate Ichkari women living in remote villages that were 
disconnected from modern social activities performed vastly different than women 
who were exposed to greater socialization and were students of a teaching course 
(for review of Luria’s time in Uzbekistan, see Nell 1999). Luria’s observations were 
not limited to Uzbekistan, very similar results were also seen in a study done by 
Gilbert (1996) in South Africa. Even today, we see that not only length of education 
and global exposure, but quality of early education can also determine our 
cognitive abilities (Sisco, 2015). Though the work of Luria is iconic in the field of 
cultural neuropsychology, attention to the subject didn’t gain much traction until 
the turn of the century (Puente & Agranovich, 2013).  
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A majority of neuropsychological assessments have been created in countries that 
have historically been considered part of the “Western World”. As a result, 
cognitive tests were shaped to mimic the cognitive styles of the people who resided 
within this world. These assessments were globally standardized under the 
assumption that there existed a universalism in cognition and conscious behavior 
(Sperry, 1965). However, many studies have since shown that cognition is 
significantly influenced by the many factors that make up one’s environment 
(Tavassoli, 2002; Norenzayan, Smith, Kim, Nisbett, 2002; Hedden et al. 2002) and 
can lead to performance disparities in neuropsychological assessments (Arnold, 
Montgomery, Castañeda, Welsh et al., 1995; Teng et al., 2002; Patton, Duff, 
Schoenberg, Mold, Scott, & Adams, 2003; Oliveira, Salter, & Tomaz, 2012). One such 
assessment that has shown cultural differences in performance is the Visual Object 
Space Perception Battery (VOSP).  
The VOSP was created in 1991 by Elizabeth Warrington and Merle James in order to 
assess visual impairment as a result of cortical damage. It consists of 8 subtests (4 
for object perception and 4 for space perception) that were designed to evaluate 
different distinct aspects of object and space perception. The object perception 
subtests were based on a model which proposes three subtypes of impaired object 
recognition: disorders of visual sensory discrimination—inability to process certain 
sensory information including acuity, shape, and color discrimination; apperceptive 
agnosia— impaired object perception;  and associative agnosia—inability to derive 
meaning of an object despite having normal perceptual and sensory abilities 
(McCarthy & Warrington, 1990). Thus, it was inferred that object perception is, “a 
requisite to object recognition, which represents the successful integration of 
sensory, perceptual, and representational information,” (Rapport, Millis & Bonello, 
1998).  
When this battery was created, residents of the UK were used in the collection of 
normative data. Thus, stimuli were created around what was expected of British 
people. A small number of studies have investigated the effects of culture on 
performance on these subtests (Casals-Coll, 2013; Kosmidis, Tsotsi, Karambela, Takou, 
& Vlahou., 2010; Herrera-Guzman, Peña-casanova, Lara, Gudayol-Ferré, & Böhm, 
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2004; Bonello, Rapport, Millis, 1997). A recent study by Dutt et al., (2016) 
demonstrated a performance disparity between Indians residing in Kolkata and 
individuals originating from Spain, Greece, and the United States on the object 
perception subtests of the VOSP, thus begging the question of what factors could be 
contributing to their results.  
Many studies have reported differences in eye movements, measured using eye-
tracking technology, between people from different cultures in scene perception 
(Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, 2005; Masuda, Ishii, & Kimura, 2016; Duan, Wang, & 
Hong, 2016), with differences attributed to social structures categorized as 
collectivist or individualist. In Chapter 4, I conducted a study that explored the 
possibility of different eye movement patterns as a contributing factor to the 
performance difference between individuals from India and the UK—cultures 
historically perceived to be collectivistic and individualistic respectively—on the 
Silhouettes Subtest from the VOSP. Results showed little evidence that a difference 
in eye movements existed. Furthermore, the study showed that Indians and British 
participants did not significantly differ in their self-construal. In relation to 
accuracy in identifying silhouettes, there was not an overall significant difference 
in total score, but there were significant discrepancies on a number of individual 
objects in the test.  
In relation to eye-movements, it is possible that what participants were looking at 
may not have been what was being consciously attended to when viewing the 
silhouetted objects (Palmer, 1999). It is also possible that participants considered 
the correct answer as part of their decision-making process to identify the object 
but then selected an alternative answer. Furthermore, Dutt et al., (2016) had 
explored level of familiarity with the objects as a way to potentially explain 
differences in performance on the Silhouettes Subtest and found no evidence that 
familiarity discrepancies explained the poorer performance of their Indian 
participants; however since familiarity was investigated in a dichotomous 
framework— yes vs. no —participants in the study reported a high level of 
familiarity because a majority of participants selected “yes” when asked whether 
or not they were familiar with the objects in the test. Therefore, the aim of this 
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study was to investigate the degree of familiarity of the Silhouettes Subtest objects 
compared to common alternative responses that were given in our previous study 
(see chapter 4). Furthermore, this study aimed to investigate whether the correct 
answer was considered by participants when presented with the images (before 
giving an incorrect answer), and whether a cultural difference is seen in the areas 
of the silhouetted images the participant felt had caught their attention when 
presented with the image. In addition, the Singelis Self-Construal Scale was also 
administered in order to supplement our previous data set and add power to our 
findings. This study was conducted in Kolkata, India and performance data on the 
Silhouettes Subtest was combined with the data we collected in Bangalore, India, 
thus allowing for greater power to our performance/accuracy data, and also adding 
an additional dimension of investigation of possible intra-cultural differences. India, 
being very culturally diverse, is more starkly contrasted between North and South 
India. Therefore, potential differences in performance between our Bangalore and 
Kolkata samples may also be present.   
Based on our aims, we tested the following hypotheses that: 
1) a difference in performance/accuracy on the identification of the silhouetted 
objects will be seen between Indians and the British. 
2) a difference in performance will be seen between individuals residing in Kolkata 
vs. Bangalore. 
3) the chance of correctly identifying an object will be influenced by how familiar 
the participant is with the object. The influence the degree of familiarity will 
have on accurately identifying the shadowed objects will differ between Indians 
and the British. 
4) areas of the silhouetted images that participants felt they attended to will 
differ between Indians and the British. 
5) performance differences will partially be explained by participants thinking of 




Participants and Recruitment 
Thirty-three British participants were recruited at the University of Glasgow (16:17 
female:male, mean age: 30, mean years of education: 15)  and 34 Indian 
participants were recruited at the Duttanagar Mental Health Center, Kolkata (17:17 
female:male, mean age: 28, mean years of education: 18). A sample of ~33/cultural 
group is in accordance with what has been recommended for this type of analysis 
(Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). The study conducted by Dutt et al. (2016) 
found a very significant difference in performance between their Indian 
participants and their European and American counterparts (effect sizes ranging 
from 0.64 - 1.87). However, in our previous study, we found the difference in 
performance to not reach significance. We determined the sample size based on 
this, powering the study to be able to detect an effect size of 0.7 with an α = 0.05 
and power = 0.8, leading to the requirement for a sample size of 33 in each 
participant group (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, 
& Lang, 2009). All Indian and British participants were born and raised in India and 
the UK respectively. For the purposes of comparing performance on the Silhouettes 
Subtest between the two groups and Singelis Self-Construal Scale scores, the data 
collected for this study were combined with our previous data collected (see 
Chapter 4) to give a total of 66 participants per cultural group, and thus increasing 
the power of the analysis, so that it would be possible to detect an effect size of 
d=0.49.  
Participants in the UK were recruited via online ads placed on community forums 
(e.g., The Student Voice), and social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter). Additionally, 
individuals registered with the University of Glasgow Subject Pool, maintained by 
the Psychology Department, were emailed an advert for the study. Volunteers were 
paid £6/hr for their participation in the study. 
Participants in India were recruited through known associates in coordination with 
staff members at the Duttanagar Mental Health Centre. Participants were provided 
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with tea or water and biscuits, and any travel expenses were covered. Participants 
were not paid for participating as this was not normal practice at the Institute.   
Ethics Approval 
All procedures and materials used were approved by the Review Boards of both the 
University of Glasgow College of Medical, Veterinary and Life Sciences, and the 
DMHC, Kolkata. All participants who passed the initial screening gave written 
informed consent before proceeding.  
Screening 
All participants were asked to fill out a demographic form where they were asked 
about their age, gender, years of education, where they have lived and for how 
long. They were also asked to self-identify their ethnicity, and the ethnicity of their 
parents and grandparents (both maternal and paternal). Participants were also 
asked if they had a history of brain injury or cognitive disfunction and were 
excluded if they did. Anyone who was under the age of 18 or who did not self-
identify themselves or their family members as solely one of the British or Indian 
ethnic groups were excluded. Those who passed this initial screening then 
proceeded to the experimental tasks. 
Materials and Procedure 
All procedures were conducted in English for all participants in the UK, and in 
either English or Bengali with the participants India, depending on which language 
the participants felt most comfortable speaking. The study was conducted by the 
same researcher, who is well versed in both English and Bengali, for all participants 
in both the UK and in India. 
In the test phase, the thirty images of the Silhouettes Subtest (15 animate, 15 
inanimate) were presented one-by-one in random order to each participant. The 
participants were asked to identify the real object that each shadow represented. 
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The participants were reassured that the shadowed images were of real objects and 
that, “I don’t know” was a valid response. There was also no time limit given.  
After presenting all 30 images, the researcher moved onto the second phase of the 
study. The same 30 images were presented in the same order to the participants 
again, this time asking the participants to describe their thought process when 
identifying the object. More specifically, they were asked if any other objects had 
come to mind when they saw each image of the silhouette: 
“when you looked at this picture, did any other objects come to mind?”  
Furthermore, the researcher asked the participants to point to the parts of each 
image that had caught their attention when they looked at each image. Parts that 
were indicated by the participants were circled by the researcher. 
Based on our previous study (see Chapter 4) conducted at the University of Glasgow 
and at the National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (NIMHANS), 
Bangalore, objects that less than 80% of participants were able to accurately 
identify were noted along with the incorrect answers—this evaluation was done 
separately for the UK and Indian sample groups. This was considered to be a 
reasonable cut-off by the researcher. Each of those objects were made into 
individual categories, and each of those categories consisted of the incorrect 
guesses made by the participants for that object—the first object listed in each 
category was the correct silhouetted object. After completing the tasks described 
above, participants were then presented with a questionnaire that contained the 
categories as previously mentioned. Participants were then asked to first rate how 
familiar they felt they were with each object listed in each category on a scale of 1 
(no familiarity) to 10—extremely familiar. Familiarity was described as how often 
one sees the object in everyday life, interacts with the object, sees the object in 
media such as in movies, television, books, magazines, social media content, etc., 
and how pervasive the object is in their cultural atmosphere such as in mythological 
or culturally iconic stories and symbolisms, religion, etc. After completing this 
questionnaire, participants were presented with a second questionnaire that was 
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exactly the same as the first questionnaire, but this time, participants were asked 
to imagine their understanding of an average British/Indian person (ie. Britons were 
asked about an average British person and Indians about the average Indian person) 
and then rate the objects according to their assumptions of how familiar that 
person would be with the objects.  
The last task that the participants was asked to complete was the Singelis Self 
Construal Scale (Singelis, 1994). This scale consists of 30 statements regarding 
social situations, 15 of which describe situation that are more characteristic of 
individualism and the other 15 are more characteristic of collectivism. Participants 
were asked to rate how much they agreed for disagreed with the statement on a 
1-7 Likert Scale. The scores of the 15 individualistic statements and 15 collectivist 
statements are added up separately and a score is calculated using the following 
formula: Total Score Individualism - Total Score Collectivism. A more negative score 
is indicative of greater collectivism and vice versa. 
Data Analysis 
We used generalized linear mixed models (GLMMs) to determine if there were 
cultural differences in participants’ responses to the Silhouette subtest. We chose 
accuracy as our response variable and created three global models that included 
the following variables: country of origin (country), location (Kolkata, Bangalore, or 
the UK), object difficulty (obj_diff), singelis, age, gender, years of education (yoe), 
and MMSE (see Table 5.1). Object difficulty was defined using the percentage of 
individuals in the original normative data set who correctly identified the object. 
This was how the creators of this test had determined the difficulty level of each 
image. 
We systematically eliminated non-influential variables from the global model until 
we identified the simplest model that best explained the data (the most 
parsimonious model), and we based our conclusions on this best-fit model. For 
greater detail on GLMMs and how best fit models are obtained, refer to the data 
analysis of the methodology section in chapters 3 and 4.  
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All best fit models were also tested against the null hypothesis as further 
confirmation. The variables included in all best-fit models are considered 
significant at P <0.05. All variables excluded was due to non-significance at P >0.05. 
A binomial distribution was selected for all best fit models, and so goodness of fit 
was accessed by confirming that the ratio of residual variance and degrees of 
freedom approached 1. Response variables presented in all graphs on the y-axis are 
predicted values derived from best fit models. 
When participants were asked about other objects that came to mind when 
evaluating the shadowed image, all alternative answers were recorded. For objects 
that were incorrectly identified, if the correct answer was mentioned as part of the 
participants’ thought process, a notation was made and the proportion of objects 
which were correctly identified but was ultimately dismissed out of all incorrect 
answers was calculated for people from India and from the UK. 
Features of each shadowed object that participants indicated had caught their 
attention when viewing them were noted and given a specific code. Commonly 
indicated features were tallied and features that at least 30% of participants had 
pointed towards were extracted. The researcher determined that extracting the 
features that at about 1/3 of the participants indicated as grabbing their attention 
was a reasonable cut-off. This was evaluated separately between Indians and the 
British and were then compared to each other to see how much overlap there was 
between the two cultures.  
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Response Variables Global Models Distribution
Accuracy country *
1
 obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff Binomial
Accuracy location * obj_diff + singelis * obj_diff Binomial
Accuracy country * familiarity + singelis * familiarity Binomial
 
Table 5.1. Global models created to predict participants' responses to the 
Silouettes subtest. All models take the form: response variable ~ explanatory 
variables + (1|random effects). In addition to the variables shown below, all 
models contain the following explanatory variables and random effects: 
age+gender+yoe+mmse+(1|participant)+(1|picture). 
1 
"*": Denotes both the interactive and the additive effect
Results 
In this study, country of origin (India or the UK), location (Kolkata, Bangalore, or 
the UK), and familiarity were tested as a function of accuracy. Best fit models are 
shown in Table 5.2. In addition to these variables, self-contrual was also measured 
using the Singelis Self-Construal Scale. 
First-level descriptive statistics were done to compare Indian and British groups on  
their overall performance and Singelis scores (Table 5.3). 
Singelis - Collectivism vs Individualism 
As reported in the previous chapter, the Singelis scores of the Bangalore and UK 
samples of the previous study were not significantly different (MBangalore = 
-8.71(0.09), MUK = -3.91(0.62); p = 0.18, d = 0.34). Looking at the Singelis scores of 
the Kolkata and UK samples taken for this study, the Singelis scores were also not 
significantly different ((MKolkata = 3.26(2.14), MUK = 3.53(5.84); p = 0.96, d = 0.055) 
Thus, the overall Singelis scores of Indians (both Bangalore and Kolkata samples 
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Accuracy location * obj_diff
Accuracy country * familiarity
1 
"*": Denotes both the interactive and the additive effect.
Table 5.2. Best fit models for participants' responses in the Silouettes 
Subtest. All models contains the random effects: 
(1|participant)+(1|picture).
Response Variables India UK
Accuracy* 15.91 (0.40) 18.06 (0.46)
Singelis -2.63(1.33) -1.58(2.99)
Table 5.3. Means of response variables measured in Sihouettes 
subtest. Format of data is: Mean (SE).
*Average Score out of 30
combined) and British participants were also not significantly different (MIndia = 
-2.63(1.33), MUK = -1.58(2.99); p = 0.75, d = 0.07) (Table 1). 
Accuracy — India vs. UK 
This analysis looked at the combined data sets as a whole. Though the overall 
performance of the British was greater than the Indians, the difference in 
performance alone did not reach significance (Table 5.3). Our best fit model for 
accuracy showed a significant interactive effect of country of origin and object 
difficulty level (Table 5.2). Object difficulty had a negative relationship with 
predicted accuracy. In other words, the performance of all participants predictably 
continued to drop as the objects became more difficult. This relationship, once 
again predictably, showed to be stronger for the British than for the Indians, i.e. 
the British were more sensitive to object difficulty than the Indians in that the 
British performed better than the Indians on the easy objects but worse than the 
Indians on the difficult objects (Figure 5.1). 
Figure 5.1. Predicted accuracy rates from the Silhouettes Subtest. Data shown refer 
to the predicted accuracy with which Indians and the British are able to correctly 
identify the silhouetted objects across different difficulty levels. Predicted values 









































Accuracy — Location: Bangalore vs. Kolkata vs. UK 
Our best fit model for accuracy showed a significant interactive effect of location 
and object difficulty level (Table 5.2). Object difficulty had a negative relationship 
with predicted accuracy and followed the same pattern as described above (Figure 
5.2). Furthermore, Indians from Bangalore and Kolkata performed very similar to 
each other.  
 
Figure 5.2. Predicted accuracy rates from the Silhouettes Subtest. Data shown refer 
to the predicted accuracy with which individuals from Kolkata, Bangalore, and the 
UK are able to correctly identify the silhouetted objects across different difficulty 
levels. Predicted values were derived from the best fit model for accuracy. 
Accuracy - Familiarity 
Our best fit model for accuracy showed a significant interactive effect of country of 
origin and familiarity (Table 5.2). The data used for this analysis only included the 
Kolkata and UK sample from this study as familiarity was not taken as a measure in 
















































however, this relationship was stronger for the British than for the Indians. In other 
words, the probability of a British individual correctly identifying one of the 
silhouettes increased as their familiarity with the object increased; however, the 
probability of an Indian to correctly identify one of the shadowed images was 
unaffected by how familiar they were with objects. These results were seen for 
both the participants’ rating of their personal familiarity with the objects, and with 
the participants’ rating of their perception of an average person from their 
country’s familiarity with the objects (Figure 5.3) 
Figure 5.3. Predicted accuracy rates from the Silhouettes Subtest. Data shown refer 
to the predicted accuracy with which individuals from India and the UK are able to 
correctly identify the silhouetted objects relative to how familiar they are to the 
shadowed object (a) and how familiar the participants’ perception of the average 
person from their respective countries are to the shadowed objects (b). Predicted 
values were derived from the best fit model for accuracy. 
Object Evaluation 
For  13% (261/2010) of the incorrect answers made by the Kolkata sample, it was 
reported that the correct answer was something the participant had thought about 
whilst attempting to identify the object from the silhouettes. In other words, for 




























































































sample, the correct answer had occurred to the participant, but the participant 
decided to provide a different object as their final answer. In some cases, upon 
looking at the image a second time, participants were able to perceive the correct 
object—it had not occurred to them previously in the test phase. This, however, 
only occurred for 3% (60/2010) of all the incorrect answers given by the Kolkata 
sample. 
For 18% (356/1980) of the incorrect answers made by the UK sample, it was 
reported that the correct answer was something they had thought about whilst 
attempting to identify the object from the silhouettes. In other words, for 18% of 
all the incorrect answers given across all the participants in the UK sample, the 
correct answer had occurred to the participant, but the participant decided to 
provide a different object as their final answer. For 10% (198/1980) of all the 
incorrect answers, participants were able to perceive the correct object when 
looking at the image for the second time during the discussion phase although it 
had not occurred to them previously in the test phase. 
Attended Object Features 
The objects in which accuracy differed between Indians and British participants by 
greater than 10% include: Corkscrew, Dustpan, Key, Frog, Deckchair, Binoculars, 
Rabbit, Spanner, Snail, Bear, Bicycle, and Sunglasses. Of these objects, the Bicycle 
and the Sunglasses were the only two objects in which the Indians outperformed 
the British. It is also worth noting that the performance of many of these by both 
the Indians and the British participants greatly differed from the normative data. 
Objects for which the performance of both Indians and the British differed from the 
norm by greater than 10% include: Cork Screw, Dustpan, Pig, Cow, Key, Frog, 




In looking at which features of the objects participants felt had caught their 
attention, many of the features largely overlapped between the Indians and the 
British. Figure 5.4 depicts the 3 animal and 3 object silhouettes with the largest 
performance disparity between the Indians and the British. 
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Picture
UK Norm UK Sample India Sample
Camel 100 90 97
Cup 100 100 97
Elephant 100 90 97
Penguin 99 96 93
Corkscrew 93 48 10
Dustpan 93 38 6
Pig 93 69 60
Bicycle 85 52 80
Shoe 85 82 90
Cow 84 63 57
Rabbit 83 85 57
Ladder 82 67 74
Spanner 81 73 48
Snail 80 73 40
Crocodile 79 69 72
Tractor 79 83 75
Key 78 46 19
Bear 77 67 55
Frog 77 65 58
Kangaroo 77 65 58
Deckchair 76 63 48
Rhinoceros 68 27 16
Sheep 67 29 25
Scissors 65 64 61
Pick Axe 59 19 28
Seal 57 44 39
Watch 54 90 88
Binoculars 45 29 40
Sunglasses 36 29 48
Duck 15 4 4
Accuracy Rates (%)
Table 5.4. Accuracy rates for participants from India, the UK, and 
from the UK normative data for each picture in the Silhouettes 
subtest of the VOSP.
Figure 5.4. Features that have been indicated by at least 30% of participants when 
asked which features of each object caught their attention when they looking at 
the image. 
Discussion 
This study aimed to investigate degree of familiarity, decision-making, and focal 
features as potential factors driving the difference in performance between Indians 
and British on items in the Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP. In addition to examining 
these factors, participants were asked to fill out a Singelis Self Construal Scale in 
order to investigate if variations in behavior could be explained by a social values 
scale. Our findings showed that though Indians, overall, rated themselves as more 
collectivist than British participants, there was a difference in how individuals 
scored between the two studies-people from Kolkata rated themselves as more 
individualistic than individuals from Bangalore. Similarly, the British sample from 
this study rated themselves as being more individualistic than the British 
participants of this study. However, the standard errors of both British samples were 
very high making conclusions on collectivism and individualism unclear. Though the 
UK and India are considered to be individualistic and collectivistic cultures 
respectively (Hofstede Insights, 2018), the high variation within each culture, 
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particularly the British culture, does not allow for the Singelis Scale to clearly 
classify the two cultures along a collectivism-individualism scale. The high variation 
could be due to globalization, exposing each other to different global perspectives, 
thus shifting values within each culture towards a more amalgamated global view 
(Shah, 2009; Majima & Savage, 2007). The two cultures may currently be in a state 
of cultural transition thus leading to the large variations seen on the Singelis Self-
Construal Scale.   
Self-construal did not have a significant effect on accuracy; however country of 
origin and familiarity both did have an effect. In conjunction with our previous 
study, the overall performance of the UK participants was better than the Indian 
participants, but did not reach significance. Furthermore, performance decreased 
as the difficulty level of the picture increased. Just as we saw in our previous study, 
the British were more sensitive to difficulty level in that the drop in performance as 
the objects became more difficult was greater than that seen by the Indians. In 
addition to comparing Indians and British, we were able to investigate cultural 
differences present within the Indian culture. Kolkata and Bangalore are considered 
to be considerably different from one another. For example, the language mainly 
spoken by those who reside in Kolkata is Bengali, a Sanskrit based language, 
whereas people living in Bangalore mainly speak Kannada, a Dravidian based 
language. This lends itself to potential performance differences on the Silhouettes 
Subtest; however the performance of participants from Bangalore and Kolkata was 
virtually the same, indicating that the overall lower performance of Indians, though 
marginally significant, may have more to do with unifying characteristics of 
“Indian” as oppose to the differences. It is important to note, however, that India 
possesses far more cultures than that seen in Bangalore and Kolkata, and that the 
results seen in this study should be generalized with caution. Future research can 
benefit from continuing to compare performances from other Indian cultures in 
order to gain a more complete picture. Our results also showed a discrepancy 
between the performance of our UK participants and the UK normative data that 
was originally used during the creation of the Silhouettes Subtest on at least half 
the objects, bringing into question whether the subtest has cultural variations 
within the UK. Though the lower cut-off for healthy individuals in this age group is 
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15, the expected performance is 23. Considering this, only two British participants 
scored above this—they both had a score of 24 and were the highest score amongst 
all the participants—and the rest all scored below 23. The participants in this study 
were all residents of Glasgow, Scotland and the subtest was created using denizens 
of London as the normative data. This is not necessarily representative of the 
British people since the UK consists of four different countries. The difference in 
performance within the UK culture could also be a result of a change in 
representation of these objects over time thus rendering the shadowed objects of 
the subtest less recognizable. Future research should also consider administering 
this subtest in different parts of the UK to see if the difference in performance 
persists. It should also be noted that the administration of the objects in this study 
was in random order. This is contrary to how the assessment is given where the 
objects are shown in the same order to all patients, according to category-objects 
and animals-and the patients are prompted as to which category the silhouette 
belongs to. For example, “what animal is this?”. Future research can consider 
whether this should be considered when design their studies. 
One potential factor that was thought to influence the difference in performance 
between Indians and British was familiarity with the objects themselves. In the 
study undertaken by Dutt et al., (2016), participants were asked whether or not 
they were familiar with the objects in the Silhouettes Subtest. A majority of their 
participants claimed to be familiar with the objects. However, we speculated that 
perhaps degree of familiarity was influencing participants’ answers. In other words, 
though participants were familiar with the objects themselves, because they were 
relatively more familiar with a different object that could be represented by the 
silouette, they were more likely to answer with the object of dominant familiarity. 
Our results showed that only the British were more likely to provide a correct 
answer if they had a higher familiarity with the object but Indians did not appear to 
be significantly affected by self-rated familiarity. The same pattern was also seen 
when rating objects based on the individual’s perception of an average person from 
their country’s familiarity with the objects. This was indicative that relative 
familiarity with the object may not be what is driving the performance differences, 
not only for the participants themselves but equally at a societal level since Indians 
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felt the prevalence of these objects to have a similar pattern as themselves at a 
societal level. This is limited, of course, because the judgement of familiarity to 
the individual’s culture as a whole is still based on the person’s understanding of 
their society which can be tied to personal identity. It is perhaps not surprising that 
individuals would rate familiarity with an object at a societal level similar to their 
personal level. In other words, this is not, necessarily, an accurate representation 
of the whole culture, but it does give insight into individuals’ understanding of their 
own culture. In India, surveys, particularly customer service surveys, have come 
into greater popularity in recent years with the rise of certain services, like home 
deliveries, and Whatsapp through which customers are sent these surveys. These 
questionnaires usually rate on a scale of 1-5. Since the questionnaires of this study 
were on a scale of 1-10, the researcher for this study faced some difficulty in 
explaining the concept to the participants in Kolkata, a difficulty that was not 
faced with the UK participants. It should be emphasized that making judgements of 
subjectivity along a more concrete, numeric scale may not be considered intuitive 
to how such judgments are generally made by people living in Kolkata. This may 
mean that the familiarity data for the Indians may not be reliable and thus, 
familiarity as a driving factor should be investigated further.     
Our results also showed that participants generally did not think of the correct 
object during their conscious process of identifying the shadowed objects, which 
would suggest that the difference in performance is not due to individuals deciding 
to choose a different object as their final identification of the shadowed objects. 
Participants also largely overlapped in features that they felt had caught their 
attention when looking at the images. This would suggest that participants from 
both cultures find, for the most part, attend to the same features when looking at 
objects for identification; however, despite this, Indians and the British are still 
ultimately coming to different conclusions.  
This study has several limitations that should be addressed. One limitation is that 
the conditions in which the participants in the UK were given the various tasks of 
this study were very different from those in Kolkata. UK participants sat in a quiet 
room with no distractions while in Kolkata, the study was conducted in various 
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environments including different home settings, libraries, and labs. Because of the 
general rhythm of the Indian culture, access to a private space with no 
interruptions was a near impossibility. Other interruptions, such as the answering of 
phone calls, conversations being started with other members present within the 
same space, etc. were very prevalent in Kolkata. The researcher-participant 
dynamic also played a major factor. Many participants insisted on speaking in 
English despite having poor fluency in English, and the researcher persisting to 
speak in the native language of the participant. This study was also limited in that 
the demographic factors that were controlled for in the UK did not necessarily 
translate in India. For example, the concept of defining one’s ethnicity, a question 
that was asked of the UK participants, was something that did not make sense to 
the Indian participants—instead, participants were asked to define their Indian-ness 
as the closest alternative to the original question. Similarly, certain demographic 
factors in India that could have played a factor in performance are not factors that 
exist in the UK. For example, the caste system strongly influences an individual’s 
access to education (Borooah & Iyer, 2004). Furthermore, education is widely varied 
in the language in which students are taught and the standardized curriculum they 
follow. The quality of education varies widely in India, which has been shown to 
influence cognition later in life (Sisco et al., 2015). Future research should consider 
doing a critical analysis of what would be considered to be demographic 
information in different cultures, and how these factors may contribute to cognitive 
differences seen between Indians and the British. 
In conclusion, features that are consciously attended to largely overlap indicating 
that features that are being attended to are more-or-less the same between 
cultures. This would mean that the same features lead to different conclusions 
between Indians and the British, resulting in Indians performing worse than the 
British for certain items. The wrong conclusions made by the Indians can not be 
explained by how familiar they are with the object, nor does it appear to be part of 
their conscious thought process when identifying the shadowed objects. Our 
previous study did not show any differences in eye movement when Indians and the 
British were looking at the silhouetted objects which would suggest that the 
difference in performance is not due to a difference in perceptual information 
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gathered. However, future research should explore this further since no other study 
has been done that has investigated cultural differences in eye movement and 




The main purpose of this thesis was to explore the influence of culture on visual 
perception. Specifically, this thesis focused on whether eye movement patterns 
observed in scene perception studies would reveal perceptual differences between 
Indians and British participants, and whether these differences in eye movements 
could be used to explain performance differences seen between Indians and the 
British on the Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP—a widely used visual perceptual 
neuropsychological assessment battery. First, a systematic review was conducted to 
examine how technologies including eye-tracking, EEG, and fMRI have been used to 
detect cultural differences during scene or object perception. In addition to this, 
the review explored the lens through which culture was defined to explain 
perceptual differences observed, and also the specific cultural groups used to 
exemplify the lens used. This gave insight as to how cultural differences could 
potentially manifest during scene or object perception, thus providing the 
framework for the studies conducted in this thesis. The systematic review revealed 
that a majority of studies explored culture through the East-West dichotomy, linking 
this paradigm to concepts of Individualism and Collectivism. They suggested that 
since cultures of the East practice a more collectivist social structure, more holistic 
thinking would be expected, and thus, a cognitive strategy involving relations 
between objects or context dependency would predominate. Complimentary to 
this, the studies suggested that since cultures of the West practice individualism in 
their societies, more analytical thinking would be expected, and this is reflected in 
a cognitive strategy that is more absolute or independent of contextual 
information. However, the cultures used by the majority of the studies to illustrate 
the two categories were individuals of Chinese heritage to represent “Eastern” and 
Americans to represent “Western”. Furthermore, the classification of these cultural 
groups was mostly done based on what is generally understood about these 
cultures. A majority of studies did not corroborate whether the assumptions made 
about the East and West in relation to individualism and collectivism were truly 
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exhibited by their participant groups. The review also revealed that only one study 
explored cultural differences in single object perception, i.e. with no background 
(Paige, Ksander, Johndro, & Gutchess, 2017) and all other studies had explored 
scene perception. Furthermore, eye-tracking during scene perception was, by far, 
the technology and paradigm most used to explore visual perceptual differences 
between cultures. Though these studies did suggest differences in eye movements 
that mimicked patterns predicted for Eastern-Western/Collectivist-Individualist 
individuals, there were some inconsistencies across studies (Rayner, Li, Williams, 
Cave, & Well, 2007; Evans, Rotello, Li, & Rayner, 2009; Rayner, Castelhano, & Yang; 
2009; Millet, Zhou, He, Rodger, & Caldera, 2010). In addition, if the scene 
perception paradigm could detect cultural differences in eye movement, it still 
remained unclear if the patterns shown in previous studies would exhibit in other 
cultures that are historically considered to be part of the “East” and “West” and 
have been generally assumed to have collectivist or individualist social structures.  
Taking what was understood from the systematic review, the scene perception study 
first conducted by Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, (2005), was replicated using individuals 
who are of UK and Indian origin and have only resided in either the UK or India, 
respectively, their whole life. These two cultures are historically considered to be 
part of the “East”—India—and “West”—UK. Moreover, India is thought to incorporate 
collectivism into their lifestyle, and UK lifestyle is thought to largely have 
individualistic characteristics; however, with current shifts in cultures due to 
factors like globalization, such a clear division in social values may no longer be 
apparent, even if it was previously. Chua, Boland, & Nisbett, (2005)’s study was also 
repeated to add to the repertoire of studies that have already been undertaken 
using this paradigm with the aim of bringing greater clarity to the association 
between culture and eye movement during scene perception. This first study 
incorporated the generalized linear mixed models statistical method to analyze the 
data which revealed the pattern of eye movement on the background of the scene 
did not differ between Indians and the British, but did differ in the focal object. 
When participants made shorter fixations, the number of fixations made by both 
the Indians and the British were comparable, however, as each fixation increased in 
duration, the number of fixations made by the Indians remained unchanged 
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however the British made far few fixations. This would suggest that Indians spent a 
shorter time in between each long fixation than the British. In other words, this 
would suggest that the British spend more time scanning the focal object in 
between long fixations. Scanning as oppose to focusing on any one point is more 
characteristic of holistic thinking, therefore, this could indicate that the British 
take a more holistic approach when looking at the focal object whereas the Indians 
take a more analytical approach. This doesn’t necessarily follow the overall pattern 
of eye movement in previous studies that suggest holistic and analytic perceptual 
approaches on based on the whole image. Furthermore, Indians and British did not 
significantly differ in self construal. This would suggest that the difference in eye 
movement may not be related to concepts of collectivism or individualism.  
The second study explored whether or not the differences in eye movement could 
explain the performance difference demonstrated in the Dutt et al. (2016) study on 
the Silhouettes subtest. Individuals were presented with the Silhouettes Subtest of 
the VOSP which consists of 30 images of silhouetted objects (15 animate, 15 
inanimate). The pictures were presented in random order and participants’ eyes 
were tracked. Since differences in eye movement between Indians and the British 
were only seen in the focal object of the scenes, we expected to see a similar 
difference for the silhouetted objects even though these images didn’t have any 
background. Using the generalized linear mixed models statistical method, our 
results were contrary to what was expected. Performance, alone, was not 
significantly different between Indians and the British; significance in performance 
was only seen with an interactive effect with object difficulty. Furthermore, self 
construal did not explain a significant amount of the variance for any variable and 
very little difference was seen between the Indians the British in eye movement 
patterns. Differences between the Indians and the British were only seen in saccade 
amplitude and in saccade velocity in a manner that would suggest that the British 
allocated more attention to the periphery of the shadowed images compared to the 
Indians. This may be enough to drive the difference in performance examined 
across object difficulty, between the Indians and the British but it was also 
important explore certain other factors, such as cultural relevance and decision 
making, as potential factors. Though familiarity was examined in Dutt et al., 
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(2016)’s study it was explored on a yes/no basis which did not tap into how familiar 
individuals were with the objects in the Silhouettes subtest. Thus in the third study, 
degree of familiarity with the object, and whether participants were able to 
perceive the correct object but then decided to settle for a different object were 
tested. Participants were, once again, presented with the Silhouettes Subtest in 
random order. After being presented with all the images, participants were asked if 
any other objects had come to mind when looking at the image, and which features 
of the image had caught their attention. After this discussion, participants were 
asked to rate and rank a list of objects in categories specific to particular 
silhouetted objects. Each category contained the actual silhouetted object the 
category was based on. It is important to note that the Indians from the first two 
studies were residents of Bangalore, India, and the Indians in the third study were 
residents of Kolkata. This is important, given the diversity that exists within India, 
particularly between a North Indian culture—Kolkata—and a South Indian culture—
Bangalore. The third study allowed for the added dimension of investigating 
potential intra-cultural differences. Our results revealed that Indians from 
Bangalore and Kolkata showed very little difference in performance from each 
other, and that the performance of Indians overall was lower, but not 
significantly,than the British. Furthermore, the performance of both Indians and UK 
participants showed a disparity on many of the items in comparison to the expected 
performance level—based on the normative data. Our results also revealed that 
only a small portion of the incorrect answers could be explained by decision making
—participants had named the correct answer as being part of their thought process 
for only a small proportion of all the incorrect answers—suggesting that participants 
considering the true object, but then dismissing it favor of a different object is not 
a strong explanation for the performance difference seen between Indians and the 
British on items in the Silhouettes Subtest. Furthermore, features of each image 
that participants felt that they were commonly attended to when viewing each 
image largely overlapped between the two cultural groups suggesting that 
individuals from both cultural groups were attending to similar features. In looking 
at how participants rated and ranked their level of familiarity to the silhouetted 
objects, our results showed that the performance of the British depended on how 
familiar they were with the objects, but Indians were not influenced by familiarity. 
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This would suggest that the sensitivity of the British individuals to object familiarity 
might explain differences in their performance compared to the normative data—
cultural relevance to some of these items may have changed within the UK from the 
time in which the subtest was first created; however object familiarity does not 
appear to largely explain the performance difference between the British and the 
Indians.   
Implications and Future Research 
Cross-cultural research has proposed different theories to explain the mechanism 
by which culture influences visual perception. These theories suggest various 
factors that include traditional philosophies as a result of geography (Nisbett, 
2003), social organization exhibited as individualistic or collectivistic (Markus and 
Kitayama 1991), self-construal as a result of the social organization (Han et al. 
2013), sense of personal control (Zhao, Gersch, Schnitzer, Dosher, & Kowler, 2012), 
language (Senzaki, Masuda, & Ishii, 2014; Papafragou, Hulbert, & Trueswell, 2008), 
and structure of physical environment (Caparos, Ahmed,  Bremner, de 
Fockert, Linnell, & Davidoff, 2012; Miyamoto, Nisbett, & Masuda, 2006; Ueda & 
Komiya, 2012). Though these theories are all partially supported by existing 
evidence, the lack of consistency and the possible interactions among them remain 
unclear. Though credence can be given to social and physical environments 
directing cognition styles, the systematic review shows us that the holistic cognitive 
style of collectivism is mainly seen in Chinese participants and thus may be more 
characteristic of the Chinese culture. Likewise analytical cognitive style of 
individualism is mainly characteristic of the American culture. Therefore extending 
these concepts to the “East” and “West” lends itself to over generalizations. This is 
demonstrated in our subsequent studies in which collectivism and individualism 
were measured in the Indian and British groups but did not show a clear division 
between the two cultures. Despite this, differences in eye movements were seen in 
the scene perception task, though these differences did not necessarily align with 
what would have been expected assuming the UK to be an archetype of the 
individualistic “West” and India to be an archetype of the collectivist “East”. This 
would suggest that the differences are being driven by a factor(s) that can not be 
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strongly attributed to this specific concept of social organization. Previous studies 
that have utilized eye-tracking to measure cultural differences in eye movement 
during scene perception have shown more consistent and clearer differences in 
tasks that require more top-down processing like the use of native language to 
maneuver perception (Senzaki, Masuda, & Ishii, 2014; Masuda, Ishii, & Kimura, 
2016). Though cultural differences in our scene perception study were present, 
future research should investigate whether these differences continue to persist in 
different scene perception tasks that require different levels of attention. Similarly, 
with varying complexities of scenes—one focal object vs multiple focal objects.  
Differences in eye movements did not translate to the Silhouettes Subtest nor did 
differences appear in the features to which the participants felt they were 
attending. It is important to note that no previous study has investigated how eye 
movements differ between cultures when viewing objects with no background. 
Therefore eye movement data on the overall image were analyzed; there was no 
previous framework to base potential focal points on the silhouetted objects. 
Future research should look into whether cultural differences in eye movement 
become more apparent given different focal points and whether this differs in what 
participants feel they are attending to. Furthermore, it would also be important to 
investigate whether features that are considered to be diagnostic on a fully 
detailed image of the objects differ between cultures, and whether the loss in 
those features in the shadowed objects are contributing to the difference in 
performance. Alternatively, since differences in performance on the subtest 
between the Indians and the British can not be explained by eye movements, 
attention, or familiarity, from our results, this could imply that the driving factor 
may not have anything to do with over all differences in perception but rather 
differences specific to particular items. For example, a cork screw is not a 
culturally relevant object in India, therefore the low accuracy rate on that object 
would be expected. Similarly, Indians performed poorly on all of the four-legged 
animals compared to the norm: Bear, Rhinoceros, Sheep, and Cow. This might have 
more to do with the great diversity of four-legged animals that exist in India and 
therefore the silhouetted objects may not have been distinct enough for Indians to 
identify them correctly. It should be noted that British participants also performed 
poorly on the four-legged animals compared to the norm—the Indians and the 
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British performed comparably only on for the Sheep and the Cow—which might 
suggest that the general representation of these items may be out dated. 
Nonetheless, future research should conduct a more item-wise study and analysis, 
or consider aspects of stimulus saliency, e.g. frequency of exposure, as part of their 
experimental design. As discussed earlier, it may be that simple measures of 
familiarity are insufficient to detect differences in exposure to objects or 
differences in exposure to different representations of objects, across cultures. 
Therefore more detailed or sophisticated assessment of the salience of particular 
representations of objects may be required.  
Beyond just the studies conducted in this thesis, it would be important to 
acknowledge certain methodological gaps. When conducting scientific work, we aim 
to control for potentially influential factors so that we are able to make fair 
comparisons between data points. The better we are able to control for these 
factors, the better we are able to create models that allow us to make more 
precise predictions at a population level. The less standard these factors are, the 
more difficult it becomes to control for them. Countries categorized as developed, 
like the UK, are characterized as such because they possess technological 
advancements that place the country in a post-industrial period where as, 
developing nations, like India, are either in a pre-industrial or industrial era where 
the economy is more dependent on agriculture (Bell & Pavitt, 1997). Currently, 
developed nations tend to possess greater overall infrastructure and therefore tend 
to have greater order. This “order”, so to speak, allows for a more controlled 
environment and therefore factors like education, socioeconomic status, etc. are 
less varied than that seen in developing nations. In the case of this study, many 
factors that were unexpected that potentially could have influence performance 
were not accounted for. For examples, the inability of the researcher to conduct 
the studies in a quiet environment or even in the same environment in India—the 
researcher had to travel to various parts of Kolkata to meet participants, behavioral 
challenges that come with the researcher-participant dynamic, a relationship that 
is accentuated in India, inability of the researcher to consistently conduct the 
studies during business hours, and other behaviors that are part of the cultural 
norm in India. For example, many participants would divert from the study task to 
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engage in personal conversation. This would be considered normal in India as 
individuals feel more comfortable when they are able to connect with the people 
they are interacting with in any way. Certain other factors that were not accounted 
for include quality of education, caste, socioeconomic status, number of languages 
spoken by participants—people in India are typically multilingual and knowing 
between 3-6 different languages is not uncommon—language in which participants 
were taught, and standardized education curriculum taught to participants. As one 
can see, in some cases, factors controlled for in one environment may not 
necessarily apply in a different environment, and for other cases the method of 
controlling for certain factors may have to be adapted to the environments. Future 
research would benefit greatly in evaluating the research method itself when 
conducting cultural studies in two or more different environments. Similarly, care 
should be taken in cultural studies that are conducted in the same environment, 
e.g. comparing British individuals to Chinese individuals who have been residing in 
the UK for less than a year, in recognizing that results do not represent what might 
be seen if the studies were conducted in the respective countries of origin. 
Identifying the most appropriate sample size for studies in this area of research is 
challenging given the wide range of effect sizes apparent in previous research and a 
lack of clarity with regard to exactly what factors are driving differences between 
studies. Future studies might consider whether it is feasible for studies to estimate 
sample sizes required on the basis of recommendations regarding the minimal 
effect sizes that have practical significance. For example, Ferguson (2009) 
suggested that for social science data an effect size of d=0.41 reflects a minimal 
practically significant effect. This will lead to the need for a much larger sample 
size (e.g. a comparison between two groups would require a sample size of 190 
participants), which may not be easy to achieve.  
It is also important to note that the approach used in this thesis and in previous 
studies have been through the quantitative lens. Though very important, 
quantitative methods do not capture social nuances that may actually explain the 
“culture” portion of such cognitive work. In other words, understanding which 
aspect(s) of culture are contributing to differences in performance on visual 
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perceptual neuropsychological tests may be more fruitfully understood by 
implementing qualitative research methods. For example, conducting an 
ethnography in order to better understand social structures and interactions. This 
method would not only more accurately grasp telling characteristics of a culture, 
but will also allow space for capturing the smaller details that are lost in 
quantitative analysis. For example, it was common for family members or friends to 
be present in the room when the studies described above were conducted. This was 
not meant as a point of supervision, but rather a common mode of social 
interaction in India, mainly driven by curiosity. The presence of the family member/
friend, however, meant that from time to time, they would prompt the participant 
towards a particular answer. Though this might lead one to think that that data 
point is compromised, it is also the very thing that may be contributing to the 
“culture” portion of the study. Similarly, qualitative and quantitative methods can 
be used to understand how language can influence performances. For example, one 
could explore if performance would change if participants were administered the 
study in their first versus their second language verse the option to all known 
languages. Future studies should consider a more mixed methods approach in their 
experimental design. 
Overall, the findings of this thesis has added dimension to the understanding of how 
eye movements can differ between two cultural groups during scene perception. 
Furthermore, this thesis is the first to explore how eye-movements may differ on 
standardized visual perceptual tasks that consist of single objects. In addition, this 
thesis has provided an avenue to further explore the driving factors behind the 
performance differences on Silhouettes Subtest of the VOSP, thus potentially 
stimulating new research that may allow for the adaptation or development of a 
new, more culturally compatible visual perceptual neuropsychological assessment. 
It is important to recognize that when deciding whether adapting a 
neuropsychological assessment can be sufficient done by simply collecting local 
normative data, we must be conscious of the fact that in a different context, the 
test may engage different cognitive domains outside of the domain it is intended 
for. For example, the VOSP was created for the purpose of testing an individuals 
object and space perceptual abilities; However, this was created within the British 
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context. Therefore, though it may it may have been validated has an effective tool 
for detecting object/space perceptual impairment in the UK, when used in the 
Indian context, it is unclear what are driving performance differences and thus 
casting doubt onto whether the assessment is still testing for the same cognitive 
domain. It could be that performing the test uses different cognitive processes 
between cultures, thus what the test is actually assessing is different. It is, 
therefore, important to examine the validity of the test to properly understand 
what it is assessing and the extent to which it is sensitive to impairments it is 
intended to detect. This may involve first understanding the construct of interest, 
e.g. perception, within the new context in order to know how to measure it and 
thus develop a test that is suitable. This approach, hopefully, will not only improve 
an important health service, but Neuropsychology as a whole.  
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Key Terms Web of Science Ebscohost
Cultur* AND “visual percept*” AND “eye” AND “movement” 3 49
Cultur* AND “visual percept*” AND “eye movement” 2 37
Cultur* AND “eye movement” 133 369
Cross cultur* AND “eye movement” 17 47
Cross cultur* AND eye movement 54 132
Cultur* AND "cognitive style*" AND "eye movement" 1 2
Cultur* AND cognitive style* AND eye movement 7 4
Cultur* AND “visual search” AND “eye movement” 8 7
Cultur* AND visual search AND eye movement 39 15
Cultur* AND perception AND eye movement 210 210
Cultur* AND “eye movement*” 519 681
Cultur* AND percept* AND “eye track*” 85 107
Cultur* AND cognit* AND “eye track*” 54 104
Cultur* AND cognit* AND “eye movement*” 138 245
Cross cultur* AND “eye track*” 39 36
Cultur* AND “visual search” AND “eye track*” 7 6
Cultur* AND “visual percept*” AND fixation 14 93
Cultur* AND “visual percept*” AND “fix* pattern*” 3 5
Cultur* AND “visual*” AND “fix* pattern*” 12 11
Cultur* AND attention* AND “eye movement” 55 42
Cultur* AND attent* AND “eye movement” 55 42
Cultur* AND attent* AND “eye track*” 84 99
Cultur* AND “eye track*” 176 217
Cultur* AND “eye fix*” 18 113
Cultur* AND “fixation pattern*” 27 12
Cultur* AND saccade* 68 85
Cultur* AND “free search” 6 4
Cultur* AND "free search" AND "eye track*" 0 1
Cultur* AND "search task" AND "eye track*" 2 2
Cultur* AND "search task" AND "eye movement*" 5 8
Cultur* AND "percept* process*" AND "eye movement*" 8 4
Cultur* AND "percept* process*" AND "eye track*" 4 1
Cultur* AND percept* process* AND "eye track*" 49 5
Cultur* AND “information process*” AND “eye movement*” 7 9
Cultur* AND “information process*” AND “eye track” 0 2
Cultur* AND information process* AND eye track 59 2
Cultur* AND “information process*” AND “fix* pattern*” 0 2
Cultur* AND information process* AND fix* pattern* 142 1
Cultur* AND “information process*” AND saccade* 2 2
Cultur* AND select* attent* AND “eye movement*” 17 3
Cultur* AND select* attent* AND “eye track*” 8 3
Cultur* AND select* attent* AND “fix* pattern*” 1 2
Cultur* AND select* attent* AND saccade* 7 2
Total Number in Search Results
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Key Terms Web of Science Ebscohost
Cultur* AND “scene percept*” 20 12
Cultur* AND “object perception” 13 18
Cultur* AND “scan* path*” 11 11
Cultur* AND “visual scan*” 26 19
Cultur* AND percept* AND fMRI 168 184
Cultur* AND percept* AND functional magnetic resonance imag* 109 169
Cultur* AND “visual percept*” AND neural 210 178
Cultur* AND “visual process*” 128 174
Cultur* AND “object process*” 19 7
“Self construal*” AND “eye movement*” 2 1
“Self construal*” AND “visual percept*” 7 12
“Self construal*” AND “visual atten*” 4 6
“Self construal*” AND “visual search*” 0 2828
“Self construal*” AND “visual scan*” 0 2690
“Self construal*” AND “visual processing*” 2 1
“Self construal” AND “visual” 24 29
Cultur* AND percept* AND EEG 77 92
Interdepend* AND independ* AND “visual attent*” 10 11
Holistic* AND analytic* AND “visual percept*” 66 160
Holistic* AND analytic* AND “visual attent*” 13 14
Interdepend* AND independ* AND “visual percept*” 27 45
Priming AND “visual percept*” AND “eye movement*” 115 194
Ethnic* AND "visual percept*" AND "eye movement*" 4 25
Ethnic* AND "visual percept*" 161 556
Ethnic* AND "visual attent*" 31 38
Cultur* AND “categor* percept*” 76 80
Cultur* AND “event related potential” AND percept* 52 36
Cultur* AND global AND local AND “eye movement*” 7 3
Cultur* AND “event related potential” AND “visual attent*” 1 1
Cultur* AND “visual* illusion” AND “eye move*” 1 1
Cultur* AND “visual* illusion*” 29 21
Cultur* AND “geometric* pattern*” AND “fMRI” 0 2
Cultur* AND “geometric* pattern*” AND “MRI” 2 1
Cultur* AND “geometric* pattern*” AND “eye track*” 0 2
Cultur* AND “geometric* pattern*” AND “eye movement*” 0 2
Cultur* AND “geometric* pattern*” AND “EEG” 2 0
Total 3562 10446
Number of Articles Excluded
Total Searches 14008
After Duplicate Removal 4718
Tittle Selection 307 4411
Abstract Selection 124 183
Full Paper Selection 38 86












Study must include technological evidence in conjunction with the 
behavioral evidence (use of an eye-tracker, fMRI, EEG, ERP, etc.)
Paper must be a pubished article and not a book, conference abstract, 
dissertation, etc.
Must be written in English.
Be reported in studies with participants who are 18 years and above
Must pertain to scene and object visual perception but not the 
Studies must be quantitative
Must include more than one cultural groups/environment.
Sample must be healthy
Article Criteria Not Fullfilled
Jiang et al. 2019 3,7
Martin et al. 2019 3
Fung et al. 2018 3
Li et al. 2018 3
Steinmetz et al. 2018 7
Ksander et al. 2018 7
Wong et al. 2018 7
Tang et al. 2018 3
Shabalina et al. 2018 1
Wang et al. 2017 3
Alsaffar et al. 2017 3
Hakim et al. 2017 7
Golubickis et al. 2017 5,7
Liddell et al. 2017 3
Varnum et al. 2017 3
Masuda et al. 2017 7
Kardan et al. 2017 3
Muehlenbeck et al. 2017 2
Rozin et al. 2016 7
Lee et al. 2016 8
Chizari et al. 2016 8
Choi et al. 2016 7
﻿Muehlenbeck et al. 2016 2
Rhode et al. 2016 7
Cramer et al. 2016 7
Saner et al. 2015 8
Duan et al. 2015 8
Goeke et al. 2015 7
Sohn et al. 2014 1
Yoon et al. 2014 7
﻿Luliucci et al. 2014 3
Han et al. 2014 2
Lim et al. 2013 3
Kincl et al. 2013 5
Shin et al. 2012 1
Yang et al. 2011 3
Matzen et al. 2011 4
Gutchess et al. 2011 4
Chokran et al. 2011 8
Adams et al. 2010 3
Kelly et al. 2010 3
Fung et al. 2010 3
Ames et al. 2010 4
Goh and Park 2009 4
Article Criteria Not Fullfilled
Chiao et al. 2009 3
Dong et al. 2008 3
Zhou et al. 2008 7
Masuda et al. 2008 1
Davidoff et al. 2008* 7
Becker er al. 2008 3
Han and Northoff, 2008 4
Davidoff et al. 2008* 7
de Fockert et al. 2007 7
Takata 2007 1
Sui et al. 2007 3,7
Jain et al. 2007 5
﻿Kobayashi et al. 2006 7
Hot et al. 2006 3
Gordon et al. 2006 3
Miyamoto et al. 2006 7
Masuda and Nisbett 2006 7
Nisbett et al. 2005 4
Zentall et al. 2005 4
﻿Kozhevnikov et al. 2005 4,7
Gajewski and Henderson 2005 5
Byrd et al. 2004 7
Kuhnen and Hannover 2003 3,7
Sanoki et al. 2003 7
Hernandez and Iyengar 2001 4
Eme and Marquer 1998 7
Ardilla et al. 1995 4
Bertenthal et al. 1993 7
Goncharova 1991 0
Coren et al. 1989 7
Magaro and Moss 1989 5








Woods and Toal 1957 7
*two different papers
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Summary of EEG Waves 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) is a technique used to record brain activity over 
time. The activity recorded are electrical impulses caused by a flow of ions into or 
out of the postsynaptic cell. Electrodes attached around the head of a participant 
detect the collective excitation and inhibition of synapses resulting from this flow 
of ions, thus producing a wave that represents the summation of the positive and 
negative charges. Various characteristics of the wave, such as time, frequency, 
amplitude and scalp location, allow for meaning to be drawn about the brain's 

























































The P1 wave refers to the positive wave that peaks at about 100 ms after a stimulus 
presentation and the N1 wave refers to the negative wave that peaks between 
90-200ms after stimulus presentation. Both waves are thought to reflect orientation 
and attention to the processing of visual stimuli.  
The N2 wave refers to the negative wave that appears about 200 ms after stimulus 
onset and represents the detection of mismatching or incongruent stimuli, cognitive 
control in quick decision-making, and the detection of rare, but relevant stimuli 
based on physical properties. Therefore, in a 3-stimulus oddball paradigm, one 
would expect to see a greater negative N2 wave when presented with the target 
stimulus. 
The Novelty P3 wave refers to the positive wave that appears 360-450 ms after 
stimulus onset, and shows a maximum amplitude located around the fronto-central 
regions of the scalp. The amplitude is directly correlated to the amount of 
attention given to a stimuli that appears on occasion but is not what is actively 
sought out for. For example, in the 3-stimulus oddball paradigm, one would expect 
to see an increase in Novelty P3 amplitude upon the appearance of the non-target, 
distractor object. The P300/P3/Target P3 wave refers to the third positive ERP 
wave that appears 300-400 ms after stimulus onset. This wave shows a maximum 
amplitude located around the parieto-occipital regions and is thought to represent 
neural activity involved in detecting rare, but meaningful events. The amplitude is 
directly correlated to the allocation of attention given towards the stimulus that 
one is actively searching for. For example, in the 3-stimulus oddball paradigm, one 
would expect to see an increase in Target P3 amplitude upon the appearance of the 
target object. The Slow Wave (SW) is thought to be an extension of the Target P3 
waves that represents rehearsal and semantic elaboration of the presented 
stimulus.  
The N350 wave refers to the collection of waves that peak at various time points 
between 200-400 ms post stimulus presentation. The wave represents object 
knowledge and categorization, and its amplitude is indirectly related to one’s 
 192
familiarity with the object, irrespective of being able to name it. Therefore, one 
would expect that greater exposure to a particular object, leading to a greater 
detailed memory representation of it, would elicit a smaller N350 wave if presented 
with the same/similar object in the future. The LPC is also a collection of waves 
that represents object identification, memory, and decision making, however, it is 
directly related to one’s knowledge of an object and ability to name it. 
The N400 wave refers to the negative wave that appears 400 ms after stimulus 
onset and is thought to represent semantic processing. Its amplitude is inversely 
correlated to the degree to which stimuli are semantically related, and to cloze 
probability, or the probability that the semantics of the target is sensical or 
expected. For example, one would expect a greater N400 wave if presented with a 
nonsensical image, thus showing a greater demand in cognitive processing for more 
ambiguous semantic information.   
Features Attended 
The following are the features that at least 30% of participants in each cultural 
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